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Abstract 
Intergenerational economic mobility goes to the heart of our understanding of fairness in 
society. It captures the way in which life chances are shaped by background, opportunity 
and effort. The degree of intergenerational economic mobility indicates the nature and 
characteristics of social and economic processes, suggests directions for public policies, 
and has important implications for social cohesion and economic efficiency. While 
Australia has historically been identified as a highly egalitarian society (the land of the ‘fair 
go’), there are growing concerns that this may no longer be the case. This thesis 
constitutes the first study that systematically examines the degree of intergenerational 
economic mobility in contemporary Australia. It contributes to the literature by laying out a 
conceptual framework that maps the relationship between intergenerational economic 
mobility and social mobility, outlining the key measures of intergenerational economic 
mobility, and providing new empirical evidence of the effect of family background on adult 
children’s economic outcomes and behaviours.  
 
I focus on three measures of intergenerational economic mobility: income mobility, wealth 
transfers, and the effect of family background on adult children’s financial practices. First, I 
use father-son earnings elasticities to measure intergenerational income mobility. Second, 
I study the effect of family background and life events of children on the probability and 
amount of wealth transfers from parents to children. Third, I explore the intergenerational 
and intragenerational determinants of adult children’s bank account choices (an important 
aspect of their financial practices). All analyses are undertaken using the Household, 
Income and Labour Dynamics in Australia Survey. This is the largest and longest running 
household panel survey in Australia, and is largely representative of the contemporary 
Australian population. These data are modelled using innovative, state-of-the-art statistical 
techniques for the analysis of panel data. 
 
In my first empirical chapter, I find that the father-son earnings elasticity in Australia 
between 2001 and 2013 ranges from 0.11 to 0.30 (with the preferred estimates lying 
between 0.24 and 0.28). Such elasticity was found to increase over the observation 
window. Elasticity estimates vary depending on the level of occupational (dis)aggregation 
and earnings measure used: they are highest when two-digit level occupations and hourly 
earnings are used, and lowest when four-digit level occupations and annual earnings are 
used. A statistically significant correlation between earnings elasticity and Gini coefficients 
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supports the argument that economic mobility is inversely associated with economic 
inequality. 
 
Results from my second empirical chapter reveal that parental characteristics are strongly 
associated with the probability of adult children receiving wealth transfers from their 
parents. Individuals who at age 14 had parents who were employed, had not had a long-
term unemployment spell, had degree-level education, worked in high-level occupations, 
or never separated/divorced, were more likely to receive parental wealth transfers, and to 
receive greater dollar amounts. The predicted probabilities and amounts of parental wealth 
transfers are consistently higher for adult children from middle/high socioeconomic 
backgrounds than for adult children from low socioeconomic backgrounds, and this pattern 
of advantage persists over their adult life courses. In addition, there are differences by 
socioeconomic background in wealth transfer patterns at children’s major life events. 
 
In my third and final empirical chapter I find evidence of substantial intra-generational and 
intergenerational impacts on partnered children’s financial practices. Within-couple bank 
account choices are contingent on economic factors (e.g. personal income), life-course 
factors (e.g. the presence of children), and socio-cultural factors (e.g. gender-role 
attitudes). Importantly, family background plays a role in influencing individuals’ bank 
account choices: high maternal education is an important precursor of daughters’ separate 
bank account ownership, and higher parental socioeconomic status is related to couple 
members’ separate banking behaviours.  
 
These findings have significant implications. In many respects, contemporary Australia 
may not be considered as an egalitarian society. Intergenerational income immobility is 
moderate, but is growing mirroring current dynamics of economic inequality. In addition, 
there remains a persistent gap in parental wealth transfers by socioeconomic status over 
children’s life courses. This may constitute an important driver of the intergenerational 
transmission of (dis)advantage, and calls for further research on its flow-on consequences 
on life domains such as children’s cognitive and non-cognitive skills, socioeconomic 
attainment, health and wellbeing. Furthermore, my findings suggest that current trends of 
increased female educational attainment may result in increased financial autonomy of 
adult women in future Australian generations.  
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Altogether, my thesis highlights that scholarship on intergenerational economic mobility 
must move beyond simple analyses of the extent of intergenerational (im)mobility, paying 
more attention to the mechanisms which produce and reproduce it. Gaining this 
knowledge is essential to devising ways of creating fairer societies in a rapidly changing 
macro-level environment characterised by higher education expansion, the 
internationalisation of labour markets, global economic uncertainty, and a progressive 
redefinition of gender roles. Younger generations will face more economic opportunities 
than older generations, but will do so in the face of increased economic inequalities. 
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1 Introduction 
 
This thesis constitutes the first study that systematically examines the degree of 
intergenerational economic mobility in contemporary Australia. Studying intergenerational 
economic mobility is important, because it is fundamental to our understanding of fairness 
in society. Intergenerational economic mobility captures the way in which life chances are 
shaped by background, opportunity and effort. Its level indicates the nature and 
characteristics of social and economic processes, suggests directions for public policies, 
and has important implications for social cohesion and economic efficiency.  
 In this thesis, I aim to address the following research questions. (i) What is 
intergenerational economic mobility, and how do we measure intergenerational economic 
mobility? (ii) What are the patterns and dynamics of intergenerational income mobility in 
contemporary Australia? (iii) What are the predictors of the likelihood and magnitude of 
parental wealth transfers in contemporary Australia, and how do parental wealth transfers 
differ by parental socioeconomic status over children’s life course? (iv) How does family 
background impact on adult children’s economic behaviours in contemporary Australia? 
 To motivate the conceptual discussions and empirical analyses on intergenerational 
economic mobility in chapters 2 to 5, this chapter provides requisite contextual information 
on (i) the history of social mobility in Australia, and (ii) normative judgements and 
conventional measures of intergenerational economic mobility. This chapter also 
overviews the conceptual framework proposed, data and methods used, contributions and 
structure of the thesis.  
 
1.1 The land of the “fair go”: A brief history of social mobility in Australia  
 
1.1.1 Social mobility in colonial Australia 
 
Australia has long prided itself as being the land of the “fair go”: a classless, 
meritocratic society with equality of opportunity for everyone regardless of their gender, 
age, race and ethnicity (Connell & Irving, 1992; Saunders, 2004; Thompson, 1994). Its 
early settlement by British convicts provided a unique historical context in which everyone 
had a “fair go” and hard work, rather than family background, led to success1 (Leigh, 
                                                          
1 Inequality in economic resources among British settlers was lower than at any other point in 
Australian history (Leigh, 2013). 
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2007). Family background, in fact, played little role in determining individuals’ lives in 
colonial Australia (1788-1901). Georgiana McCrae, daughter of the Duke of Gordon, led a 
frugal life in Melbourne after moving to Australia, a life in stark contrast to her privileged life 
as a member of the upper class back in England (Niall, 1994). In contrast, Caroline 
Chisholm, the wife of a British soldier, worked hard to house, educate and employ 
immigrant women, becoming recognised as a leading social reformer and remembered 
across Australian generations (Walker, 2011). Born to a Scottish poet and lyricist, Walter 
Hume accrued power and prestige in colonial Queensland through personal merits 
(ambition, courage, hard work, energy and perseverance), capital gain (ownership of land 
and property) and attainment of networks with people in power (Augustus Gregory, the 
Surveyor General and Commissioner for Lands, and William Tully, the Under-Secretary for 
Public Land) (Davies, 2009).  
More generally, colonial Australia is considered to be ‘classless’ due to (i) the 
absence of an aristocracy and land gentry, and (ii) the absence of class deference, which 
was a prominent part of European class practice and experience. This can be exemplified 
by the widely quoted “Jack thought himself as good as his master” (Connell & Irving, 1992: 
12). Relatively high standards of living for significant parts of the working class, reasonably 
high demand of labour, early achievement of political democracy and autonomy, and the 
success of labour organisations are important contributors to the formation of a classless 
colonial society and to the widespread belief in classlessness (Connell & Irving, 1992; 
Wells, 1989). The simple and fluid social structure also provided tremendous opportunities 
for ‘ordinary’ people like Caroline Chisholm and Walter Hume to experience upward social 
mobility in colonial Australia (Davies, 2009).2  
Colonial Australia also pioneered a series of social and political reforms that 
promoted equality of opportunity and symbolised democracy in the workplace. As 
described in Whiteford (2013: 10): “Australian colonies in the 19th Century included the first 
jurisdictions to introduce the eight hour day (1856), among the first where women won the 
vote (1894), the first Labour Party government in the world (1899), and among the first to 
use the secret ballot (1856)”. Such strong union movement with progressive social policies 
earned Australia the reputation of being “the working man’s paradise” (Lane, 1892): a land 
                                                          
2 For example, the population of Queensland before 1870s was small. The social structure had 
squatters at the top due to their legislative, judicial and media controls, a small middle class, and 
the majority of rural and railway workers at the bottom. The growing middle class after 1870s 
increased their influence in legislative, judicial and media institutions (Davies, 2009).  
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free of social hierarchies and a country that offers jobs and decent lives to everybody 
regardless of their social origins.  
 
1.1.2 Social mobility in post-colonial Australia 
 
Labour movement continued to shape the social fabric in post-colonial Australia, 
with its statutory wage regulation system and universal social security provision identifying 
Australia a unique model of “wage-earners’ welfare state” (Castles, 1985). While this 
welfare state model was predicated on white male full-time employment in the labour 
market, it effectively offered a viable social safety net for the working class and delivered 
strong egalitarian outcomes for the first 80 years after colonisation (Castles, 1985).  
However, post-colonial Australia also saw changes in the formation of social 
hierarchies and signs of variations of economic mobility, characterised by race-based 
immigration legislations, inequality of property ownership, falls and growth of income and 
wealth inequality, and a rapidly rising class of elites who dominated the country (O'Lincoln, 
1996; Murray, 2006).  
First, a set of “White Australia” policies that aimed to restrict immigrant intake based 
on the origin country of the applicants and deport non-white immigrants already in 
Australia was passed after the Federation of Australia, with the Immigration Restriction Act 
1901 and the Pacific Island Labourers Act 1901 being the most representative legislations 
(London, 1970; Willard, 1978). The Migration Act 1966 dismantled the White Australia 
policies and legalised equality of immigration, and the Racial Discrimination Act 1975 
officially brought the White Australia policies to an end (Tavan, 2005). These “White 
Australia” policies from the early 1900s to the mid 1970s undermined the cultural legacy of 
egalitarianism established during colonial Australia and excluded non-European, non-
British immigrants from equal chance of living and working in Australia.  
Second, land holdings became more concentrated after the Federation of Australia. 
Figure 1-1 shows that the Gini coefficient for the concentration of land holdings increased 
from 0.73 in 1910 to 0.81 in 1971. Similarly, the Theil index increased from 0.49 to 0.61 
over the same time period (Frankema, 2006). These metrics suggest a high level of 
inequality in land ownership and a trend towards a more unequal distribution of land 
holdings in post-colonial Australia. 
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Figure 1-1 Gini coefficient and Theil index for the concentration of land holdings 
after the Federation of Australia 
Notes: Figure reproduced by the author. 
Source: Frankema, 2006, Table A.1. 
 
Third, post-colonial Australia also saw changes in the distributions of income and 
wealth. Leigh (2013) used historical data and compiled the long-run trends of income and 
wealth shares of top earners in Australia since 1910 (Figures 1-2 and 1-3). These figures 
show that, from the 1910s to the late 1970s, the income share for the top 1% dropped from 
12% to 5%, and their wealth share dropped from 34% to 7%. From the 1980s to 2010, 
their income and wealth shares rose to 9% and 11%, respectively, back to the respective 
levels in the 1940s (Leigh, 2013; Perez-Arce & Mishra, 2015). These increases in the 
income and wealth shares of top earners indicate growing income and wealth inequality in 
Australian society.  
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Figure 1-2 Share of income received by top earners in post-colonial Australia, 1910-
2010 
Notes: Figure reproduced as a screenshot. 
Source: Leigh, 2013, Figure 4. 
 
 
Figure 1-3 Share of wealth by top earners in post-colonial Australia, 1915-2010 
Notes: Figure reproduced as a screenshot. 
Source: Leigh, 2013, Figure 6. 
 
Finally, capitalists in post-colonial Australia became the “ruling class” based on their 
ownership of productive resources, and exerted power and control over politics, 
businesses and mass media (Connell, 1977; O'Lincoln, 1996; Kuhn, 2004; Murray, 2006; 
Piketty, 2014; Western & Western, 1988). The main form of ruling-class organisation in 
Australia is company (Connell, 1977). The top 10% owned 86% of company shares in the 
Australian stock exchange market, 62% of rental properties, 60% of cash deposits and 
50% of business assets in 2003 (Murray, 2006). The directors of the top twenty Australian 
companies in the Australian stock exchange held an average of 2.2 directorships on the 
boards of other corporations in 2004 (Pietsch, 2004). Capitalists also have strong influence 
in politics, set the policy agenda, and build political consensus and awareness of common 
interests within the ruling class (Pietsch, 2004). For example, Frank Lowy, Chairman of 
Westfield Corporation, sat on the board of the Reserve Bank of Australia, chaired the 
board of the Australian Soccer Association, and advised the then Prime Minister John 
Howard on foreign relations (Mellish, 2004; Pietsch, 2004). 
Altogether, race-based immigration legislations, concentration in land ownership, 
growing income and wealth inequality in recent decades, and the ruling class of capitalists 
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raise concerns that the egalitarian tradition in Australia is under threat and that the “fair go” 
may have “fair gone”.  
A number of other commentators have also drawn attention to a wider range of 
social indicators which suggest that contemporary Australia is becoming less open to 
intergenerational mobility and that economic and social inequality is becoming more 
entrenched. Using annual panel data from the Survey of Employment and Unemployment 
Patterns stretching from 1995 to 1997, Abello and Harding (2006) found that 28% of 
Australian children experienced financial disadvantage in at least one of these three years, 
and 12% of all Australian children lived in households suffering persistent financial 
disadvantage. Using the FaCS Transgenerational Dataset (1996-1999) that contains 
selected information from Family Allowance and income support records of 85% of 
Australian young people born between January and March 1980, Pech and McCoull 
(2000) found that young Australians from welfare-recipient families are 5 times more likely 
to become welfare recipients themselves than their peers from high income families. 
These results suggest a great degree of intergenerational welfare dependence among low-
income Australian families.  
Moreover, rising cost of childcare, job casualisation, computerisation and 
automation, and the decline in housing affordability and in the stock of public housing are 
hitting households from low socioeconomic backgrounds the most.  
First, the rate of formal childcare used by families with children between the age of 
0 and 11 increased from 13.4% in 1996 to 23.7% in 2011, and the gross cost of childcare 
grew from an average of $30 per day in 2003 to an average of $75 per day in 2013 
(NATSEM, 2014). Although the Commonwealth Government provides two forms of fee 
assistance: Child Care Benefit (means-tested, targeted at low income families) and Child 
Care Rebate (universal, providing a rebate of 50% of out-of-pocket costs) (Productivity 
Commission, 2016), the economic gain associated with returning to work is negligible for 
mothers from low income families with 1-2 children, and affordability remains a major issue 
for low socioeconomic families (The Senate Education and Employment References 
Committee, 2014; NATSEM, 2014). 
Second, the proportion of wage and salary earners working on a casual basis 
increased from 21.5% in 1992 to 23.9% in 2013 (Kryger, 2015). It is estimated that 40% of 
jobs in Australia will be susceptible to computerisation and automation in the next 10 to 15 
years, with jobs in hospitality, transport, retail and administration sectors being most at risk 
(Durrant-Whyte et al., 2015). 
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Third, the median house prices (all residential dwellings sold) increased by 263% 
from 1991 to 2011, whereas the median after-tax household income grew by ‘just’ 95% 
over the same time period, which indicates that income growth is far from catching up with 
the growth of housing prices (NATSEM, 2011). The share of the public housing stock over 
the national dwelling stock decreased steadily from 5.2% in 1996 to 4.1% in 2011 
(Groenhart & Burke, 2014), and the number of new allocations to public housing declined 
by 35% from 31,000 in 2004 to 20,000 in 2009 (The Senate Economics References 
Committee, 2015). The decline in the supply of public housing was, however, 
accompanied by an increase in the demand: the number of applicants on the waiting list 
for public housing increased by 8% from 2009 (147,065) to 2013 (158,971) (AIHW, 2014). 
Taken together, persistent financial disadvantage, transgenerational welfare 
dependence, rising cost of childcare, job casualisation and automation, and declines in 
housing affordability are likely leading contemporary Australia towards the immobile end of 
the international comparative range (Argy, 2006).3 
 
1.1.3 “Fair go” for all? 
 
                                                          
3 Using an approach of group-level rare surname analysis proposed in Clark (2014), Clark et al. 
(2017) recently argued that status persistence in Australia was strong throughout 1870-2017, with 
an intergenerational correlation of 0.7-0.8 and no change over time, suggesting that Australian 
long-run social mobility rates are as low as those in the UK and US. Data in Clark et al. (2017) 
come from the electoral rolls and records of graduates from Melbourne and Sydney universities, 
tracing a set of elite rare surnames in 1900. However, Torche and Corvalan (2016) show that 
surname-level estimate of persistence is not comparable with individual-level estimate 
conventionally used by mobility researchers: “using surname-level income averages is an 
inappropriate strategy if the intent is to understand mobility of individuals” (Torche & Corvalan, 
2016: 4). Additionally, “Clark’s findings of high and stable intergenerational persistence is an 
artifact of his selection of what he calls elite … groups in the contexts he examines” (Torche & 
Corvalan, 2016: 4), because these elite groups are “historically shaped by widely diverging 
historical advantages” (Torche & Corvalan, 2016: 21). “[T]he level of surname-aggregate 
persistence depends on the groups being chosen for the analysis and … it can be higher, of similar 
magnitude, or lower (or even have different signs) than estimates of individual-level persistence 
traditionally used by the mobility literature” (Torche & Corvalan, 2016: 5). Therefore, caution needs 
to be exercised when comparing intergenerational correlation in Australia in Clark et al. (2017) with 
intergenerational earnings elasticities estimated using individual-level data in conventional 
economic literature. 
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While Australia has historically been considered as the land of the “fair go”, and it 
has shown comparatively high levels of social mobility for Anglo-Celtic and European men, 
there have been systematic structural inequalities in society in relation to Aboriginality, 
gender and country of origin.  
Indigenous children have been forcibly separated from their families and 
communities, and Indigenous people exploited for their labour, under constant 
surveillance, and subject to severe discrimination since the very first days of the European 
occupation of Australia (Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission, 1997). The 
forcible removal and the associated legislations effectively created the “Stolen 
Generations” and had profound impact on the Indigenous families (Read, 2006).  
Women in Australia had historically lower socioeconomic standing than men: 
married women were barred for employment in public sectors until 1966, women were not 
integrated in the military until the late 1970s, and a married woman’s passport application 
had to be authorised by her husband until 1983 (Stilinovic, 2017). Today, women in 
Australia continue to earn less than men for the same jobs, engage in more low paid, 
casual and part-time work than men do, and be significantly underrepresented in 
leadership positions in government and industry (Human Rights and Equal Opportunity 
Commission, 2008). The Australian workforce is highly segregated by gender and female-
dominated industries have been historically undervalued (Australian Human Rights 
Commission, 2014).  
Immigrants from non-English speaking backgrounds consistently face racism and 
discrimination in Australia, dating back to the violence and hostility towards Asian gold 
miners in the 1850s and race-based White Australian policies over three quarters of the 
20th century. Policies of racial assimilation “also found Southern and Eastern European 
immigrants subject to harassment and discrimination” (Chan, 1997: 16). Since the 1980s, 
Asian and Arab Australians were found to most likely experience harassment and 
violence, and Asian youths were “increasingly the targets of racist comments and 
discrimination in schools and workplaces” (Chan, 1997: 16). Modern day immigrants also 
experience multiple barriers to inclusion such as housing, employment and social 
participation (Ethnic Communities’ Council of Victoria, 2009; Kosny et al., 2017; Taylor, 
2004).  
These literatures are not about social mobility per se, but distributional outcomes 
and generative power relations (i.e. socio-structural relations which generate systematic 
inequalities in life chances, life outcomes, the distribution of valued social rewards, and 
relations of power and control). Collectively, these structural inequalities faced by 
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Indigenous Australians, women and immigrants suggest that considerable policy effort 
may be needed to accomplish equality of opportunity for all. 
 
1.2 Good or bad: Normative judgement of intergenerational economic immobility 
 
In an economically immobile society parental socioeconomic statuses are strongly 
replicated by the socioeconomic status of their children (Blanden, 2009). In such a society, 
parental resources become an important determinant of children’s status attainment 
(Erola, Jalonen & Lehti, 2016), and family background, rather than individual talents and 
merits, determines economic success. This gives rise to a process of status replication, 
whereby heredity becomes a prevailing pathway into power and prestige and poverty and 
adversity are largely inherited.  
Intergenerational economic immobility is typically thought to have deleterious 
consequences for families and societies. At the societal level, economic immobility 
potentially erodes social cohesion and solidarity. Social cohesion refers to “the extent of 
connectedness and solidarity among groups in society” (Kawachi & Berkman, 2007: 174). 
It involves the absence of social conflict, the presence of social bonds, and high trust in 
civil society (Cumberland Lodge, 2017). There is more social cohesion if individuals trust 
that they are able to achieve social and economic success through their efforts and 
abilities (Cobb-Clark, 2010). Conversely, if socioeconomic success is attained 
predominantly through the reproduction of parental status, social conflict is more likely to 
occur. In addition, economic immobility likely leads to economic inefficiency. This is 
because talented individuals born to families with low socioeconomic background may not 
live up to their productive potential due to under-development of their skills and under-
utilisation of their talents (Blanden, 2009; Cobb-Clark, 2010). As a consequence, there is 
efficiency loss in economically immobile societies.   
It is important to note three caveats regarding the normative argument that 
economic immobility should be avoided. The first caveat is that a detailed conceptual 
analysis of equality of opportunity may itself not stand up to theoretical scrutiny4 (Fishkin, 
                                                          
4 Equality of opportunity is a critical link between economic inequality and mobility. As Brunori et al. 
(2013: 17) pointed out, “if higher inequality makes intergenerational mobility more difficult, it is 
likely because opportunities for economic advancement are more unequally distributed among 
children. Conversely, the way lower mobility may contribute to the persistence of income inequality 
is through making opportunity sets very different among the children of the rich and the children of 
the poor.” The intergenerational consequence of inequality of opportunity is immobility across 
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2013). We use different conceptual tools on different domains of equal opportunity: we talk 
about contests (such as college admissions or job recruitments) in terms of merit and 
discrimination, whereas we consider educational opportunities in different schools 
predominantly in developmental terms instead of meritocratic ones.5 Therefore, 
discussions on different domains of equal opportunity—contests and educational 
opportunities in different schools—present inconsistent explanations of equality of 
opportunity—in meritocratic terms (for contests) vis-à-vis in developmental terms (for 
educational opportunities in different schools). 
Breaking down the analysis of equal opportunity into specific domains narrows our 
focus and limits our ability to ask many broader questions: discussions on college 
admissions are, for example, narrowly focused on how admissions could provide equal 
opportunity, rather than why the openings are scarce in the first place, and how the 
competitions fit into the trajectories of the contestants’ lives.  
Focusing on each domain in isolation also ignores the dynamics of the interactions 
between outcomes and equal opportunities: our college admission decisions shape the 
qualifications and skills of college graduates, which continue to influence the outcomes of 
their competitions in the labour market. Previous developmental opportunities bring new 
opportunities. Viewing each domain of equal opportunity in isolation would therefore miss 
the inter-relationships between these domains. We therefore need to consider the 
longitudinal dependencies and the interdependency of life domains. 
The second caveat is that a fully mobile society, characterised by a zero correlation 
between social origins (i.e. parents) and destinations (i.e. children), may not be 
achievable. Complete mobility refers to a society in which parental background has no 
effect on children’s social and economic outcomes: children born within adverse family 
backgrounds can move just as easily up to the top as children born to affluent families 
moving down to the bottom. While this level of mobility sounds appealing, it is likely to be 
unachievable for two reasons. First, since part of the correlation between origins and 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
generations: “a much higher rate of transmission of economic advantage at the very top” (Corak, 
2013a: 80). 
5 For example, differences in early educational outcomes reflect the presence and accumulation of 
(dis)advantage due to inequalities in the socioeconomic statuses of schools and family background 
(Lee & Burkam, 2002), and such differences in early education are a key contributor of the greater 
divergence in children’s achievements in higher education and labour market. 
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destinations comes about through assortative mating6, the process of partner selection 
has to be randomised to achieve zero intergenerational correlation. However, spousal 
selection has found to be non-random (Bateson, 1983). Therefore, the correlation between 
origins and destinations cannot be reduced to zero. Second, even if we were able to 
reduce the intergenerational correlation to zero, it would imply complete upward and 
downward mobility. This is likely to be politically infeasible, because public policies are 
made to improve upward mobility and reduce downward mobility. Public policies aimed at 
improving social justice need to “grow the pie” across generations to promote 
intergenerational upward mobility for all. For example, mass expansion of compulsory 
education (an important way to “grow the pie”) is likely to improve intergenerational upward 
mobility for all, because even in the most disadvantaged families, children will be better 
educated than their parents, and as a result, upward mobility takes place even among the 
population at the bottom of distribution by socioeconomic status. 
The third caveat is that intergenerational immobility may come about because of 
social and economic inequality, which enables advantaged parents to confer advantages 
onto their offspring. Conversely, this situation reduces the chances of children from 
adverse background to move out of adversity. Inequality is often thought to have 
pernicious effects on the progress of society (see e.g. Wilkinson & Pickett, 2009), but 
some would argue that we need inequality to disproportionately reward people for effort 
and training and to ensure that socially valued scarce positions are filled by the brightest 
talents (Davis & Moore, 1945; Milner, 1987; Tumin, 1953). Proponents of this argument 
claim that some positions in society are functionally more important than others, and 
require special skills which only the most talented individuals with specialised training can 
have. To motivate these individuals to acquire the necessary skills and incentivise them to 
fill in these important positions, society needs to offer these talents “privileged and 
disproportionate access to the scarce and desired reward” (Tumin, 1953: 387). While there 
is abundant criticism of this perspective (see e.g. Bredemeier & Stephenson, 1962; De 
Maio, 2009), this “functional necessity” thesis of social stratification remains one of the 
most influential perspectives in sociology and has recently gained momentum (Hauhart, 
2003).  
                                                          
6 Assortative mating refers to the process of partner selection through which individuals with similar 
social, economic and cultural characteristics mate and marry one another (Lam, 1988; Mare, 
1991). Examples of these characteristics include education, ethnicity, religion, occupation and 
wealth.  
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In economics, similar arguments point towards the equity-efficiency trade off (Okun, 
1975) that stimulated widespread and long-standing debates. It is argued that inequality is 
beneficial for the growth of the economy for two reasons. First, since investment is a key 
source of economic growth and comes primarily from the wealthy, a smaller share of 
income for the wealthy resulting from less inequality should lead to less investment. This 
would in turn reduce economic growth. Second, an equal distribution of income and a 
highly redistributive system through high income tax rates create fewer monetary 
incentives for hard work, reduce work effort and skill development, and induce welfare 
dependence. All of these would jeopardise economic efficiency and growth (Kenworthy, 
2007). Other economists, however, argue that more inequality is related to weaker 
consumer demand, reduced worker motivation and workplace cooperation, reduced 
affordability of college education by the poor, and increased crime rates and government 
expenditure (Kenworthy, 2007). Consequently, more inequality ultimately leads to lower 
economic growth. Taken together, while there is no consensus on the equity-efficiency 
trade off, arguments that justify the presence of inequality need not be overlooked when 
suggesting that economic immobility should be avoided. 
 
1.3 Conventional measures of intergenerational economic mobility and its recent 
development 
 
Intergenerational economic mobility is conventionally measured using 
intergenerational associations of earnings and income (Behrman & Taubman, 1990). This 
can be done by examining the correlation of parents’ and children’s lifetime 
earnings/income, or by modelling adult children’s earnings/income and taking into account 
their age and labour force characteristics, such as education and occupation. This 
modelling strategy involves the log of children’s earnings/income as the outcome variable 
and the log of parental earnings/income as the key predictor of interest. The coefficient of 
the log of parental earnings/income is termed intergenerational earnings/income elasticity. 
It is a measure of the percentage change in children’s expected earnings/income for a 
one-percent change in parents’ earnings/income (Björklund & Jäntti, 2012). An associated 
measure, the earnings/income correlation, can be calculated by multiplying the elasticity 
by the ratio of the standard deviation of parents’ earnings/income over the standard 
deviation of children’s earnings/income. This correlation coefficient tells us how many 
standard deviations children’s earnings/income would change for a one-standard-deviation 
change in parents’ earnings/income (Björklund & Jäntti, 2012). Both the correlation and the 
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elasticity range from 0 to 1. The closer the correlation/elasticity to 1, the stronger the 
relationship between parents’ and children’s earnings/income, and the lower the mobility 
across generations. On the contrary, the closer the correlation/elasticity to 0, the weaker 
the relationship between parents’ and children’s earnings/income, and the higher the 
mobility across generations.  
Broadly, in estimating intergenerational earnings/income elasticity it is important to 
consider (i) what parent-child dyad is used, (ii) what data are available, and (iii) at what 
age earnings/income are measured. First, earnings/income of different parent-child dyads 
may yield different elasticities, so the selection of parent-child dyad is important for the 
elasticity estimate to represent intergenerational mobility within families. In general, 
women’s earnings/income are more volatile and less predictable over their life course than 
men’s due to different career choices and progression (e.g. high rates of part-time 
employment) associated with certain life events (e.g. childbirth). Existing literature 
predominantly uses father-son dyads when estimating earnings/income elasticity. Second, 
early literature primarily uses cross-sectional data to estimate earnings/income elasticity 
(see e.g. Björklund & Jäntti, 1997; Solon, 1992; Zimmerman, 1992), which are susceptible 
to downward-biased elasticity estimates due to response errors and transitory fluctuations 
in earnings/income (Corak, 2006; D'Addio, 2007; Mazumder, 2001). Recent work on 
earnings/income elasticity improves upon these early studies by leveraging longitudinal 
surveys (see e.g. Hansen, 2010; Lee & Solon, 2009; Mazumder, 2005). Third, when data 
on lifetime earnings/income for both generations are not available (as is the case in many 
short-run longitudinal surveys), elasticities vary depending on the age at which 
earnings/income are measured (life-cycle bias). For instance, using young fathers’ or 
young sons’ earnings/income results in downward-biased elasticity estimates (D'Addio, 
2007; Grawe, 2006; Piraino, 2007). This bias is small and not significant if current 
earnings/income (as proxies for lifetime earnings) are measured between the early 30s 
and the mid 40s (Böhlmark & Lindquist, 2006; Haider & Solon, 2006). 
Recently, studies on intergenerational economic mobility also begin to examine the 
intergenerational association of parental and adult child wealth (Boserup, Kopczuk & 
Kreiner, 2013; Charles & Hurst, 2003; Pfeffer & Killewald, 2015). While the underlying 
principle is still to model parents’ and children’s wealth and obtain wealth elasticity 
estimates (i.e. the coefficient of the log of parental wealth on the log of children’s wealth), 
unlike earnings which is one-dimensional, wealth has multiple components: income, 
assets, debts, and transfers from older generations (e.g. gifts, allowances, inheritance 
and/or bequests). The multi-dimensional nature of wealth poses significant challenges in 
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estimating wealth elasticity: it demands more data than do earnings, wealth data are more 
susceptible to measurement error than earnings data (as wealth data aggregate 
measurement error in each wealth component), and data quality (such as missing data 
and negative wealth) can be a major source of concern. As a result, there are much fewer 
studies on intergenerational correlations of wealth than on intergenerational correlations of 
earnings, and studies on wealth correlations use either administrative records that capture 
lifetime wealth of multiple generations (Boserup, Kopczuk & Kreiner, 2013) or long-run 
panel survey data with the capacity to track individuals over their entire life course 
(Charles & Hurst, 2003; Pfeffer & Killewald, 2015). In the absence of such administrative 
or long-run panel data, studies on wealth focus largely on the transfers made across 
generations. 
 
1.4 Conceptualising and measuring intergenerational economic mobility: This thesis 
 
In explaining the conception of economic mobility, Fields (2000) identified five 
different processes through which mobility can be understood and measured: (i) time 
dependence, (ii) positional movement, (iii) share movement, (iv) symmetric income 
movement, and (v) directional income movement.  
(i) Time dependence is “a particular form of immobility” (Fields, 2000: 2). In its intra-
generational context, time dependence concerns the extent to which one’s current income 
is predicted by his/her past income. In its intergenerational context, time dependence 
concerns the extent to which offspring’s income is predicted by parental income. 
Individual-level mobility at the societal level aggregates into a structural characteristic of 
the social system. 
(ii) Positional movement is the movement of individual’s income along the entire 
income distribution. It is most commonly in the form of quantiles and ranks. Under this 
concept, income movement becomes important only when changes in income cross the 
quantiles/ranks defined by the researchers. Within-quantile/rank income changes are not 
observed in positional movement. 
(iii) Share movement compares individual’s income movement with income 
movement of the rest of the population. Individuals are considered to have experienced 
downward mobility if their income increases by 50% but the income growth of the rest of 
the population is 100%, for example. Unlike positional movement, share movement 
captures the actual changes in individual’s income, even when such changes are not 
substantial enough to cross quantiles. For instance, let us divide the income distribution of 
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the population into quartiles, assume that the income range of each quartile is: $25,000 
and below (the bottom quartile), $25,001-50,000 (the 2nd quartile), $50,001-75,000 (the 3rd 
quartile), and $75,001 and above (the top quartile), and assume that an individual’s 
income is $40,000 (hence in the 2nd quartile). If income increases by 50% for this individual 
($60,000) but 100% for the rest of the population (e.g. $50,000 and below for the bottom 
quartile, etc.), this individual experienced downward mobility under the concept of share 
movement, but experienced no change under the concept of positional movement, 
because this individual’s income stays in the 2nd quartile after the increase. 
(iv) Symmetric income movement concerns the overall magnitude of income 
changes in society, but not the direction of the changes. For example, if certain social 
group experiences a $1,000 income gain but the rest of the population experiences a 
$1,000 income loss, the income movement is $2,000. 
(v) Directional income movement, on the other hand, examines income gains and 
losses separately. Common measures of directional income movement include the fraction 
of upward or downward movers and the mean income gains and losses.   
This thesis conceptual framework is based on Fields’s (2000) first mobility concept, 
which deals with the association in parents’ and offspring’s economic status. It provides a 
conceptual framework of intergenerational economic mobility that not only encompasses 
intergenerational earnings mobility and wealth transfers, but also incorporates the impact 
of family background on economic behaviours of the adult children. Establishing the 
relationship between family background and various measures of the economic 
performance of the children is important, because these measures collectively better 
represent the multi-dimensionality of children’s economic outcomes than it would using a 
single measure, and help to examine multiple channels (e.g. parental income, education, 
occupation, union history etc.) through which intergenerational transmission of 
(dis)advantage in contemporary Australia takes place. Economic behaviours may also 
represent likely channels via which economic outcomes are realised. 
Using data from the Household, Income and Labour Dynamics in Australia (HILDA) 
Survey, I then provide empirical evidence to support the relationship between family 
background and the economic performance of the adult children, as outlined in the 
conceptual framework of intergenerational economic mobility. I use a number of state-of-
the-art statistical techniques to take account of the longitudinal dependencies in the data, 
reduce biases associated with cross-sectional analysis and sample selection, and improve 
efficiency and precision of the estimation.  
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1.5 Thesis contributions 
 
This thesis contributes to the existing literature on intergenerational economic 
mobility in several ways. Conceptually, it builds on three inter-related areas of research 
and develops a framework that attempts to link intergenerational economic mobility to the 
broader concept of social mobility and provide a more comprehensive and encompassing 
account of intergenerational economic mobility.  
Additionally, it makes several important empirical contributions. First, the data I use 
have advantages over other existing Australian surveys that could be used to examine the 
issues under consideration. The HILDA Survey is the longest-running household panel 
survey in Australia (2001-2015). It tracks a large, nationally representative sample of 
13,969 respondents from 7,682 households since wave one. It has high response rates, 
ranging from 86.8% in wave 2 to 97.0% in wave 15. It contains rich information on 
respondent’s labour force characteristics, personal wealth, finances and wealth transfers, 
and detailed information on parental and sibling characteristics, background of families in 
which respondents grew up, and major life events of the respondents. Hence, the HILDA 
Survey represents one of the highest quality household panel surveys by international 
standards, and the data are particularly useful for my research purposes. Specifically, the 
HILDA Survey data enable me to obtain more reliable estimates and more current findings 
than ever before, and allow for longitudinal analyses that are not possible with cross-
sectional datasets.  
Second, I apply advanced statistical methods to the analysis of these panel data. 
Panel data have several advantages over cross-sectional and time series data in capturing 
complex human activities: they enable (i) more accurate statistical inference by improving 
the efficiency of estimates, (ii) modelling the dynamics of and changes in life events, (iii) 
addressing research questions and testing hypotheses that require sequential 
observations from the same individuals, and (iv) estimating more robust associations by 
controlling for the impact of omitted variables (Hsiao, 2014). The proliferation of panel 
studies, however, is just a recent phenomenon (Hsiao, 2007). This is largely due to the 
methodological constraints and the computational complexity in analysing panel data 
(Faes, Geys & Catalano, 2008). As the need and interest in using panel data grow, so do 
the methodological developments and the analytical tools (Hsiao, 2007). The existing 
literature on intergenerational economic mobility predominantly uses cross-sectional 
methods, even in the presence of panel data (see e.g. Mendolia & Siminski, 2015). In this 
thesis, I will not only use conventional analytical tools for panel data in the context of 
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intergenerational economic mobility (where they remain underutilised), but also push 
methodological boundaries in the process (e.g. by developing statistical methods suitable 
for panel data and sample selection). Applying statistical techniques that make full use of 
panel data will thus add methodological rigour to my research, improve accuracy and 
efficiency of my estimates, and contribute to moving the field of intergenerational economic 
mobility forwards in the methodological realm. 
Third, this thesis constitutes the first Australian study that systematically examines 
the extent of economic mobility across generations. It is an encompassing analysis that 
moves beyond income mobility (as was done in Leigh, 2007 and Mendolia & Siminski, 
2015), and incorporates wealth transfers and economic behaviours as important 
components of economic mobility. While mobility studies have a long tradition in Australia 
(e.g. Radford, 1962), most of these existing studies focus on occupational mobility (Hayes, 
1990; Jones & Davis, 1986; Wanner & Hayes, 1996), class mobility (Western, 1994) and 
educational mobility (Barón & Cobb-Clark, 2010; Marks & McMillan, 2003; Tomaszewski, 
Western & Martinez, 2015). Intergenerational earnings mobility did not receive appropriate 
academic attention until 2007, when Leigh (2007) published the first Australian study on 
father-son earnings elasticities. Studies on earnings mobility continued to be dormant, and 
since then only three more studies were published (Fairbrother & Mahadevan, 2016; 
Huang, Perales & Western, 2016a; Mendolia & Siminski, 2015). Similarly, academic work 
on intergenerational wealth transfers is very limited in Australia (see Sappideen, 2008 and 
Barrett et al., 2015 for exceptions), and little research has investigated the impact of family 
background on adult children’s economic behaviours in Australia. Knowledge gaps in 
these areas between Australia and other developed countries are widening. As a 
consequence, we know very little about the level of economic mobility across Australian 
generations. The lack of scientific evidence derived from robust data and analytical 
methods also prevents us from developing a better understanding of the underlying 
mechanisms producing the intergenerational transmission of (dis)advantage in Australia, 
and obstructs evidence-based policy in this realm. This thesis endeavours to address 
these research gaps, provide comparable analyses that enrich international comparisons, 
and inform public policies aimed at breaking the intergenerational cycle of disadvantage. 
 
1.6 Thesis structure 
 
This thesis is structured as follows. Chapter 2 contextualises intergenerational 
economic mobility in the broader concept of social mobility, develops a conceptual 
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framework of intergenerational economic mobility, and lays a foundation for the three 
empirical chapters that follow. In this chapter, I will lay out three important measures of 
intergenerational economic mobility: intergenerational income mobility, intergenerational 
wealth transfers, and the intergenerational impact of family background on adult children’s 
economic behaviours. I will provide detailed analyses on each measure in Chapters 3 to 5.  
Chapter 3 discusses the intergenerational associations of income, using data on 
labour income. It examines the patterns and dynamics of intergenerational income mobility 
in Australia, assessing the effects of using different levels of occupational (dis)aggregation, 
different earnings measures, and different compositions of sample on the magnitude of 
father-son earnings elasticities. I also test whether the positive association between 
economic inequality and immobility across countries (illustrated in the Great Gatsby 
Curve7) exist within Australia over time. While comparative analysis reveals the 
association between inequality and mobility, whether this association holds within 
countries over time remains unexplored. However, this is of theoretical interest and policy 
relevance, because (i) the inequality-mobility association can become conclusive if it is 
supported by both cross-country comparisons and within-country comparisons over time; 
and (ii) if the positive relationship between economic inequality and immobility holds in 
Australia over time, intergenerational economic mobility can be improved by deriving 
public policies aimed at reducing economic inequality. Chapter 3 will discuss these issues 
in more detail. 
Chapter 4 discusses intergenerational wealth transfers. It examines the patterns 
and determinants of the likelihood and magnitude of parental wealth transfers in Australia, 
focusing on the role that family background plays in influencing the probability and amount 
of parental wealth transfers, how such transfers differ over children’s life courses and at 
                                                          
7 The Great Gatsby Curve is a graphical representation of the positive relationship between 
economic inequality and immobility. It is a scatter plot of 22 countries with income mobility 
(measured by intergenerational earnings elasticity) on the Y axis and income inequality (measured 
by Gini coefficient for after-tax income) on the X axis: higher values on both axes indicate higher 
inequality (immobility). These points cluster around an upward sloping line, suggesting that 
countries with high income inequality tend to have low income mobility across generations 
(Krueger, 2012; Corak, 2013; The White House, 2012). In other words, children born to poor 
families are more likely to stay poor as adults in countries with higher inequality. Using the Great 
Gatsby Curve, Krueger (2012: 4) predicted that the intergenerational transmission of income 
disadvantage in the United States will “rise by a quarter for the next generation as a result of the 
rise in inequality that the U.S. has seen in the last 25 years.” 
37 
 
children’s major life events by parental socioeconomic status. By examining parental 
wealth transfers from the perspective of family background, I will document the disparities 
in parental monetary transfers across advantaged and adverse family backgrounds, and 
provide relevant implications for research and practice. 
Chapter 5 discusses the impact of family background on adult children’s economic 
behaviours. It examines trends in and predictors of adult children’s bank account choices 
in the context of intimate relationships, taking into consideration that joint ownership of 
bank accounts (mainly with a partner) is a financial strategy related to the characteristics of 
both adult children and their partners. I therefore assess how intra- and inter-generational 
economic, life-course, and socio-cultural factors jointly determine couples’ bank account 
choices, using relevant information from both couple members.  
Chapter 6 returns to the conceptual framework of intergenerational economic 
mobility I developed in Chapter 2, summarises the key findings from the empirical 
chapters, and concludes. 
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Chapter 2 Concepts of intergenerational economic mobility and a review of the 
existing literature 
 
2.1 Chapter introduction 
 
This chapter proposes a conceptual framework of intergenerational economic 
mobility, built on different conceptualisations in economics and sociology. Section 2.2 
outlines the different economic and sociological perspectives that have been used to 
conceptualise intergenerational economic mobility. Built on these discussions, section 
2.3.1 presents the proposed conceptual framework that (i) maps the relationship between 
social mobility and intergenerational economic mobility, and (ii) outlines the components 
and measures of intergenerational economic mobility. Section 2.3.2 explains and interprets 
intergenerational economic mobility from the perspective of the associations between 
social origins and destinations, which relate various family background factors to children’s 
economic outcomes. Section 2.3.3 outlines the contributions of the proposed framework in 
broader terms and scopes. Section 2.4 summarises the conceptual framework proposed. 
 
2.2 Conceptualising intergenerational economic mobility in economics and 
sociology 
 
Economists conceptualise economic mobility in a number of ways (Fields, 2000). 
First, mobility can be thought to have a time dimension: individuals’ past status influences 
their current status. In the intergenerational context, parental status influences the status 
of their children. Second, mobility can be viewed as changes in individuals’ status along 
the entire income distribution (e.g. ranks and quantiles). The third type of mobility is 
changes in individuals’ shares of total income compared with changes in others’ shares of 
total income. For example, if income of a certain group of individuals rises by 50% while 
income of the rest population grows by 100%, this group is thought to have experienced 
downward mobility, even though their income growth is positive. Finally, mobility can also 
be viewed in dollar terms, where movement of economic statuses is measured in either 
the size of dollars or directions (i.e. economic gains and losses) at an aggregate level. For 
instance, we can measure income mobility within a population by comparing total income 
in the base year (the first year of a time period for which comparison is made) with total 
income in the final year (of the same time period). We can either use the absolute values 
of the income changes (non-directional), or separate the analysis by the direction of the 
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change, such as the shares of upward and downward movers or the values of upward and 
downward movement.  
These different ways economists conceptualise mobility can also be extended to 
sociology to pick up on different types of questions: how much mobility is there in society 
(either positional movement at one time point or movement over time)? How strong is the 
association between social origin and destination? What do patterns of intergenerational 
movement look like? How do destination statuses depend on origin characteristics? These 
questions shape mobility research in economics and sociology, and can be applied to 
various dimensions of mobility, such as class mobility, occupational mobility, 
earnings/income mobility, and educational mobility. A typology of approaches to mobility 
studies could therefore be derived by cross-classifying these mobility questions and these 
mobility dimensions, which could then be used to situate different research traditions in 
sociology and economics. 
In economics, directions in mobility research over the past three decades have 
been mainly restricted to the analysis of mobility in what pertains to earnings/income 
(Blanden, Haveman, Smeeding, & Wilson, 2014; Torche, 2015). Solon’s (1992) and 
Zimmerman’s (1992) influential work on father-son earnings elasticity constitute seminal 
studies within this paradigm. In sociology, researchers have mainly drawn on empirical 
studies of class and occupational mobility as well as on status attainment models. Class 
mobility and occupational mobility are concerned with examining how much mobility there 
is and documenting patterns of movement from categorical origins to categorical 
destinations (for class mobility, see e.g. Erikson, Goldthorpe & Portocarero, 1979; 
Ganzeboom, Luijkx & Treiman, 1989.; for occupational mobility, see e.g. Duncan, 1979; 
Hout, 1984; Sobel, Hout & Duncan, 1985). Status attainment models focus on examining 
socioeconomic attainment over the lifecycle as the outcome of processes occurring in the 
family of origin, intermediate education and early occupation (Blau & Duncan, 1967), with 
additional attention paid to psychological factors (ability, motivation, aspirations and plans) 
and peer as well as neighbourhood effects in the Wisconsin model of status attainment 
(Sewell, Haller & Ohlendorf, 1970). These path-breaking studies provide important 
guidance for the conceptualisation of intergenerational economic mobility in this thesis.8 
                                                          
8 Discussing the different ways economists and sociologists conceptualise intergenerational 
mobility is very relevant to the framework proposed in this chapter. This is because these two 
different conceptualisations provide important ground work and the proposed framework in section 
2.2 is essentially built on both conceptualisations. The sociological conceptualisation focuses on 
class, occupations and education, while the economic conceptualisation focuses on income. These 
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2.3 Intergenerational economic mobility: A conceptual framework 
 
2.3.1 Intergenerational economic mobility and social mobility 
 
Intergenerational economic mobility is the extent of persistence in economic 
outcomes across generations: the degree to which the next generation can move up (or 
down) the economic ladder compared to their parental generation. It is one type of mobility 
that has two important dimensions: the intergenerational dimension and the economic 
dimension. The non-economic dimensions of intergenerational mobility include 
intergenerational class, occupational and educational mobility. These non-economic 
dimensions reflect the sociological conceptualisation of intergenerational mobility. 
Conceptually, intergenerational economic mobility falls under the broad concept of social 
mobility. It is therefore critical to understand intergenerational economic mobility by 
situating it in the context of social mobility. 
Social mobility is the movement of individuals or families along the stratified social 
positions (Rytina, 2011). It consists of intra-generational and intergenerational mobility 
(D'Addio, 2007). Intra-generational mobility, also known as career mobility, is the extent to 
which individuals over their life course move from one socioeconomic status to another. 
Drivers of intra-generational mobility include attending higher education (i.e. pursuing a 
university degree), job training, promotion, etc. Intergenerational mobility, on the other 
hand, is the extent to which adult children’s socioeconomic outcomes are determined by 
their family background. It reflects the ease with which children born to adverse family 
background can move up and children born to rich parents can move down. It shows the 
degree of ‘fluidity’ in society. Drivers of intergenerational mobility include taxation of gifts 
and inheritance, expansion of education, universal access to public goods and services, 
equal opportunities through labour market legislations, etc.  
                                                                                                                                                                                                
different conceptualisations form the fundamental components of intergenerational mobility. The 
missing pieces in these conventional conceptualisations in sociology and economics are wealth 
transfers and economic behaviours, and together with income, they collectively represent the 
economic dimension of intergenerational mobility (as opposed to the non-economic dimensions of 
intergenerational mobility: class, occupations and education). My contribution in this framework is 
therefore to (i) consolidate the economic and sociological conceptualisations, and (ii) put together 
these missing pieces to provide a more granular concept of intergenerational economic mobility 
than what it conventionally is, i.e. economic mobility equals income mobility. 
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Intergenerational mobility can be categorised into occupational mobility, class 
mobility, educational mobility and economic mobility. As outlined before, sociologists 
traditionally examine intergenerational mobility by occupational status and social class, 
understood as the processes through which the destination class and occupation is 
determined by the origin class and occupation. In contrast, economists typically focus on 
income and earnings (D'Addio, 2007; Torche, 2015). Intergenerational economic mobility, 
however, needs not only encompass income and/or earnings mobility; wealth transfers 
from older generations, most notably parents, are a significant contributor to adult 
children’s wealth accumulation (Kotlikoff, 1987) and liquidity constraint alleviation (Cox, 
1990). That is, parents transfer money onto their children as a means of improving their 
financial circumstances. For example, parents transfer money to their offspring to confront 
the often high tuition fees of universities. In the absence of such transfers, many young 
adults would be unable to fund their university education due to a lack of personal financial 
resources. In addition, consumer socialisation theory indicates that children acquire 
consumer skills, knowledge and attitudes through interacting with various socialisation 
agents (Ali et al., 2012; Moschis, 1987; Ward, 1974). In particular, parents and family exert 
strong influence in shaping children’s financial attitudes and behaviours (Lyons, Scherpf, & 
Neelakantan, 2007; Lyons, Scherpf, & Roberts, 2006; Moschis, 1987; Shim et al., 2009; 
Shim et al., 2010), which in turn affect their financial wellbeing in their adult life. Parental 
socioeconomic status has also been found to directly influence adult children’s financial 
satisfaction and wellbeing (Shim et al., 2009; Shim et al., 2010). To the extent that 
monetary transfers (received from parents) and economic behaviours constitute important 
components/channels of adult children’s economic outcomes, discussions on the effect of 
family background on income, transfers and finance of the adult children would contribute 
to a better understanding of the multi-dimensionality of intergenerational economic 
mobility. 
In this thesis, I build on these arguments and propose a conceptual framework of 
intergenerational economic mobility which has the aforementioned three components: 
income mobility, wealth transfers, and economic behaviours, attitudes and wellbeing of the 
offspring. This framework is illustrated in Figure 2-1. It further explains how each 
component of intergenerational economic mobility is measured.  
 
2.3.1.1 Intergenerational income mobility 
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Intergenerational income mobility is measured using earnings elasticity. It shows 
the percentage change in children’s expected earnings associated with a one-percentage 
increase in parents’ earnings (Björklund & Jäntti, 2012). For example, an earnings 
elasticity estimate of 0.5 indicates that, on average, children’s earnings increase by 0.5% if 
parents’ earnings increase by 1%. At the aggregate level, this elasticity suggests that 
children earn 25% more than the average in the population if their parents earn 50% 
above the average.9 Hence, a larger earnings elasticity indicates lower income mobility. A 
number of factors may influence elasticity estimates: (i) whose earnings are modelled, (ii) 
the data and methods used, (iii) the age at which earnings are measured, and (iv) 
differences in the institutional context, e.g. country differences. I briefly discuss each of 
these factors.  
Whose earnings are modelled. While existing literature predominantly modelled 
father-son earnings, the literature using other parent-child dyads is small but growing. It 
has been found, for example, that elasticity estimates are smaller using daughters’ 
earnings than using sons’ earnings (Chadwick & Solon, 2002; Pekkala & Lucas, 2007).  
The data and methods used. Early literature primarily uses cross-sectional data and 
ordinary least squares (OLS) regression to estimate earnings elasticity (Behrman & 
Taubman, 1985). However, this technique is known to lead to downwardly biased 
estimates (Mazumder, 2001). Recent studies using longitudinal surveys have yielded 
larger elasticity estimates (Lee & Solon, 2009; Mazumder, 2005).  
Age at which earnings are measured. Using young fathers’ or young sons’ earnings 
is found to result in downward-biased elasticity estimates (Grawe, 2006; Piraino, 2007), 
although such bias is not statistically significant if earnings are measured between the 
early 30s and the mid 40s (Haider & Solon, 2006).  
Differences in the institutional context. Studies on changes in income mobility over 
time provide mixed findings across different countries. Some studies find a decline in 
income mobility in countries such as the US (Aaronson & Mazumder, 2008), the UK 
(Nicoletti & Ermisch, 2007), Norway (Hansen, 2010) and Finland (Pekkala & Lucas, 2007), 
whereas other studies find no significant changes over time in countries such as France 
(Lefranc & Trannoy, 2005).  
Chapter 3 provides a detailed examination of the patterns and dynamics of 
intergenerational earnings elasticity in contemporary Australia. 
                                                          
9 If parents earn 50% above the average of the population, an earnings elasticity of 0.5 gives 
50%×0.5=25% higher earnings of their children than the population average. 
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2.3.1.2 Intergenerational wealth transfers 
 
Intergenerational wealth transfers comprise inter vivos transfers (i.e., gifts or 
allowances) and inheritance/bequest transfers. Inter vivos transfers are monetary transfers 
made when the donor (or sender) is alive, whereas inheritance/bequest transfers are 
transfers made (usually in the form of a legal will) when the donor deceases. While it is 
known that financial transfers can be generation-skipping (e.g. grandparents to 
grandchildren) and reciprocal (e.g. children to parents), in this thesis my main focus is the 
mainstream transfers from parents to children. This is because transfers in the direction 
from parents to children are more prevalent, of greater quantity, and more likely to take 
place over the receiver’s life course than transfers in other directions (Hughes, Massenzio 
& Whitaker, 2012).  
In Chapter 4, I will examine the effect of family background on the probability and 
amount of parental wealth transfers, and separate by parental socioeconomic statuses the 
analyses on how parental wealth transfers differ over children’s life course and how 
patterns of parental wealth transfers differ at children’s major life events. I argue that 
parental wealth transfers constitute an important component of intergenerational economic 
mobility for three reasons.  
First, such transfers are an important driver of wealth inequality across generations 
(Heer, 2001). It has been found, for example, that parental wealth transfers account for 
half of the wealth of average young adults, but over 90% of the wealth of rich children 
(Boserup, Kopczuk & Kreiner, 2016).  
Second, parental wealth transfers alleviate borrowing constraints and affect adult 
children’s socioeconomic outcomes and wellbeing over the life course (Berry, 2008). Such 
transfers at certain points of children’s life, such as tertiary education, marriage, childbirth 
and property purchase may have profound impact on children’s life outcomes and 
wellbeing (Leopold & Schneider, 2011).  
Third, linking family background to the study of parental wealth transfers provides a 
new way of considering such transfers as a means of status reproduction (Albertini & Radl, 
2012).  
Empirical evidence has consistently pointed towards a positive relationship between 
parental socioeconomic statuses and wealth transfers (Albertini & Kohli, 2013; Brandt & 
Deindl, 2013; Karagiannaki, 2011; Cooney & Uhlenberg, 1992; Hochguertel & Ohlsson, 
2009; Tiefensee & Westermeier, 2016), but only a handful of studies looked at the life-
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course patterns of parental wealth transfers (Cooney & Uhlenberg, 1992; Leopold & 
Schneider, 2011). Importantly, none of these studies considered differences in the life-
course patterns of parental wealth transfers by parental socioeconomic statuses. My 
analyses will therefore offer important insights into the life-course differences in parental 
wealth transfers across high and low socioeconomic families, thereby underlining parental 
wealth transfers as a potential mechanism through which intergenerational economic 
(im)mobility takes place. 
 
2.3.1.3 Economic behaviours, attitudes and wellbeing of the offspring 
 
Adult children’s economic behaviours, attitudes and wellbeing are measured by 
their strategies of organising finance, their autonomy in making financial decisions, their 
attitudes towards financial risks, and their current financial conditions as well as 
constraints.  
There are considerable links between family background and adult children’s 
financial performance (Fagereng, Mogstad & Rønning, 2015), and individual’s economic 
behaviours, attitudes and wellbeing are highly inter-related. In this respect, this thesis will 
mainly explore how family background affects children’s financial organisation in Chapter 
5. In doing so, this thesis captures another important dimension of intergenerational 
economic mobility that has been overlooked in the literature. Financial organisation reflects 
one important aspect of adult children’s economic behaviours, which has implications on 
their economic outcomes, such as consumption patterns, investment portfolios, economic 
independence and status attainment. Family financial socialisation theory suggests that 
individuals’ financial perceptions and practices are reflective of parental social class and 
parental education (Cateora, 1963; Gudmunson & Danes, 2011; John, 1999; Wald, 1974). 
Highly educated parents are more likely to set up egalitarian family arrangements 
concerning finances and money management (Conger, Conger & Martin, 2010). Hence, it 
is possible that their adult children also do so through the impact of socialisation and role 
modelling.  
In Chapter 5, I will use bank account ownership of the adult children to study the 
organisation of their finance, and place their financial strategy in the context of intimate 
relationships. This is because joint bank accounts are predominantly held with partners, 
the choice of such joint bank accounts is therefore reflective of the characteristics of both 
couple members. Failure to account for partner characteristics when predicting bank 
account choices may result in measurement error due to mismatches in partners’ reports 
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and the erroneous identification of joint couple bank account strategies when joint 
accounts are actually held with individuals other than one’s partner.  
In predicting the bank account choices of couples, I will assess both the intra-
generational (i.e. couple-level characteristics) and intergenerational (i.e. family 
background) factors. These factors include absolute and relative income (Heimdal & 
Houseknecht, 2003; Vogler & Pahl, 1993; Yodanis & Lauer, 2007), number of dependent 
children (Treas, 1993), relationship history and duration (Heimdal & Houseknecht, 2003; 
Lyngstad, Noack & Tufte, 2011), gender-role attitudes (Cheal, 1993; Kenney, 2006; 
Vogler, 1998; Vogler, Brockmann & Wiggins, 2006), and parental education and 
occupation (Volger & Pahl, 1993). 
 
Figure 2-1 Intergenerational economic mobility—a conceptual framework 
 
2.3.2 Pathways from origins to destinations 
 
In Figure 2-1 I presented a concept map that outlines the framework of 
intergenerational economic mobility and its relationship with social mobility. However, the 
association between family background and economic mobility is unclear. Figure 2-2 is a 
Venn diagram showing the directions of the influences of various family background 
characteristics (origins) on the economic outcomes of adult children (destinations). 
Existing evidence has pointed out the relationships between some parental 
background indicators and these economic outcomes. For instance, intergenerational 
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income mobility measures the effect of parental income on children’s income, and the 
magnitude of parental wealth transfers is highly associated with parental education. While 
these parental labour force characteristics are important predictors, other parental 
background factors can also play a significant role in influencing adult children’s economic 
outcomes, such as parental ethnicity, long-term unemployment history, union history, early 
decease of parents, even the type of parenthood (i.e., biological, adoptive, or step 
parents). This is because some of these factors are related to parent-child relationships 
and family bonds, and are thus likely to affect the development of children’s cognitive and 
non-cognitive skills through day-to-day interactions and role modelling (World Bank, 2015). 
These in turn would affect children’s academic achievements and labour market 
performance as they become adults. Parental economic and non-economic characteristics 
are also associated with the family environment in which children grow up: the language 
they speak, the books they read, and the activities they spend time on would shape 
children’s mentality, personality and creativity, all of which are associated with their 
economic outcomes later in life. Furthermore, other familial factors beyond parental 
characteristics may also underlie the economic performance of adult children, such as the 
characteristics of siblings, whether they are the oldest amongst their siblings, the 
geographical location of the families in which they grew up, and so forth. Strong sibling 
effects, for example, have been found in the intergenerational transmission of income and 
wealth (see Black & Devereux, 2011). Therefore, we need a systematic examination of the 
collective effects of these family background indicators on adult children’s economic 
outcomes.  
It is important to note that while parental income and wealth are critical precursors 
of intergenerational economic mobility, most survey data are unable to capture lifetime 
income and wealth of the parents (hence represented by a dashed circle in Figure 2-2). 
Panel surveys have the advantage of tracking individuals over time, but only a handful of 
these surveys are long enough to observe income and wealth information for both the 
parental and children’s generation. An example of these surveys is the Panel Study of 
Income Dynamics in the U.S., which began its first wave in 1968; data were collected 
annually before 1997 and biennially thereafter (Beaule et al., 2015). The longest-running 
panel survey in Australia, the Household, Income and Labour Dynamics in Australia 
(HILDA) Survey, however, was initiated in 2001 and has been conducted annually. To 
date, this panel survey has been running for 17 years with 15 years of available data. 
Since young participants enter the HILDA Survey when they reach 15 years of age, data 
from the HILDA Survey do not contain income and wealth information for two entire 
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Australian generations. For example, the youngest cohort who entered the panel in 2001 
would be 30 years old in the latest year of available data.10  
Administrative data are data which are collected continuously by government 
agencies for purposes other than research, such as taxation, education and health 
records. Like survey data, administrative data are another important data source for the 
study of intergenerational economic mobility,11 because these data contain rich information 
on actual (rather than self-reported) income and wealth of the population across several 
generations (Grusky, Mitnik & Wimer, 2011). Examples of administrative data used for 
analyses of intergenerational mobility include Danish wealth records (see Boserup, 
Kopczuk & Kreiner, 2014), Norwegian administrative registers (see Fagereng, Mogstad & 
Rønning, 2015), and Swedish Inheritance Tax Register (see Elinder, Erixson & Ohlsson, 
2012). Therefore, administrative data have the potential to link parents and offspring on a 
much larger scale than do survey data. Using data from federal income tax records in the 
US (1996-2012), for example, Chetty et al. (2014) identified parents for 95% of children 
born between 1980 and 1991 and obtained an analytical sample of 10 million children. 
This analytical dataset has complete records of household and individual income for both 
generations. In the Australian context, however, these data remain difficult to access, as 
                                                          
10 Like many international panel surveys, the HILDA Survey also experienced sample attrition as 
the panel continues to develop. For example, the wave-on-wave non-response rates in the HILDA 
Survey range from 13% in wave 2 to 3% in wave 15 (Summerfield et al., 2016). The attrition was 
higher in early waves of the HILDA Survey than in the British Household Panel Study (BHPS), but 
dropped below the BHPS attrition since wave 9 (Summerfield et al., 2016). Attrition bias in the 
HILDA Survey likely arises due to low re-interview rates among those who are young, migrants, 
Indigenous, single, unemployed, or working in low-skilled occupations (Summerfield et al., 2016). A 
top-up sample was added to the panel in wave 11 to improve sample representativeness (Watson, 
2011). All the analyses in this thesis are conducted based on the full sample (the original sample 
and the top-up sample). 
11 Administrative data and survey data can be seen as complementary for the study of 
intergenerational economic mobility. Since administrative data cover actual income and wealth 
across multiple generations, estimates of inter- and multi-generational income and wealth 
correlations using such data can achieve high-level precision. Survey data, on the other hand, 
have the strength of containing richer information on individuals’ socioeconomic and demographic 
circumstances, life-course events, and parent-child relationships and exchanges. Hence, using 
survey data one can better examine the underlying mechanisms of intergenerational economic 
mobility. 
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digitised records are only available since 2001 for many collections and legislation and 
regulation may prohibit data disclosure (Productivity Commission, 2013).  
In the absence of long-running panel and administrative data, a common practice in 
studies of intergenerational income mobility is to use respondents’ self-reported parental 
characteristics, such as parental age, education and occupation, to impute parental 
earnings/income (Bjorklund & Jantti, 1997; Piraino, 2007; Solon, 2002). Wealth, however, 
is more difficult to impute based on these characteristics, because (i) unlike 
earnings/income which is one-dimensional, wealth is multi-dimensional, which includes 
debts, public and private transfers, and assets other than earnings, such as properties, 
bonds, stocks, superannuation funds, credit cards, and other funds; and (ii) the functional 
form for imputing parental wealth is theoretically and empirically unclear. Imputing parental 
earnings/income based on parental labour force characteristics can be done by regressing 
the earnings/income on age and occupation/education using an older sample (pseudo 
parents), and by substituting the labour force characteristics of the actual parents in the 
same regression equation (Bjorklund & Jantti, 1997; Piraino, 2007). Therefore, the process 
of imputing parental earnings/income assumes a linear functional form between 
earnings/income and parental characteristics. In contrast, there have been no studies 
imputing parental wealth based on parental labour force characteristics. 
In Chapter 3 of this thesis, I will derive statistical techniques to impute parental 
earnings before estimating intergenerational earnings elasticity. Drawing on the two-stage 
OLS regression method used in existing studies, I will develop a two-stage panel 
regression model with the imputation of fathers’ earnings at stage one and the estimation 
of elasticities at stage two. While this model will leverage multiple observations in the 
panel data to arrive at imputed fathers’ earnings that reduce bias due to transitory earnings 
fluctuations (Mazumder, 2005), the imputation will result in several limitations, such as 
assuming that parents with the same age and occupation have the same earnings (i.e. 
deterministic assignment of parental earnings). Given these methodological shortcomings, 
in Chapters 4 and 5, I will mainly use respondents’ self-reported parental characteristics as 
proxies of parental socioeconomic status and family background. 
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Figure 2-2 Pathways from origins to destinations: linking family background to 
children’s economic outcomes 
 
2.3.3 Contributions of this conceptual framework 
 
In developing this conceptual framework, this thesis contributed to the topic of 
intergenerational economic mobility in the following ways. First, it provided a new 
conceptualisation of intergenerational economic mobility that was neither explicitly nor fully 
discussed in the literature. It mapped out the hierarchical relationship between social 
mobility, intergenerational mobility and intergenerational economic mobility, and clearly 
outlined the components of each type of mobility. This is important, because a number of 
the existing literature do not distinguish between these concepts, resulting in confusions 
when understanding the type of mobility. For example, in examining the association 
between intergenerational income mobility and intergenerational class/occupational 
mobility, Breen et al. (2016) used social mobility, intergenerational class mobility and 
intergenerational occupational mobility interchangeably; similarly, income mobility and 
economic mobility are used interchangeably, leading to inconsistencies in the mobility 
types they examine. Likewise, while Fields (2000) classified five types of mobility, these 
types were understood in the context of income mobility, which, as has been discussed 
throughout this chapter, is just one component of economic mobility.  
Second, this conceptual framework combined research areas in economics and 
sociology, thereby providing a more comprehensive and granular picture of social mobility 
than ever before. It borrowed classic sociological work of intergenerational class and 
occupational mobility (Duncan, 1979; Erikson, Goldthorpe & Portocarero, 1979; Hout, 
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1984), and referenced the booming economic literature on intergenerational earnings and 
income mobility since the early 1990s (Blanden et al., 2014; Torche, 2015). It also 
incorporated intergenerational wealth transfers, a research area where sociological and 
economic interests align (for classic economic work on intergenerational wealth transfers, 
see Cox & Rank, 1992; Kotlikoff & Summers, 1980; for sociological work, see Albertini, 
Kohli & Vogel, 2007; Kohli, 1999).  
Third, this conceptual framework linked the study of intergenerational economic 
mobility to the study of economic behaviours. Studying economic behaviours provides an 
important lens into economic mobility by examining the impact that family background has 
on grown-up children’s economic and financial practices, which has implications on their 
economic outcomes. For example, risk-averse economic behaviours may reflect a 
traditional family environment (or a low socioeconomic status family) in which children 
grew up, which in turn affects adult children’s consumption patterns and investment 
portfolios. Within-household financial arrangements may also reflect children’s family 
background, which in turn has implications for women’s economic independence and 
status attainment (Furnham, 1999; Gudmunson & Danes, 2011; Volger & Pahl, 1993). 
Therefore, the study of economic behaviours can provide additional insights into 
intergenerational economic mobility, and future research can examine intergenerational 
transmission of economic behaviours and mentalities as an additional aspect of economic 
mobility across generations. 
Finally, this conceptual framework provided an important guidance for future 
mobility studies to expand and modify the conceptualisation of intergenerational economic 
mobility in different contexts. One direction to expand this framework is to include 
intergenerational wealth mobility. Similar to income, wealth is another critical indicator of 
individuals’ economic status. Unlike income, however, the multi-dimensionality of wealth 
may provide additional information on the degree of persistence across generations than 
income does. It is likely, for example, that a society is mobile in income (through high-level 
income redistribution and low-level income inequality) but immobile in wealth (through 
well-preserved wealth heredity legislative and jurisdictional systems and zero inheritance 
tax). It is therefore important to examine wealth mobility in addition to income mobility. 
Using large-scale administrative records (such as Danish wealth records and Norwegian 
administrative registers) and long-running panel datasets (such as the Panel Study of 
Income Dynamics) that capture lifetime wealth of multiple generations, one could estimate 
the intergenerational wealth elasticity and correlations to measure the degree of wealth 
mobility (see Boserup, Kopczuk & Kreiner, 2013; Charles & Hurst, 2003). 
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2.4 Summary of the chapter 
 
In summary, in this chapter I have proposed a conceptual framework of 
intergenerational economic mobility, situating intergenerational economic mobility in the 
broad area of social mobility. Social mobility can be categorised into within-generation 
(intra-generational) and between-generation (intergenerational) mobility. Intergenerational 
mobility constitutes occupational mobility, class mobility, educational mobility and 
economic mobility. Three important components are identified to measure 
intergenerational economic mobility: income mobility, wealth transfers, and the effect of 
family background on adult children’s financial performance. Theoretically, wealth mobility 
is another critical measure of economic mobility, because lifetime wealth is one of the best 
proxies of economic resources (Boserup, Kopczuk & Kreiner, 2014). In practice, however, 
studies on intergenerational wealth mobility are largely constrained by the availability of 
wealth data that (i) capture all dimensions of wealth (including assets, debts, public and 
private transfers etc.), and (ii) capture life-time wealth of at least two generations. In the 
absence of administrative data and long-run panel data, in this thesis I will derive statistical 
techniques to impute parental earnings before estimating intergenerational earnings 
elasticity, and will examine parental wealth transfers as an important mechanism of 
intergenerational wealth transmission to assess intergenerational economic mobility.  
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Chapter 3 Intergenerational income mobility in contemporary Australia 
 
3.1 Chapter introduction 
 
This chapter presents empirical evidence of the patterns and dynamics of 
intergenerational income mobility (measured using intergenerational earnings elasticity) in 
contemporary Australia. It focuses on assessing the effects of different levels of 
occupational (dis)aggregation, earnings measures and sample compositions on father-son 
earnings elasticity estimates. It also establishes the trend in such elasticities over time. 
Section 3.2 discusses the institutional and historical context in Australia for the study of 
income mobility. Section 3.3 reviews the international and Australian body of literature on 
intergenerational earnings elasticity, identifies the research gaps, and presents my 
contributions in this chapter. Section 3.4 details the data and methods used, discusses 
known methodological limitations, and conducts sensitivity checks on the quality of the 
data and the chosen methods. Section 3.5 presents the findings and their interpretations. 
Section 3.6 concludes. 
 
3.2 Background 
 
 Australia has historically been considered as the land of the “fair go” (Douglas et al., 
2014; Leigh, 2007). Many Australians believe that a fair society may feature a certain 
amount of economic inequality, provided that there is equality of opportunity (Andrews & 
Leigh, 2009). Equal opportunity means that people’s life chances rely more on individual 
effort and hard work than on circumstances over which they have no control, such as 
parental socioeconomic status and family background. When parental socioeconomic 
status has little influence over individuals’ life outcomes, one would expect high levels of 
intergenerational mobility.12 In reality, evidence from many Western countries indicates 
that this is not the norm: children from high income families are significantly more likely to 
become top earners than children from low income families (Corak, 2013a). Parents with 
higher socioeconomic resources invest more money on their children’s human capital (e.g. 
on private schooling, after-school tuition, and computer equipment), are more likely to 
                                                          
12 It is also possible to observe low intergenerational mobility if there is no direct link between 
parents’ and offspring’s socioeconomic statuses but these are both correlated with other factors, 
such as cognitive or non-cognitive abilities.  
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adopt positive parenting practices, are better able to provide a safe and secure home 
environment that facilitates learning, and dispose of greater social networks upon which 
their children can draw, all of which lay solid foundations for their offspring’s subsequent 
life chances (Beenstock, 2012). 
The fact that parental earnings capacity is a strong predictor of adult children’s 
economic performance has been found in an extensive body of literature, and substantial 
attention has been paid to how intergenerational correlations in earnings are defined, 
estimated and compared. The most widely used indicator is the intergenerational earnings 
elasticity, a measure of the extent to which parental earnings determine their children’s 
earnings (Fields, 2008). As an index of income mobility, the intergenerational earnings 
elasticity benchmarks adult children’s earnings with their parents’ earnings after controlling 
for demographic characteristics. Larger elasticities indicate less income mobility. 
While a burgeoning literature has estimated intergenerational earnings elasticities in 
developed and developing countries and cross-national comparative studies have thrived 
in recent years, there is surprisingly little research on the patterns and dynamics of 
earnings elasticity in Australia. This gap needs to be addressed, as Australia’s institutional 
and historical arrangements make it an important case study. First, for most of the 20th 
century Australia had an internationally distinctive set of labour market institutions built 
around a centralised pay setting driven by industrial tribunals that promoted both high real 
wages and substantial uniformity of pay and working conditions across occupations and 
industries (Castles, 1985). These institutions began to be unwound by successive 
governments in the 1980s, but they laid a path-dependent foundation for earnings equality 
and income mobility that makes Australia a noteworthy case. Second, it has been argued 
that the Australian state was founded on particular ideals of egalitarianism (Lambert, 
2000). Australia has often been characterised as a country with public attitudes leaning 
towards egalitarianism, a flat social structure without pronounced symbolic or behavioural 
class distinctions, and strong antidiscrimination legislation (Thompson, 1994). Third, 
existing cross-national evidence shows that intergenerational mobility is inversely 
associated with economic inequality (OECD, 2011). Countries with higher mobility (i.e. 
lower earnings elasticity) usually exhibit less economic inequality (as measured by the Gini 
index). Nevertheless, plotted on the Great Gatsby Curve (Corak, 2013b), which locates 
countries according to economic inequality and mobility, Australia stands as a distinctive 
case with both a high level of mobility and a moderate level of inequality.  
Using panel data from the Household, Income and Labour Dynamics in Australia 
(HILDA) Survey, I examine father-son earnings elasticities in contemporary Australia. 
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Since fathers’ earnings are not observable in the HILDA Survey, I apply a two-stage panel 
regression model which first computes fathers’ earnings based on sons’ reports of fathers’ 
occupations, and then estimates the earnings elasticity. I add to the existing literature by (i) 
introducing and applying a two-stage panel regression model to estimate intergenerational 
earnings elasticities, (ii) establishing trends in earnings elasticity in Australia over time, (iii) 
examining how using different levels of occupational (dis)aggregation and earnings 
measures affects elasticity estimates, and (iv) using more recent data than previous 
Australian studies. Key findings show that the father-son earnings elasticity in Australia 
between 2001 and 2013 ranges from 0.11 to 0.30, and has increased over the observation 
window. My preferred elasticity estimates lie between 0.24 and 0.28. Elasticity estimates 
vary depending on the level of occupational (dis)aggregation and earnings measure used: 
they are highest when two-digit level occupations and hourly earnings are used, and 
lowest when four-digit level occupations and annual earnings are used. I read these 
findings as indicating that (i) Australia has a moderately high level of income mobility by 
international standards, (ii) over the past decade there was a slight decline in 
intergenerational income mobility, and (iii) elasticity estimates are very sensitive to the 
choice of data and methods. This point has two important implications: (i) analyses of 
earnings elasticity should pay careful attention to the extent to which their results are 
robust to alternative analytic choices, and (ii) cross-temporal and cross-national 
comparative analyses should recognise that differences in the analytic approach across 
comparison units may contribute to observed similarities or differences.  
 
3.3 Intergenerational earnings elasticity in comparative context 
 
3.3.1 International comparisons on elasticity estimates 
 
Quantitative research on the intergenerational correlation of life outcomes can be 
traced back to the 1920s (Sorokin, 1927), with work on occupational mobility beginning in 
the 1950s (Glass, 1954) and work on socio-economic status in the 1960s (Blau & Duncan, 
1967). In the last three decades, research on the intergenerational correlation of earnings 
has taken off (Blanden et al., 2014; Torche, 2015). Earnings elasticity is now accepted as 
the dominant indicator of the intergenerational association of earnings, and has been 
estimated on different parent-children dyads (especially father-son dyads) across a wealth 
of studies. It is calculated by modelling the log of children’s earnings on the log of parental 
55 
 
earnings, and it measures the percentage change in children’s expected earnings for a 
one-percent change in parents’ earnings (Björklund & Jäntti, 2012). 
International comparisons provide almost unanimous evidence that father-son 
intergenerational earnings elasticity is highest in developed countries such as the US, UK, 
Italy and developing countries like Brazil, China and South Africa, and lowest in the Nordic 
countries (Blanden, 2013; Causa & Johansson, 2010; Corak, 2006; D'Addio, 2007; Gong, 
Leigh & Meng, 2012; Grawe, 2004; Jäntti et al., 2006; Mocetti, 2007; Ng, 2007; Piraino, 
2007; Solon, 2002). Most countries have earnings elasticities that fall within the Nordic-US 
spectrum, such as France (Lefranc & Trannoy, 2005), Germany (Couch & Dunn, 1997), 
Canada (Corak, 2013a), Australia (Leigh, 2007), Japan (Lefranc, Ojima & Yoshida, 2008; 
Ueda, 2009) and South Korea (Ueda, 2013). I present a summary of up-to-date measures 
of income mobility in OECD countries since the late 1980s in Table A3-1 in the 
Appendices. 
 
3.3.2 Comparisons on income measures and estimation methods of elasticity 
 
The measure of income used to estimate earnings elasticity differs across studies, 
primarily due to data availability, but labour income (i.e. earnings from employment) is one 
of the most widely used (Björklund & Jäntti, 2012), because earnings represent the major 
source of income for most people and the biggest source of economic growth for most 
households (Greenville, Pobke & Rogers, 2013).  
Correspondingly, a variety of estimation methods have been employed to 
accommodate the properties of the available data. Most early studies use cross-sectional 
data to estimate earnings elasticity (Behrman & Taubman, 1985), and estimation typically 
takes place via ordinary least squares (OLS) regression. However, using OLS and short-
run earnings to proxy lifetime earnings has been found to result in downward bias in 
elasticity estimates (Solon, 1989; Solon, 1992). Top-coding earnings for high-income 
earners to de-identify respondents is a common practice in large-scale surveys, but this 
practice leads to a right-censored earnings distribution, which violates the assumption of 
normally distributed errors in the OLS regression.  
These limitations of OLS motivated the development and applications of other 
methods, including instrumental variable regression (Björklund & Jäntti, 1997; Solon, 1992; 
Zimmerman, 1992), quantile regression (Bratberg, Nilsen & Vaage, 2007), tobit regression 
(Mazumder, 2005), two-sample two-stage least squares (TS2SLS) models (Gong, Leigh & 
Meng, 2012; Mocetti, 2007; Nicoletti & Ermisch, 2007; Piraino, 2007), simulation 
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extrapolation (Ueda, 2013) and non-parametric analyses (Bhattacharya & Mazumder, 
2011; Corak & Heisz, 1999; Ueda, 2013). Collectively, these methods not only provide 
more accurate elasticity estimates by better accommodating and modelling the data (e.g. 
tobit regression takes into account the censoring issue of earnings, and non-parametric 
methods do not impose as many stringent statistical assumptions as parametric methods 
do), but also provide additional insights into the differences in elasticity estimates across 
the earnings distribution (e.g. quantile regression gives elasticity estimates that vary 
across sons’ earnings distribution). 
 
3.3.3 Comparisons on earnings of different parent-child dyads 
 
Daughters’ permanent earnings (i.e. lifetime earnings) are less predictable than 
sons’, because women’s employment circumstances remain more heterogeneous than 
men’s, with high rates of part-time work and long and recurrent periods of economic 
inactivity (Steiber & Haas, 2012). Father-daughter earnings elasticities are complicated by 
occupational sex segregation, while mother-daughter elasticities are further complicated 
by mother’s discontinuous employment histories. As a result, most attention in the 
literature has been devoted to father-son earnings elasticities. However, with good-quality 
data and careful sample selection, it is argued that father-daughter elasticities can be 
robustly estimated (see Bratberg, Nilsen & Vaage, 2007; Chadwick & Solon, 2002; Couch 
& Dunn, 1997; Grawe, 2004; Hansen, 2010; Hertz, 2007; Lee & Solon, 2009; Lefranc & 
Trannoy, 2005; Mazumder, 2005; Pekkala & Lucas, 2007). Comparisons by ethnicity 
(Bhattacharya & Mazumder, 2011; Hertz, 2006; Kearney, 2006; Mazumder, 2014) and 
migrant status (Dustmann, 2008; Hammarstedt & Palme, 2012; Leigh, 2007; Vogel, 2006) 
have also been undertaken.   
 
3.3.4 Earnings elasticity in Australia and the current study 
 
Compared to other OECD countries, research on intergenerational earnings 
elasticity in Australia is scarce, and the available evidence is “limited and inconclusive” 
(Argy, 2006: 14). The first study of earnings elasticity in Australia was conducted by Leigh 
(2007), who estimated father-son single-year elasticities using hourly wages and four 
different survey datasets: the Social Stratification in Australia survey (1965), the Social 
Mobility in Australia Project (1973) the National Social Science Survey (1987-1988), and 
the HILDA Survey (2001-2004). He found that intergenerational earnings elasticity in 
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Australia ranges between 0.2 and 0.3 (compared to 0.4 to 0.6 in the United States), with 
no significant changes taking place between 1965 and 2004.  
While Leigh’s has been the most influential Australian study to date, it is not without 
limitations. First, its conclusions are based on analyses of different datasets with different 
income measures and occupational classifications: the 1965 survey uses annual income 
measured in 6 bands and 89 occupations; the 1973 survey uses weekly income measured 
in 16 bands and 214 occupations; the 1987 survey contains annual income in dollars and 
78 occupations; whereas the 2004 survey contains weekly earnings in dollars and 241 
occupations. As I will demonstrate, the variability in the income and occupation measures 
Leigh used is likely to have affected his comparisons. Second, the analyses rely on cross-
sectional methods that capture earnings elasticities in a point-in-time fashion, which 
obscures underlying dynamics. As Corak, Curtis and Phipps (2011: 75) point out, the study 
of intergenerational earnings elasticity “ideally requires data from a longitudinal study of a 
large, nationally representative sample of individuals and families”. Finally, the most recent 
data Leigh used are now over ten years old. Therefore, work that extends Leigh’s analyses 
by leveraging recent longitudinal data and panel regression models is warranted. 
A more recent study by Mendolia and Siminski (2015) makes use of Australian data 
from the HILDA Survey (2001-2012) and US data from the Panel Study of Income 
Dynamics (2001, 2003, 2005, 2007). Using a sample of individuals aged 25-54 and four-
digit level occupations as predictors in pooled OLS models, the authors report the 
intergenerational earnings elasticity in Australia to be 0.35. This work contributes to the 
study of earnings elasticity within Australia by adjusting the standard errors of the elasticity 
estimates to sampling variation using US data as a benchmark. 
I add to the existing literature on earnings elasticity in Australia in the following 
ways. First, I propose and apply a two-stage panel regression model to estimate earnings 
elasticities in the absence of observed parental earnings. Second, I undertake a 
comparison of earnings elasticities estimated using different analytic approaches to 
determine how sensitive these are to the choice of data and methods. I consider both 
differences in the degree of precision with which occupation data is measured (one-digit, 
two-digit, three-digit and four-digit occupations), and different earnings measures (hourly, 
weekly and annual earnings). Third, I examine changing patterns in earnings elasticity by 
considering linear and curvilinear trends over time. 
 
3.4 Data and methods 
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3.4.1 Data 
 
I use 13 waves (2001-2013) of the Household, Income and Labour Dynamics in 
Australia (HILDA) Survey. The HILDA Survey is a nationally representative panel survey 
initiated in 2001 with 13,969 respondents from 7,682 households. Data were collected 
primarily via face-to-face interviews and self-complete questionnaires with in-scope 
respondents aged 15 years and over residing in private dwellings (Watson & Wooden, 
2002). Since then, interviews with participants have been conducted annually. New 
participants are recruited if they begin sharing residence with an existing survey member, 
or if they belong to sample households and turn 15 years of age. The HILDA Survey has 
relatively high wave-on-wave response rates ranging from 86.8% to 96.4% (Summerfield 
et al., 2015). 
The HILDA Survey collects detailed information on respondents’ labour force 
participation, with a multiplicity of earnings measures readily available to the researcher. 
These include weekly as well as annual wages from different sources. Here, I will use 
three earnings measures: hourly earnings from the main job; weekly earnings from the 
main job; and annual earnings from all jobs. Weekly and annual earnings are directly 
reported by respondents, whereas hourly earnings are calculated by dividing weekly 
earnings by usual weekly hours of work. I use versions of these measures which are pre-
tax (i.e. gross), top-coded (for confidentiality reasons by the HILDA Survey), and for which 
missing values have not been imputed. I adjust all earnings measures for inflation using 
annual Consumer Price Index rates, taking year 2013 as the base year.13 My preferred 
elasticity estimates are those which use hourly earnings as the income measure, because 
I use occupation data to impute fathers’ earnings (see Section 3.4.2) and occupations are 
a better proxy for hourly earnings than other earnings measures (Leigh, 2007). For 
example, Leigh (2007) decomposed variation in annual work hours and in hourly wages 
into within- and between-occupation components. He found a higher degree of within-
occupation variation for annual work hours than for hourly wages. Since more within-
                                                          
13 Another possible way to adjust for inflation is to use the wage price index (WPI). The advantage 
of this measure over CPI is that it accounts for changes in wages paid by employers that arise from 
market factors, while CPI accounts for changes in the purchasing power of earnings (ABS, 2012). 
However, the WPI can be used to adjust for hourly but not weekly or annual earnings, as the latter 
depend on the number of hours individuals work (ABS, 2012). I have replicated my analyses 
adjusting hourly earnings using the WPI instead of the CPI, and elasticity estimates remain very 
similar. These estimates can be found in Table A3-2 in the Appendices. 
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occupation variation is related to less precision in using occupation to proxy earnings, 
Leigh (2007) concluded that occupations are a better proxy for hourly wages than for 
annual earnings (which are the product of both hourly wages and annual work hours). 
The person questionnaire within the HILDA Survey contains modules on “family 
background” and “history and status of parents”. The former is administered annually 
whereas the latter is administered in waves eight and 12. These modules contain rich 
retrospective information on the employment circumstances of the respondent’s father 
when the respondent was 14 years old, including employment status and occupational 
titles at different levels of (dis)aggregation. Occupational data are coded to the 2006 
Australian and New Zealand Standard Classification of Occupations (ANZSCO). The 2006 
ANZSCO is structured into five hierarchical levels: major groups (one-digit level, n=8), sub-
major groups (two-digit level, n=43), minor groups (three-digit level, n=97), occupational 
units (four-digit level, n=358), and individual occupations (n=998) (ABS, 2006). In its 
general release, the HILDA Survey contains information on one- and two-digit level 
occupations, whereas in its unconfidentialized release, occupations are disaggregated up 
to the four-digit level.  
Fathers’ earnings in the HILDA Survey are not directly observed, and so they need 
to be imputed. Fathers’ ages should be included when imputing their earnings, as doing so 
increases the precision of the imputation as well as the variation in the resulting measure 
(so that this gets closer to the true variation). Some studies consider all fathers to have the 
same age (e.g. 40 years). This is problematic because it is likely to result in 
underestimated earnings for older fathers and overestimated earnings for younger fathers. 
It is therefore important to account for fathers’ actual ages when respondents were age 14 
when imputing fathers’ earnings and estimating earnings elasticities. Fortunately, 
information on father’s age when the respondent was 14 can be derived from responses to 
questions in the HILDA Survey asking respondents about their fathers’ year of birth and 
current age (if alive). These questions, however, were only included in waves eight and 12. 
Since respondents in the HILDA Survey are at least 15 years of age, their fathers’ age 
when they were 14 constitutes time-constant information. As a result, such information can 
be extrapolated to other survey waves.  
 
3.4.2 Methodological approach 
 
Becker and Tomes (1979, 1986) introduced the theoretical model by which the 
intergenerational earnings elasticity is estimated: 
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                                                  ln 𝑌𝑖
𝑐 = 𝛼 + 𝛽 ln 𝑌𝑖
𝑝 + 𝜀𝑖                                                  (3.1) 
 
where 𝑌𝑖
𝑐  and 𝑌𝑖
𝑝 denote adult children’s and fathers’ lifetime earnings, respectively, 
and 𝛽 reflects the extent of intergenerational earnings persistence. This model follows 
what Fields (2000) called “time difference” type of mobility: this type of mobility has a time 
dimension. Viewed in the intergenerational context, it explains the effect of parental 
economic status (i.e. earnings in equation 3.1) on the economic status of children. In 
practice, lifetime earnings for both generations cannot be captured in most longitudinal 
surveys, and so most studies use a measure of short-run earnings as a proxy (Lee & 
Solon, 2009). However, caution should be exerted when using such a proxy due to 
measurement error from two sources. First, the number of time periods used to calculate 
measures of short-run earnings influences the precision of the results. The longer the time 
span, the more accurate the measure should be. Particularly, measures based on a single 
time point yield downward-biased elasticities due to response errors and transitory 
fluctuations (Corak, 2006; D'Addio, 2007; Mazumder, 2001). Second, elasticities vary 
depending on the age at which earnings are measured (life-cycle bias). For instance, using 
young fathers’ or young sons’ earnings results in downward-biased elasticity estimates 
(D'Addio, 2007; Grawe, 2006; Piraino, 2007). 
The longitudinal data analysis in this study helps mitigate the first type of 
measurement error. I propose a two-stage panel regression model with the computation of 
fathers’ earnings at stage one and the estimation of elasticities at stage two. Since fathers’ 
earnings when their sons were age 14 are a time-constant construct, in stage one I impute 
a single value for these for each respondent using a between effects model. The 
imputation leverages information on the over-time averages in sons’ earnings, ages and 
occupations. Using multiple observations to arrive at an imputed measure of fathers’ 
earnings reduces bias due to transitory earnings fluctuations (Mazumder, 2005). The 
model that I fit is outlined below: 
 
                                     ln 𝑌𝑖
𝑠 = 𝛼 + 𝜽′?̅?𝒊
𝒔 + 𝛿1?̅?𝑖
𝑠 + 𝛿2?̅?𝑖
𝑠2 + 𝑢𝑖 + ?̅?𝑖                                  (3.2) 
 
where 𝜽′ = (𝜃1, … , 𝜃𝑁), and  𝑿𝒊
𝒔′ = (𝑥𝑖
(1), … , 𝑥𝑖
(𝑁)
). 𝑌𝑖
𝑠 denotes the earnings of son 𝑖, 
𝑿𝒊 is a set of occupation dummies, each of which is denoted as 𝑥𝑖
(𝑗)
, 𝑗 = 1, … , 𝑁; ?̅?𝑖
𝑠 
represents the average of the 𝑖th son’s ages, and 𝑁 is the total number of occupation 
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categories, which depends on the level of aggregation used. 𝛼 is the intercept, 𝜽′ is a set 
of coefficients for sons’ occupations, 𝛿1 is the coefficient for sons’ ages, and 𝛿2 is the 
coefficient for sons’ age squared. These coefficients are to be estimated. 𝑢𝑖 represents the 
average of the individual-level error term (which is identical to the error term itself, because 
it is constant over time), and ?̅?𝑖 represent the average of the observation-level error term. 
The coefficients obtained from model (3.2) (i.e. 𝛼, 𝜽′, 𝛿1 and 𝛿2) are then used to compute 
fathers’ earnings (denoted as ln 𝑌𝑖
𝑓
) by substituting sons’ retrospective reports of fathers’ 
occupations (𝑿𝒊
𝒇
) and ages (𝐴𝑖
𝑓
) in the following equation:14 
 
                                            ln 𝑌𝑖
𝑓 = 𝛼 + 𝜽′𝑿𝒊
𝒇
+ 𝛿1𝐴𝑖
𝑓 + 𝛿2𝐴𝑖
𝑓2
                                        (3.3) 
 
The theoretical model of earnings elasticity in equation (3.1) can be improved by 
adding both sons’ and fathers’ ages as control variables (Piraino, 2007). I follow this 
updated method, centring ages of both generations at 40, and fitting a random effects 
model: 
 
ln 𝑌𝑖𝑡
𝑠 = ?̃? + 𝛽 ln 𝑌𝑖
𝑓 + 𝜆1(𝐴𝑖𝑡
𝑠 − 40) + 𝜆2(𝐴𝑖𝑡
𝑠 − 40)2 + 𝜆3(𝐴𝑖
𝑓 − 40) + 𝜆4(𝐴𝑖
𝑓 − 40)
2
+
𝛾𝑡 + ?̃?𝑖 + ?̃?𝑖𝑡                                                                                                          (3.4) 
 
The random effects model takes account of the longitudinal dependencies in the 
data (i.e. the repeated measures for the same individuals over time), whereas a cross-
sectional (pooled OLS) regression model would not. The random effects estimator uses a 
weighted average of the within and between estimators, with weights given by the relative 
variances of the individual-specific errors, ?̃?𝑖 , and the observation-specific idiosyncratic 
errors, ?̃?𝑖𝑡. 
I then examine polynomial trends in elasticity by interacting fathers’ logarithmic 
earnings with survey wave polynomials, and adding the interaction term in model (3.4). 
These are generalised to the function below: 
 
                                                          
14 This equation does not have error terms, because it is used to predict fathers’ earnings, and 
there is no information on the variation of fathers’ earnings. This prediction method is also used in 
Leigh (2007), Mendolia and Siminski (2015), Mocetti (2007) and Piraino (2007). Detailed 
discussions on the limitation of this method can be found in section 3.6. 
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ln 𝑌𝑖𝑡
𝑠 = ?̌? + 𝑓(𝑛)(𝑡) ∙ ln 𝑌𝑖𝑡
𝑓 + ?̌?1(𝐴𝑖𝑡
𝑠 − 40) + ?̌?2(𝐴𝑖𝑡
𝑠 − 40)2 + ?̌?3(𝐴𝑖𝑡
𝑓 − 40) +
?̌?4(𝐴𝑖𝑡
𝑓 − 40)
2
+ 𝑔(𝑛)(𝑡) + ?̌?𝑖 + ?̌?𝑖𝑡                                                                          (3.5) 
 
Where 𝑓(𝑛)(𝑡) and 𝑔(𝑛)(𝑡) are functions of wave 𝑡 with power 𝑛, 𝑛 = 1, 2, 3. To be 
specific, denote 𝝋′(𝑛) ∶= (𝜑0, … , 𝜑𝑛) as the coefficient vector for the interaction terms with 
power 𝑛, and 𝝎′(𝑛) ∶= (𝜔1, … , 𝜔𝑛) as the coefficient vector for wave 𝑡 with power 𝑛. 𝑓
(𝑛)(𝑡) 
and 𝑔(𝑛)(𝑡) can then be written as 
 
                                          𝑓(𝑛)(𝑡) = ∑ 𝜑𝑘 ∙ 𝑡
𝑘𝑛
𝑘=0 = 𝝋
′(𝑛)𝑻𝒇
(𝑛)
                                          (3.6) 
 
                                          𝑔(𝑛)(𝑡) = ∑ 𝑤𝑙 ∙ 𝑡
𝑙𝑛
𝑙=1 = 𝝎
′(𝑛)𝑻𝒈
(𝑛)
                                            (3.7)       
 
Where 𝑻𝒇
′ (𝑛) ∶= (1, 𝑡, … , 𝑡𝑛) and 𝑻𝒈
′ (𝑛) ∶= (𝑡, … , 𝑡𝑛). In this way, I depict the linear, 
quadratic and cubic trends of earnings elasticity. I can then obtain the trends of elasticity 
by taking the partial derivative of ln 𝑌𝑖𝑡
𝑠 with respect to ln 𝑌𝑖𝑡
𝑓
 at each wave. Model 
diagnostics then help decide which polynomial trend fits the data best.  
It is worth noting that, in estimating the earnings elasticity, the age distributions of 
fathers and sons in my model ameliorate the issues associated with the life-cycle bias 
discussed previously. Such bias is small and not significant if current earnings (as proxies 
for lifetime earnings) are measured between the early 30s and the mid 40s (Böhlmark & 
Lindquist, 2006; Haider & Solon, 2006). In my models, age is centred at 40 and restricted 
to a certain range for estimation (Gong, Leigh & Meng, 2012; Lee & Solon, 2009). Both 
sons’ and fathers’ ages in my data exhibit normal distributions with the mean and median 
ages ranging from 42 to 45. This ensures reduced life-cycle bias in the estimation of the 
earnings elasticity. 
 
3.4.3 Known methodological limitations 
 
While my analytic approach improves on the earlier literature in several ways, I do 
not resolve all outstanding issues in the estimation of intergenerational earnings elasticities 
in the Australian context. Therefore, some data-driven shortcomings must be 
acknowledged. First, the absence of long-panel data so that both fathers’ and sons’ 
earnings can be observed for a large sample of individuals forces me to rely on imputed 
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rather than observed fathers’ earnings. This issue has been faced by a number of 
international (e.g. Björklund & Jäntti, 1997; Nicoletti & Ermisch, 2007; Piraino, 2007) as 
well as Australian studies (Leigh, 2007; Mendolia & Siminski, 2015). Second, the lack of 
reliable and recurrent Australian surveys for older time periods with consistent occupation 
classifications and income measures forces me to use the HILDA Survey to impute 
fathers’ earnings. Ideally, one would use a collation of older, external datasets that match 
the period in which fathers of different cohorts had 14-year-old children. This problem 
applies also to other Australian studies (see Leigh, 2007 and Mendolia & Siminski, 2015). 
Third, the imputation methods deployed in previous studies of intergenerational earnings 
elasticities yield deterministic rather than probabilistic fathers’ earnings: all fathers with the 
same age-occupation profiles are expected to earn the same. This is also the case for 
other Australian (Leigh, 2007; Mendolia & Siminski, 2015) as well as international (Mocetti, 
2007; Piraino, 2007) studies. I return to these issues and discuss them in more detail in 
Section 3.6. 
 
3.4.4 Analytical sample and descriptive statistics 
 
My HILDA Survey sample consists of male respondents (hereafter referred to as 
sons) who are employed with positive earnings, have non-missing data on the analytical 
variables, and took part in at least one survey wave. This yields an unbalanced panel that 
minimizes information loss. I correct implausible values of fathers’ ages when their sons 
were 14 by excluding fathers whose ages were below 12 or above 70 when their sons 
were born. To minimize volatility associated with early or late career effects when 
computing fathers’ earnings, I run the model depicted in equation (3.2) above using only 
sons in prime working ages (i.e. ages between 30 and 55). 94% of fathers’ ages when 
sons were 14 in my model fall within this range. When estimating earnings elasticities at 
stage two, I exclude sons younger than 25 (they may combine work with education) or 
older than 64 (they may change their work patterns prior to retirement). Similarly, I exclude 
fathers outside the same age range when their sons were 14. For comparison purposes, I 
restrict both fathers’ and sons’ ages to prime working ages at stage two. Table 3-1 shows 
descriptive statistics for the main analytical variables.   
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Table 3-1 Descriptive statistics for main analytical variables 
Variable 
Sons 
Fathers 
1-digit 2-digit 3-digit 4-digit 
mean s.d. Obs. mean s.d. Obs. mean s.d. Obs. mean s.d. Obs. mean s.d. Obs. 
Log hourly earnings 3.41 0.52 30,175     3.36 0.20 30,175 3.29 0.31 30,175 3.29 0.35 30,175 3.29 0.49 30,175 
Log weekly earnings 7.14 0.62 30,211   7.10 0.28 30,211 7.04 0.35 30,211 7.04 0.39 30,211 7.05 0.48 30,211 
Log annual earnings 11.08 0.72 32,675     11.00 0.30 32,675     10.94 0.39 32,675     10.94 0.43 32,675     10.95 0.56 32,675     
Age  42.44 10.32 30,175    44.63 6.14 30,175 44.63 6.14 30,175 44.63 6.14 30,175 44.63 6.14 30,175 
Wave  7.56 3.79 30,175               
Notes: Sons’ earnings adjusted for inflation using the Consumer Price Index. Father’s predicted earnings differ based on the level of occupational 
(dis)aggregation used in stage one. Statistics for the age and wave variables are from analyses using hourly earnings and individuals aged 25-64.  
Source: HILDA Survey, 2001-2013. 
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3.4.5 Sensitivity checks on imputed fathers’ earnings & preferred model 
specifications 
 
The estimation relies on the accuracy of the imputation strategy. While a systematic 
evaluation of this is obviously not possible without access to observed data, I undertook 
some sensitivity checks that helped ascertain the degree of confidence in my analytic 
approach. To do so, I leveraged information from a small subsample of HILDA Survey 
respondents for whom their fathers’ characteristics were observed when they were age 14.  
Young participants enter the HILDA Survey when they reach 15 years of age, and 
only co-residing fathers are included in the survey. Hence to identify this sample, I need to 
find out the father-son pairs that satisfy: (i) sons entered the survey no earlier than wave 2 
(so that father’s earnings when they were 14 can be observed in the survey) and no later 
than wave 13 (so that their own earnings can be observed in the survey); (ii) sons and 
fathers reside in the same household (so that fathers can be identified); (iii) sons reported 
earnings in their participation wave(s) to enable estimating the regression coefficients that 
are used to impute father’s earnings; (iv) sons reported father’s characteristics when they 
were 14 to enable the imputation of father’s earnings; and (v) the identified fathers 
reported earnings in early waves when sons aged 14. The age profile of sons in the 
resulting sample is shown in Figure 3-1.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3-1 Age profile of sons in a sample with observed father’s earnings when 
sons aged 14 
 
For this subsample, I had information on both the fathers’ observed earnings, age 
and occupation, and the sons’ subsequent retrospective reports of these characteristics as 
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they became 15 years old and entered the panel. This subsample includes 595 sons and 
496 fathers. While this is undoubtedly a selected subsample (it involves parents and 
children from younger generations who were observed to co-reside in the near past), I can 
use this to tease out the robustness of my imputation approach. 
Using these father-son pairs I first compared the son-reported paternal ages and 
occupations when sons were age 14, with the observed paternal ages and occupations 
when sons were age 14. Results in Figure 3-2 show a high level of similarity between 
these. In addition, the Pearson and Spearman correlation coefficients between son-
reported and observed father’s age and occupation were very large and highly statistically 
significant (Table 3-2). Taken together, these results suggest that sons’ reports do not 
distort the true distribution of the variables capturing fathers’ characteristics. 
 
 
Figure 3-2 Observed and son-reported fathers’ characteristics 
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Table 3-2 Correlation coefficients of observed and son’s report of father’s age and 
occupation 
Observed vs imputed 
father’s agea 
Observed vs son’s 
report of father’s 1-
digit occupationb 
Observed vs son’s 
report of father’s 2-
digit occupationb 
Observed vs son’s 
report of father’s 4-
digit occupationb 
0.95 0.63 0.64 0.64 
Notes: All coefficients are statistically significant at 0.1% level.  
a Pearson correlation coefficient. 
b Spearman rank correlation coefficient. 
 
Second, I compared the observed and imputed fathers’ earnings at each level of 
occupational (dis)aggregation by means of Pearson’s correlation coefficients. Such 
correlations, displayed in Table 3-3, are moderately large and highly significant, which 
supports the validity of my imputation strategy. Hence, the results of my robustness 
checks are generally encouraging. 
 
Table 3-3 Correlations between observed and imputed fathers’ earnings, by level of 
occupational (dis)aggregation 
 Pearson’s r 
1-digit occupations 0.29 
2-digit occupations 0.43 
3-digit occupations 0.47 
4-digit occupations 0.39 
Notes: All correlations are statistically significant at p<0.001. 
Source: HILDA Survey, 2001-2013. 
 
Additionally, I perused this subsample of father-son pairs to settle on a preferred 
specification regarding the level of occupational (dis)aggregation. There is an inherent 
trade-off between occupational precision and small sample sizes when using different 
levels of occupational (dis)aggregation to estimate earnings elasticities. Using detailed 
occupations reduces the within-occupation wage heterogeneity that exists at more 
aggregated levels. However, using highly-disaggregated occupations with a dataset of the 
size of the HILDA Survey yields cell sizes that are too small for robust analysis. Therefore, 
elasticity estimates from occupational levels that are not too aggregated (one-digit level) or 
too disaggregated (four-digit level) are preferable (i.e. two- or three-digit occupations). 
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Results in Table 3-3 provide additional empirical evidence for this, as they indicate that the 
imputation of fathers’ earnings is most precise when using 3-digit occupations (r=0.47), 
followed by two-digit (r=0.43), four-digit (r=0.39), and finally one-digit (r=0.29) occupations. 
Hence, I conclude that the models using 2-digit and 3-digit occupations should be my 
preferred models. 
 
3.5 Results 
 
3.5.1 Intergenerational earnings elasticity in Australia by level of occupational 
(dis)aggregation 
 
Table 3-4 displays the estimated intergenerational earnings elasticities (equation 
3.4) by the level of occupational (dis)aggregation and by different age restrictions. Full 
model output can be found in Table A3-3 in the Appendices. The father-son earnings 
elasticity in Australia between 2001 and 2013 ranges from 0.11 to 0.30.  
The estimated elasticities are larger when using the two-digit level than when using 
the three- or four-digit levels. The results when using the one-digit level are more volatile. 
Lower elasticities associated with more detailed occupation categories would be expected 
if earnings vary by occupational categories and fathers’ and sons’ occupational categories 
are more likely to differ when occupations are disaggregated. 
For each digit of occupational (dis)aggregation, the point estimates are higher when 
age is restricted to prime working age (30-55) than when using a broader age restriction 
(25-64), although these differences are small. 
 
Table 3-4 Father-son hourly earnings elasticity in Australia, by level of occupational 
(dis)aggregation 
Results 
Level of occupational (dis)aggregation 
One digit Two digits Three digits Four digits 
25-64 30-55 25-64 30-55 25-64 30-55 25-64 30-55 
Elasticities 0.232 0.301 0.259 0.282 0.235 0.255 0.112 0.129 
 (0.034) (0.040) (0.022) (0.026) (0.019) (0.023) (0.013) (0.015) 
R2 (overall) 0.044 0.038 0.060 0.051 0.061 0.053 0.050 0.044 
N (observations) 30,175 21,101 30,175 21,101 30,175 21,101 30,175 21,101 
N (individuals) 4,960 3,603 4,960 3,603 4,960 3,603 4,960 3,603 
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Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. All elasticities are statistically significant at p<0.001.  
Source: HILDA Survey, 2001-2013. 
 
3.5.2 Trends in intergenerational earnings elasticity over time 
 
The results obtained from my main model (i.e. equation 3.4) are overall mean 
elasticities across 13 years. In this section I extend my main model by incorporating the 
interaction terms of fathers’ logarithmic earnings with survey year, namely models (3.5)-
(3.7), to delineate trends in earnings elasticity over time. To simplify the analyses, I 
present trends using my preferred specification of 2-digit occupations. 
I first include the product of fathers’ earnings and year, assuming the trend is linear. 
The linear assumption is the simplest way to capture overall changes in elasticity. The 
changes can be derived from the marginal effects of fathers’ earnings, namely, 𝑓(𝑛)(𝑡) in 
model (3.6). I then fit models including higher-order polynomials of the year variable and 
plot them together with the linear trends for comparison purposes. I also test the 
significance of the added polynomials in ascending order. The test results show that the 
linear and cubic trends are statistically significant, indicating that the cubic model better 
depicts how earnings elasticity is changing over time.15 I plot the linear and cubic trends in 
Figure 3-3. 
Both the linear and the cubic trends display a similar overall increase in father-son 
earnings elasticity between 2001 and 2013, suggesting that earnings persistence in 
Australia is strengthening over the past decade. This decline in income mobility is 
consistent with previous findings for the US (Aaronson & Mazumder, 2008), the UK 
(Nicoletti & Ermisch, 2007), Norway (Hansen, 2010) and Finland (Pekkala & Lucas, 2007). 
                                                          
15 I also considered using quartic trends, but the fourth-order survey year polynomials were not 
statistically significant. 
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Figure 3-3 Linear and curvilinear trends of father-son earnings elasticity in Australia 
Notes: Elasticities estimated using hourly earnings in the main job. All elasticities are statistically 
significant at the 0.1% level.  
Source: HILDA Survey, 2001-2013. 
 
While I have established that there is an upward trend in earnings elasticity in 
Australia, the reasons behind this trend remain unexplored. Although a detailed 
examination is beyond the scope of this chapter, one obvious candidate is the degree of 
earnings inequality (Corak, 2013a). As a preliminary test, I further examined the 
association between inequality and mobility in Australia using my elasticity estimates and 
Gini coefficients.16 Figure 3-4 shows trends in earnings elasticity and Gini coefficients. The 
elasticities range from 0.22 to 0.28 between 2001 and 2012, whereas the Gini coefficients 
range from 0.3 to 0.34 over the same period. Both trends display a smooth “S” shape: the 
Gini coefficient reaches its local maximum in 2008, and declines afterwards; similarly, the 
elasticity moves downwardly after 2011.  
I then assess the strength of this association, taking care of artefactual correlation 
resulting from mutual dependence on time by detrending the data. I apply both parametric 
and non-parametric methods to detrend the data. For the parametric method, I model the 
two time series separately using linear regressions, and peruse their respective residuals. 
Test statistics confirm normality and homoscedasticity in these residuals. The correlation 
                                                          
16 The Gini coefficients for 2001, 2003-2004, 2006, 2008, 2010 and 2012 come from ABS (2013), 
while those for 2002, 2005, 2007 and 2009 come from Whiteford (2013). These Gini coefficients 
were calculated using equivalised disposable household income from ABS Surveys of Income and 
Housing. 
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coefficient between the two residual variables is 0.87 and is statistically significant at the 
1% level. For the non-parametric method, I take the first difference of each of the time 
series. Tests of autocorrelation show that these first differences are not autocorrelated. 
The correlation coefficient between the first differences of the earnings elasticity and those 
of the Gini coefficient is 0.71 and is statistically significant at the 5% level. My findings, 
therefore, provide evidence from Australia that economic inequality is positively associated 
with immobility.17  
 
Figure 3-4 Trends of father-son earnings elasticity and Gini coefficient in Australia 
over time 
Notes: Elasticities estimated using two-digit occupations and hourly earnings in the main job. All 
elasticities are statistically significant at the 0.1% level.  
Source: HILDA Survey, 2001-2013; ABS (2013); Whiteford (2013). 
 
3.5.3 Intergenerational earnings elasticity using different earnings measures 
 
Elasticities may depend also on the reference period for the measure of earnings 
considered. I argue that, compared to hourly earnings, weekly and annual earnings should 
be weaker in estimating elasticities, as they are affected by individuals’ work hours – which 
are positively correlated with the earnings rate. Since weekly and annual earnings are 
affected by working hours, these earnings measures should be more volatile and their use 
should yield lower elasticities. Drawing upon the rich information in the HILDA Survey, I 
test the effects on the elasticity estimates of using different earnings measures. Given the 
                                                          
17 Future research could move the analysis forward by assessing whether there is a lag between 
decreased mobility and increased economic inequality, and which direction the causal arrow goes. 
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large number of figures and comparison units, I undertake these analyses only for my two 
preferred specifications, i.e. the models using the two- and three-digit levels of 
occupational (dis)aggregation. 
Evidence in Table 3-5 supports my prior argument: using weekly and annual 
earnings rather than hourly earnings noticeably reduces the estimated elasticities. Full 
model output can be found in Table A3-4 in the Appendices. Relative to using hourly 
earnings, using weekly earnings reduces elasticities for individuals aged 25-64 years at 
the two- and three-digit occupation levels by about 32% and 29%, respectively; while using 
annual earnings reduces such elasticities by 21% and 25%. The same pattern can be 
observed for elasticities estimated on the sample of fathers and sons in prime working 
ages (30-55 years). Results of t tests show that, at each level of occupational 
(dis)aggregation, elasticities using weekly and annual earnings are significantly different 
from elasticities using hourly earnings for the sample aged 25-64, whereas elasticities 
using different earnings measures are not statistically significant for the sample aged 30-
55.18 Hence, my results indicate that estimated elasticities depend on the earnings 
measure used.  
 
Table 3-5 Father-son earnings elasticity using different earnings measures 
Occupational 
(dis)aggregation 
Earnings measures 
Hourly earnings Weekly earnings Annual earnings 
25-64 30-55 25-64 30-55 25-64 30-55 
Two digits 0.259 0.282 0.175++ 0.234 0.205+ 0.235 
 (0.022) (0.026) (0.025) (0.029) (0.025) (0.029) 
R2 (overall) 0.060 0.051 0.052 0.037 0.043 0.030 
N (observations) 30,175 21,101 30,211 21,125 32,675 22,857 
N (individuals) 4,960 3,603 4,962 3,604 5,017 3,674 
Three digits 0.235 0.255 0.166++ 0.221 0.177++ 0.207 
 (0.019) (0.023) (0.022) (0.025) (0.023) (0.026) 
R2 (overall) 0.061 0.053 0.053 0.040 0.042 0.030 
N (observations) 30,175 21,101 30,211 21,125 32,675 22,857 
                                                          
18 I compare elasticities estimated using different outcome variables, i.e. earnings measures. 
Hence, a caveat of these t tests is that I cannot estimate a covariance term. If I assume this to be 
positive, then the standard error of the difference will be sqrt (se12 + se22 – 2cov(se1,se2)). The t 
statistic assuming independence is therefore biased towards zero. 
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N (individuals) 4,960 3,603 4,962 3,604 5,017 3,674 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. All elasticities are statistically significant at p<0.001. p 
values for t tests: + p<0.11, ++ p<0.05. 
Source: HILDA Survey, 2001-2013. 
 
3.6 Discussion and conclusion 
 
In this chapter I have (i) developed and applied a two-stage panel regression model 
for estimating earnings elasticities, (ii) established trends of earnings elasticity over time, 
(iii) gathered empirical evidence about how elasticities are affected by the choice of level 
of occupational (dis)aggregation and earnings measures, and (iv) provided up-to-date 
elasticity estimates for Australia.  
I find that the intergenerational earnings persistence in contemporary Australia lies 
between 11% and 30%. My preferred estimates lie between 24% and 28% (using two- and 
three-digit occupations and hourly earnings). The elasticity increased slightly between 
2001 and 2013, and this upward trend is accompanied by a moderate level of inequality. A 
statistically significant correlation between earnings elasticity and Gini coefficients 
supports the empirical argument in the existing literature that economic mobility is 
inversely associated with economic inequality. This suggests that changing patterns of 
elasticity in a specific country need to be carefully evaluated with the dynamics of 
inequality. Elasticity estimates vary depending on the level of occupational 
(dis)aggregation used: they are highest when using two-digit occupations and lowest when 
using four-digit occupations. My supplementary analyses suggest that, when occupation-
based imputation of parental earnings is used, elasticity estimates using the two- and 
three-digit levels of occupational (dis)aggregation are preferable. Using different earnings 
measures also results in substantially different elasticity estimates: these are lowest when 
using annual earnings, and highest when using hourly earnings.  
Altogether, my results indicate that (i) Australia has a moderate level of income 
mobility by international standards, (ii) over the past decade there was a slight decline in 
intergenerational income mobility, and (iii) cross-temporal and cross-national comparisons 
of earnings elasticities should be exercised with caution, as differences in the data and 
methods used across comparison units have the potential to substantially alter the results 
(D’Addio, 2007; Jerrim, Choi & Rodríguez, 2013; Solon, 2002). 
While I made several important methodological contributions to the existing 
literature, particularly as it pertains to the Australian body of knowledge, this study does 
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not resolve other methodological shortcomings –many of which are driven by the lack of 
optimal data for the study of intergenerational earnings elasticity in Australia. These are 
obvious avenues for methodological refinement in subsequent Australian research in this 
field. 
First, fathers’ earnings are imputed using sons’ retrospective information, rather 
than being directly observed. While the use of imputed parental earnings is commonplace 
when observed fathers’ earnings are unavailable (Andrews & Leigh, 2009; Björklund & 
Jäntti, 1997; Leigh, 2007; Piraino, 2007), retrospective reports of parental characteristics 
are prone to measurement error and recall bias (Wooden & Watson, 2000). As a result, it 
has been argued that elasticity estimates obtained using this approach are likely to be 
downward-biased (Leigh, 2007; Mendolia & Siminski, 2015). In the sensitivity checks in 
section 3.4.5, however, I have quantified the degree of measurement error using paired 
fathers and sons in the survey, and found that (i) son-reported fathers’ characteristics 
closely match fathers’ actual characteristics, with large and statistically significant 
correlations; and (ii) the correlations between imputed and observed fathers’ earnings by 
different levels of occupational disaggregation are moderately large and statistically 
significant. These findings suggest that the measurement error and recall bias are small in 
my dataset and that my imputation methodology is valid. More generally, the strategy used 
to adjust for the potentially downward bias in elasticity estimates involves calculating and 
applying an “adjustment ratio”. This is a ratio of the magnitude of elasticities estimated 
using observed and imputed father data. This requires long-running panel data and has 
sometimes been done using the US Panel Study of Income Dynamics. Using this 
approach, Leigh (2007) obtained a ratio of 1.23 while Mendolia and Siminski (2015) 
obtained a ratio of 1.55. Applying Leigh’s ratio to my estimates would move them to be in 
the range of 0.14 (1.23×0.11) to 0.37 (1.23×0.30), while using Mendolia and Siminski’s 
would put my estimates in the 0.17 to 0.46 range. These corrections move my preferred 
estimates to be in the range of 0.30-0.34 (using Leigh’s ratio) and 0.37-0.43 (using 
Mendolia and Siminki’s ratio). Future studies may attempt to leverage new Australian data 
sources that enable researchers to observe parental as well as offspring earnings. 
Observing the earnings of both fathers and sons for a large and representative sample of 
Australians will be possible in the long term as more waves of the HILDA Survey become 
available. In the meantime, the progressive availability of long series of Commonwealth 
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Government administrative datasets for research purposes may open up new possibilities 
(Productivity Commission, 2013).19 
Second, imputing fathers’ earnings using data from sons assumes that the origin 
earnings regime is the same as the destination earnings regime. In other words, it requires 
the assumption that differences in earnings by age and across occupations have remained 
constant over time. This is a restrictive and unrealistic presumption, but one that needs to 
be confronted in the absence of suitable earnings data spanning a long period of time. 
Some researchers have used information from ‘pseudo fathers’ from older, external 
datasets to impute fathers’ earnings (Bjorklund & Jantti, 1997; Piraino, 2007; Solon, 2002), 
but the requisite data are not readily available in the Australian case. Even if they were, 
important trade-offs and further assumptions would be required. The effects that imputing 
fathers’ earnings using son’s data may have on elasticity estimates are uncertain, and 
further research into this issue would be welcome in Australia as well as internationally.  
Third, the methods commonly used to impute fathers’ earnings in the literature on 
earnings elasticities rely on deterministic rather than stochastic models, i.e. fathers who 
reportedly work in the same occupations and have the same ages are assumed to have 
earned exactly the same when their children were 14 years of age. This problem is shared 
by the existing Australian (Leigh, 2007; Mendolia & Siminski, 2015) and international 
(Mocetti, 2007; Piraino, 2007) studies. It is likely that the deterministic nature of the 
imputation of fathers’ earnings results in downward-biased standard errors on the elasticity 
estimates. In my case, this is unlikely to be highly problematic, as my elasticities are 
generally estimated with a very large degree of precision (p<0.001). In any case, 
introducing uncertainty in the imputation of fathers’ earnings in studies of intergenerational 
earnings elasticities is something that future studies in the field should consider. 
Finally, my analyses are performed on unweighted data and this may have 
implications on the observed trends in the presence of panel attrition. Correcting for this 
would nevertheless cause significant selection bias, chiefly because the longitudinal 
                                                          
19 Chetty et al. (2017) recently showed that, in the absence of historical panel data for early birth 
cohorts (the population-level panel data for children born before 1980 are not available in US 
censuses and population surveys), the trends of absolute mobility (measured using the fraction of 
children earning more than their parents) can be estimated by combining the marginal income 
distribution of each cohort with the joint income distribution of the cohort and their parents, under 
the assumption that this joint income distribution is stable across all cohorts. Therefore, cross-
sectional data for these early birth cohorts in the censuses can still be used to estimate the mobility 
patterns. 
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weights adjusting for attrition in the HILDA Survey can only be used with a strongly 
balanced panel. Restricting my analytical sample to respondents who participated in all 13 
waves in the survey reduces the sample size from 30,175 to 18,174, and such restriction 
also drops 57% of individuals in my sample. Hence, using the longitudinal weights in 
estimation arguably introduces more selectivity than it corrects for. Respondents who 
attrited from the HILDA Survey are more likely to be immigrants, from an ethnic minority, 
unemployed, or working in low-skilled occupations (Summerfield et al., 2014), so these 
groups are underrepresented in my unweighted sample - and progressively more as time 
unfolds. Studies have found much less upward mobility among ethnic minorities 
(Bhattacharya & Mazumder, 2011; Hertz, 2006), and elasticities are larger for immigrants 
than for natives (Dustmann, 2005; Hammarstedt & Palme, 2012; Vogel, 2006). Correcting 
for the attrition of these groups would arguably increase earnings elasticities, also because 
they show limited work-life mobility. Therefore, I believe that my elasticity estimates 
constitute a lower bound, and that elasticity trends would have been steeper had we had 
zero attrition in my sample. 
It is also important to note that I am only able to provide short-term snapshots of the 
changing patterns of father-son earnings elasticity with 13 waves of the HILDA Survey. 
This limitation could be addressed as the Survey continues to mature. 
In sum, this chapter has provided up-to-date estimates of intergenerational earnings 
elasticity in Australia using different techniques and assumptions. In doing so, it has shown 
the range of elasticities consistent with different analytic approaches, and enabled more 
reliable estimates for Australia to be used in future cross-national and cross-temporal 
research. My work has also improved and updated our understanding of income mobility in 
a wealthy capitalist nation with a very unique configuration of social and economic 
institutions. Since Australia had an internationally distinctive history of relatively 
compressed wage distributions and relatively uniform working conditions by occupation 
and industry, we could have anticipated low elasticities if historical data on income for 
early birth cohorts were available. Parental background may not matter over much for 
these early birth cohorts because institutional conditions compressed their earnings 
variability. Using contemporary panel data, however, I find an increase in earnings 
elasticity over time. This trend suggests that Australia is becoming less different from the 
US and the UK because it is moving towards more economic immobility accompanied with 
more economic inequality. It remains to be examined whether this decline in economic 
mobility reflects the weakening of labour market institutions such as unionisation, 
centralised wage fixing and the predominance of state and federal awards, and the 
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emergence of more individualised and enterprise level forms of wage negotiation and 
bargaining, over the course of the progressive marketisation of the economy and labour 
market in contemporary Australia.  
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Chapter 4 Parental wealth transfers in contemporary Australia 
 
4.1 Chapter introduction  
 
 This chapter examines the patterns and predictors of the likelihood and magnitude 
of parental wealth transfers in contemporary Australia. It focuses on how family 
background affects the probability and amount of parental wealth transfers over adult 
children’s life courses as well as at adult children’s major life events. Section 4.1 outlines 
the background of this empirical chapter, the importance of studying parental wealth 
transfers, research gaps in the existing literature, and the contributions and key findings of 
this chapter. Sections 4.2 and 4.3 offer an overview of the economic and sociological 
literature on parental wealth transfers. Section 4.4 provides details on the social and 
institutional context in Australia for the study of parental wealth transfers. Sections 4.5 and 
4.6 detail the data and methods used. Section 4.7 presents the findings and their 
interpretations. Section 4.8 concludes. 
 
4.1.1 Background 
 
There are well-known correlations between the socioeconomic outcomes of parents 
and those of their offspring, giving rise to the intergenerational persistence of 
(dis)advantage. Different social science theories rest on the premise that, when given the 
chance, privileged parents strive to transfer their privilege onto their children. There are 
however long-running and ongoing debates as to when and how this process occurs, i.e. 
the mechanisms through which advantaged parents advantage their children. 
The most prolific strand of the literature focuses on those life-course stages in 
which ‘children’ are underage. During childhood, high status parents spend comparatively 
more economic resources on material goods that stimulate children´s cognitive and socio-
emotional development and keep children in good health (e.g. access to good schools, 
extracurricular activities or health care, see Crosnoe & Muller, 2014; Hao & Yeung, 2015; 
Nilsen et al., 2010). They also advantage their offspring by making use of their 
comparatively high non-material resources, such as their more advanced cultural and 
social capital (e.g. by exerting optimal parenting practices and socialising their children into 
hegemonic cultural values, see Park & Lau, 2016). Later in life, high status parents can 
also afford to enrol their children in top universities, support them through their studies, 
and use their more developed social networks to aid them in their search for a first job 
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(Hardaway & McLoyd, 2009). These advantages attained during childhood, adolescence 
and early adulthood line the children of high status parents for success in subsequent life-
course stages, setting the stage for the intergenerational reproduction of socioeconomic 
status. 
However, the mechanisms used by high status parents to transfer their advantage 
onto their children do not end when their offspring reach adulthood, with some operating 
when children have ‘left the nest’ and over the remainder of their life courses. While 
comparatively fewer studies have focused on this stage, there is evidence that parental 
wealth transfers are a means through which privileged parents facilitate their adult 
children´s status attainment process. 
The topic of parental wealth transfers has been extensively studied by economists 
and sociologists. Early literature focuses on estimating the magnitude of wealth transfers 
(Gale & Scholz, 1994; Kotlikoff & Summers, 1980; Modigliani, 1988; Schoeni, 1997), and 
found that intended parental wealth transfers are the source of 20%-25% of aggregate 
national wealth. This body of literature was followed by an abundance of studies theorising 
and testing transfer motives (Cox & Rank, 1992; McGarry, 1999; Norton & Van Houtven, 
2006; Laitner, 1992; Laitner, 2002; Laitner & Ohlsson, 2001; Page, 2003). While theorists 
have proposed a number of transfer motives, including altruistic motives (i.e. parents care 
particularly about the wellbeing of disadvantaged children), strategic exchange motives 
(i.e. parents exchange transfers for children’s care and attention), and warm-glow motives 
(i.e. parents make transfers because they enjoy the action of giving), empirical evidence 
has so far provided mixed findings and different transfer motives have been found using 
different data and methods.  
 
4.1.2 Why studying parental wealth transfers is important 
 
Studying parental wealth transfers is important for a number of reasons. The first 
reason is related to the effect of public transfers (typically transfers made by government) 
on private transfers (i.e. parental transfers within families). Existing literature has no 
consensus on which direction this effect should go: early literature primarily argues for a 
crowd-out effect where generous welfare payments may reduce private transfers (Reil-
Held, 2006). More recent literature argues for a complementary relationship between 
public and private transfers (Brandt & Deindl, 2013). That is, public and private transfers 
work together and share family responsibilities: the state provides social services and legal 
obligations, while the families provide private care and supplementary support (Brandt & 
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Deindl, 2013). It is therefore of theoretical interest to understand how private transfers 
interact with public transfers in providing intergenerational support. 
The second reason why the study of parental transfers is important is that, parental 
wealth transfers are an important driver of wealth inequality across generations (Heer, 
2001). It has been found, for example, that parental wealth transfers account for half of the 
wealth of average young adults, but over 90% of the wealth of rich children (Boserup, 
Kopczuk & Kreiner, 2016).  
Additionally, parental wealth transfers not only affect the donor’s (i.e. parents) life-
time consumption and wealth transfer decisions (Laitner, 2008; McGarry, 1999), but also 
alleviate borrowing constraints and affect the receiver’s (i.e. grown-up children) 
socioeconomic outcomes and wellbeing over the life course (Berry, 2008). Intended wealth 
transfers may reduce parental consumption over their lives, but such transfers at certain 
points of children’s life, such as tertiary education, marriage, childbirth and property 
purchase may have profound impact on children’s life outcomes and wellbeing (Leopold & 
Schneider, 2011).  
 
4.1.3 Bridging research gaps in parental wealth transfers: This chapter 
 
While wealth transfers can be generation-skipping (e.g., grandparents to 
grandchildren) and reciprocal (e.g., children to parents), the majority of transfers are made 
from parents to children (Hughes, Massenzio & Whitaker, 2012). Parental wealth transfers 
consist of inter vivos transfers (i.e. gifts and allowances transferred when parents are 
alive) and inheritances/bequests (i.e. monetary transfers upon the death of parents). 
Research to date has found heterogeneous motives of inter vivos transfers: gift giving is 
reflective of both the altruistic goal of assisting the most disadvantaged children (Berry, 
2008; McGarry, 1999) and the strategic exchange of rewarding children who paid most 
attention (e.g. contact, informal care) to them in return (Norton & Van Houtven, 2006; Cox 
& Rank, 1992). Such heterogeneous motives result in differences in the probability, 
frequency and amount of transfers received by children (Arrondel & Masson, 2001). In 
contrast, inheritances/bequests are usually divided equally among children (McGarry, 
1999; Norton & Van Houtven, 2006; Sappideen, 2008). My focus in this chapter is on 
parental inter vivos transfers (hereafter generalised as parental wealth transfers). 
While most of the existing studies examined the effects of child characteristics 
(such as education, income, marital and employment status) on the probability and amount 
of giving/receiving parental wealth transfers, the effects of family background remain 
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understudied.20 In the handful of wealth transfer studies that included family background, 
the latter was treated as a control variable and the focus was elsewhere. For example, 
Brandt and Deindl (2013) use parental education and parental marital status as controls to 
examine the effect of social policies on gift transfers. Kohli (1999) controlled for parental 
income, wealth and education to study the interactions between public (old-age pensions) 
and private (inter vivos) transfers. Villanueva, Demange and Hochguertel (2005) use 
parental income to assess the crowd-out effect of unemployment insurance payment on 
inter vivos transfers. Various parental characteristics are also controlled to assess the 
relationship between gift transfer patterns and welfare regimes in Europe (Albertini & Kohli, 
2013; Albertini, Kohli & Vogel, 2007). Additionally, few of these studies examined the 
different patterns of parental wealth transfers by parental socioeconomic status (hereafter 
referred to as SES) over their adult children’s life courses. Consequently, we know little 
about when and how adult children from different socioeconomic backgrounds and over 
their life courses receive monetary help from parents. This gap needs to be addressed, 
because (i) parental wealth transfers are an important means through which social and 
economic (dis)advantage is reproduced, and an important driver of wealth inequality 
across generations; and (ii) knowing the different patterns of parental wealth transfers over 
children's life course helps better understand the disparities in parental investment across 
advantaged versus disadvantaged families, which may have important policy implications. 
For example, if status transmission in advantaged families is associated with parental 
wealth transfers taking place early in children’s life and at significant life events, then 
public policies need to derive interventions that target disadvantaged families by providing 
direct compensatory public transfers to these children when they are young and when they 
experience life-course transitions. 
This chapter bridges this knowledge gap by systematically exploring how family 
background is associated with differences in parental wealth transfers. It surveys the 
economic and sociological literature on parental wealth transfers, identifies various family 
background variables as potential predictors, and examines the associations between 
these variables and the likelihood as well as magnitude of parental wealth transfers. I 
begin the data analysis by estimating the (main) effects of family background on the 
likelihood and magnitude of parental wealth transfers using the whole sample, then 
separate the analysis on the differences in the likelihood and magnitude of parental wealth 
                                                          
20 For a detailed review of the effect of family background on intergenerational correlation of 
earnings and education, see Black and Devereux (2011). 
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transfers by parental socioeconomic statuses. In doing so, I add to the parental wealth 
transfer literature both substantively and methodologically. Substantively, I advance the 
field by applying a life-course approach that enables me to provide novel evidence on how 
differences in parental wealth transfers by family background evolve over children’s life 
courses and whether they are contingent on major life-course events. Methodologically, I 
contribute to the field by exploiting long-running panel data from an Australian national 
sample to follow a more sophisticated and fit-for-purpose analytic approach than previous 
studies, consisting of random-effect, Heckman selection models. This estimation technique 
simultaneously accounts for the inter-dependence of the probability and amount of 
parental wealth transfers, corrects for several sources of omitted-variable and selection 
bias, and capture the underlying dynamics of parental wealth transfers. 
Key findings show an overall increase in the probability of receiving parental wealth 
transfers over time, while transfer amount remains stable. Advantaged family backgrounds 
(approximated by parental education level, employment status, unemployment history, 
occupational standing and family breakdown) are associated with increases in both the 
likelihood and the magnitude of parental wealth transfers to adult children. Differences are 
most pronounced in early adulthood, but remain over the children’s life courses. Transfer 
patterns by family background are similar at the events of childbirth, marriage, being a full-
time student, material deprivation, lack of financial prosperity and income poverty, while 
purchasing a property and financial worsening are related to increases in the likelihood 
and magnitude of parental wealth transfers for children born to middle/high family 
background only. 
 
4.2 Family background, parental investments and wealth transfers 
 
Parental investments take on a number of forms: investment in nutrition, cognitive 
and non-cognitive skill development, human capital investment (education), equipment to 
facilitate learning, social networks and social capital. Research has found that parental 
investments differ substantially, in both quantity and quality, by the SES of the families. 
High SES families provide children with better diet and nutrition (Nilsen et al., 2010), afford 
more extracurricular activities and after-school tuitions to develop children’s skills and 
abilities (Hao & Yeung, 2015), are more likely to send children to better schools and to 
universities (Crosnoe & Muller, 2014), purchase better computer equipment (Escarce, 
2003), and open up better career potentials and opportunities (Hardaway & McLoyd, 
2009), than low SES families do.  
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Parental wealth transfers constitute an important form of parental investments, 
because these transfers provide direct financial means to alleviate liquidity constraints and 
improve financial conditions of the children (McGarry, 2016). Similar to other forms of 
parental investments, the probability and amount of parental transfers vary across different 
SES families. However, the relationship between parental SES, the probability and the 
amount of transfers is not clear-cut.  
On one hand, parents of high SES are more likely to transfer and transfer more 
simply because they have the capacity to do so—they are financially better-off than 
parents of low SES (Fingerman et al., 2009; Smeeding, 2016). Faced with financial 
constraints, parents of low SES instead provide more practical, non-monetary help and 
support (e.g. allowing children to co-reside, taking care of grandchildren, etc. For details, 
see Berry, 2006).  
On the other hand, parents of low SES have higher marginal utility of transferring 
wealth if wealth transfer is motivated by exchange, and children of low SES families have 
greater needs that motivate altruistic parents to provide more financial assistance (Albertini 
& Radl, 2012). In this respect, the probability and amount of wealth transfers are higher for 
parents of low SES than for parents of high SES.  
A third perspective relates to the “status reproduction” thesis—high SES parents 
are more engaged in wealth transfers in order to facilitate the transmission of social and 
economic advantage and to prevent their children from downward mobility (Albertini & 
Radl, 2012).  
Therefore, theories pertaining to the association between family background and 
parental wealth transfers provide limited and contradicting guidance regarding the direction 
of the effect of family background on the probability and the amount of wealth transfers. 
Conversely, empirical evidence consistently points towards a positive relationship 
between parental SES and parental transfers. The higher level the parental income, 
wealth, education and occupation, the more likely parents make transfers and transfer 
more (Albertini & Kohli, 2013; Brandt & Deindl, 2013; Karagiannaki, 2011; Cooney & 
Uhlenberg, 1992; Jayakody, 1998; Hochguertel & Ohlsson, 2009; Tiefensee & 
Westermeier, 2016). As Lee and Aytac (1998: 428) put it, “For donors, sufficient resources 
always increase the probability and the amount of transfers”. Parents in marriage are also 
found to transfer more than separated/divorced/widowed parents (Brandt & Deindl, 2013; 
Cooney & Uhlenberg, 1992).  
 
4.3 A life-course approach to the study of parental wealth transfers 
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There have been extensive discussions on the life-cycle patterns of parental 
investments on children (Erola, Jalonen & Lehti, 2016; Kaplan & Lancaster, 2003) and the 
differences in these patterns by parental SES (Hango, 2005). Parents invest in education 
when children are young; provide financial assistance and social capital as children enter 
labour market; devote time, money and care for grandchildren; and transmit wealth (such 
as estate, bequests and inheritance) after they decease (Arrondel & Masson, 2001). On 
average, children born to higher SES families receive more parental investments 
(particularly financial investments) over their life course than children born to low SES 
(Hango, 2005).  
While parental wealth transfers are an important form of parental investments, 
research into the life-course perspective of such transfers is surprisingly lacking. Cooney 
and Uhlenberg (1992) focus primarily on parental support over children’s life course. They 
find a decline in the probability of receiving parental transfers as children age, with children 
aged 25-29 three times more likely to receive parental transfers than children aged 60-64. 
The effect of children’s age on the probability of receiving parental transfers remains 
strong after controlling for children’s life events such as enrolling in school, starting to work 
and getting married, but this effect is even stronger when parental life-course 
characteristics are included such as parental age, health, marital and decease status. 
Leopold and Schneider (2011) examine the transfer patterns upon children’s life events. 
They find that large gifts are more likely to be transferred in the years of marriage and 
divorce, but not at childbirth, indicating that gift transfers respond to children’s economic 
needs. Their findings resonate with Ploeg et al. (2004) that financial assistance from 
parents helps children go through important life events and difficult transitions such as 
forming families, beginning careers and union dissolution. Parental financial support made 
early in the family life cycle also significantly increases the social support children 
reciprocate over the course of their later life (Silverstein et al., 2002), suggesting that 
parental wealth transfers based on motives of strategic exchange yield long-run pay-off as 
children continue to mature while parents enter old age (Albertini & Radl, 2012; Henretta et 
al., 1997). 
While these studies provide important insights into the life-course patterns of 
parental wealth transfers, they can be improved in several fronts. First, although Cooney 
and Uhlenberg (1992) noticed that the effect of children’s age on the probability of 
receiving parental wealth transfers is non-linear, they were not able to test this by 
modelling higher-order age polynomials because their age variable is categorical. While it 
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is important to find that older children are less likely to receive parental wealth transfers, 
the gradient of the decline in the probability remains unclear, that is, whether the decline is 
sharper or slower in children’s early versus late life.  
Second, Leopold and Schneider (2011) mainly explored parental wealth transfers at 
children’s three life events: marriage, childbirth and divorce. Since parental transfers are 
mostly monetary transfers, such financial assistance may also be associated with other 
money-related life circumstances of children, such as income poverty, material deprivation, 
and worsening financial situations.  
Third, all these studies applied the life-course perspective to the probability of 
receiving parental wealth transfers, yet the amount of parental wealth transfers may as 
well follow a similar or different life-course trajectory. Importantly, none of these studies 
considered differences in the life-course patterns of parental wealth transfers by parental 
SES. If parental investments show divergent life-course profiles in low compared to high 
SES families, I would expect this to also apply to parental wealth transfers.  
 
4.4 The Australian case: Institutional context and international experience 
 
The majority of studies on parental wealth transfers exist in Europe and the US, and 
in-kind studies in Australia are very limited. Barrett et al. (2015) provided some evidence of 
the incidence and magnitude of gift transfers and inheritance, but their prime focus was on 
the effect of wealth transfers on home ownership. Sappideen (2008) provided some 
theoretical discussions about the nature and motives of intergenerational wealth transfers 
among Australian parents. She found unequal gift transfers and equal shares of bequests 
among Australian children. She showed that gift transfers involve extensive reciprocal 
exchange, with children living close to parents providing more assistance and receiving 
more gifts in return. However, her subject of interest was the baby boomer generation 
(born between 1946 and 1966; ABS, 2014), and no statistical analysis on the patterns, 
determinants and dynamics of intergenerational wealth transfers was involved. Neither of 
these studies looked at the effect of family background on wealth transfers. Cobb-Clark 
and Gørgens (2012) compared parental wealth transfers received by young adults (18 and 
20 years old) from Australian families with and without a history of receiving government 
support. They found that young adults with a family history of government support receipt 
receive significantly lower amount of parental wealth transfers. Their work, however, only 
explored parental wealth transfers at children’s young adulthood, rather than how wealth 
transfers evolve over children’s life course. I argue, however, that studying parental wealth 
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transfers associated with family background and receivers’ life course is particularly 
interesting in the Australian context. 
Australia is among the few OECD countries that have no tax on gifts and 
inheritances.21 Australia was ahead of most of these countries in abolishing wealth transfer 
taxes and repealed gift and inheritance taxes in the early 1980s as a result of three 
contributing factors: (i) the threshold of tax exemptions was not increased to account for 
inflation, (ii) the commonwealth and state duties yielded a duplicative system of wealth 
transfer taxes, and (iii) taxes were more easily avoided by the affluent than by the general 
public, putting the distributive purpose of such tax in question (Duff, 2005; Duff, 2016; 
Pedrick, 1981; Taxation Policy Elective Class, 1994).  
In countries that tax gifts and inheritances, taxation is found to have a significant 
impact on transfer behaviours of parents. The change in parental transfer behaviours 
exhibits three patterns: first, parents make choices between gifts and inheritances 
depending on the respective tax rates. When the tax rate is higher for gifts than for 
inheritances, parents are less likely to give, and give smaller gifts, to children; conversely, 
when inheritance tax rate exceeds gift tax rate, gifts are more likely to follow (Joulfaian, 
2005; Bernheim et al., 2004).  
Second, when gifts and inheritances are taxed separately, parents have the 
incentive to avoid or minimise taxes by changing the timing of transfers: parents may 
strategically allocate the money into gifts and inheritances such that both portions are 
below or very close to the respective threshold of tax exemptions. In contrast, if gifts and 
inheritances are taxed jointly (i.e. the tax rate on inheritances applies to the total amount of 
inheritances and gifts transferred previously), the allocation of money and the timing of 
transfers do not reduce or eliminate taxes. Parents would hence make transfer decisions 
based on children’s economic needs (altruistic motive) or their expected future benefits 
(exchange motive), rather than on the purpose of tax avoidance (see examples in 
Nordblom & Ohlsson, 2006).  
                                                          
21 Among the OECD countries, Australia, Austria, Canada, Estonia, Israel, Latvia, Mexico, New 
Zealand, Norway, Slovakia and Sweden have no taxes for gifts and inheritances. Chile, Denmark, 
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, 
Netherlands, Poland, South Korea, Slovenia, Spain, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom and 
the United States tax both gifts and inheritances. In the Czech Republic, gifts and inheritances 
taxes were incorporated into the income tax since 2014. In Portugal, gift and inheritance taxes 
were abolished in 2004 and gifts and inheritances are subject to stamp tax instead (Cole, 2015; 
European Foundation Centre, 2014; EY, 2014; Ydstedt & Wollstad, 2014).  
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Third, when gift taxes apply only to the amount of individual transactions, parents 
would make each transaction at the borderline of the tax exemption threshold. In contrast, 
if taxes are based on the cumulative gifts transferred in the past (i.e. lifetime gifts, see 
Kopczuk, 2013), transferring large gifts would not be time dependent—that is, parents 
would not split large gifts into small pieces and make transfers multiple times. 
Given these complex mechanisms through which parental transfer decisions (to 
avoid tax) and the design of taxation systems (to preclude actions of tax avoidance) 
interact, “no tax on transfers” over the past 40 years provides an internationally unique 
context to study the patterns of parental wealth transfers in contemporary Australia. The 
Australian context is unique because the taxation environment largely frees the donors 
from optimising the time and allocation of transfers to reduce tax payment, as what their 
peers have to do in tax-levying Europe and the US—Australian donors can simply transfer 
any amount at any time, and this may have implications on the effect of parental SES on 
the observed probability and amount of parental transfers Australian children receive.  
 
4.5 Data  
 
4.5.1 Dataset  
 
The data I use in this chapter come from 15 waves of the Household, Income and 
Labour Dynamics in Australia (HILDA) Survey. Detailed explanations on survey 
administration, data collection, sample follow-up and response rates can be found in 
section 3.4.1 in Chapter 3. This dataset is unique for my research purposes in this chapter, 
because it contains rich retrospective information on family background and on parental 
wealth transfers.  
 
4.5.2 Sample selection 
 
I restrict my sample to respondents aged between 18 and 40. This is because older 
respondents are less likely to have parents who are still alive, and are more likely to be gift 
givers (Albertini, Kohli & Vogel, 2007).22 My final analytical sample consists of 87,854 
observations nested within 16,723 individuals. Among them, 3,873 individuals (7,274 
                                                          
22 Sensitivity checks restricting the sample to respondents aged 18 to 50 produced similar results 
to those presented here. 
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observations, 8.3%) reported having received parental transfers over the survey window, 
among whom 3,795 individuals (7,059 observations, 97.0%) provided the amount of 
parental transfers received. 
 
4.5.3 Dependent variables 
 
Data on parental wealth transfers were collected via a two-part survey question. 
The first part of the question asks respondents whether they received money during the 
last financial year from any of the following sources: (i) superannuation/rollover, 
fund/annuity/life insurance/allocated pension fund; (ii) child support/maintenance; (iii) 
workers compensation/accident or sickness insurance/personal accident claims; (iv) 
redundancy and severance payments; (v) inheritance/bequests; (vi) parents (if respondent 
lives with parents, say: include any money you may receive as pocket money or as a 
regular allowance); (vii) other persons not in this household; and (viii) other source 
[emphasis added]. The second part of the question asks the total amount across all the 
payments received from each nominated source. Parental wealth transfer data comes 
from responses related to the category from ‘parents’. 
I adjust the amount of parental wealth transfers for inflation to 2015 prices using the 
Consumer Price Index. Due to the severe right skewness of the variable’s distribution, I 
apply a logarithmic transformation using the natural log. 
These data on parental wealth transfers in the HILDA Survey have two important 
advantages over data collected in other surveys. First, the question on gift transfers clearly 
shows transfers from parents to children. This allows me to confidently model the effect of 
parental background on the transfers received by the children. Some surveys, such as the 
Panel Study of Income Dynamics, do not distinguish between the adult children and their 
families as receivers: parental transfers can be received by any family member (Jayakody, 
1998). In this case, the relationship between the senders and receivers could be parents 
and children or parents-in-law and children, so using the characteristics of respondents’ 
parents to model the transfers received may lead to error if the transfers were actually 
made by respondents’ parent-in-law. Second, it enables me to model not only the 
likelihood of children receiving parental transfers, but also the amounts they receive, and 
to do so jointly. Joint models of the probability and amount of parental transfers not only 
leverages the advantage of using the full sample (as compared to a single model of 
transfers based only on a subsample of receivers), but also provide additional insights into 
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the transfer volumes (as compared to the single model of the probability of receiving 
transfers with the full sample).  
 
4.5.4 Family socioeconomic background variables 
 
My key independent variables capture different dimensions of family socioeconomic 
background. The HILDA Survey collects a wide range of retrospective parental 
background information, pertaining to when the respondents were 14 years of age. I 
peruse this to construct the following measures: 
Parental union history. Using answers to a question asking “Did your mother and 
father ever get divorced or separate?”, I create a dichotomous variable indicating whether 
the respondent’s parents ever got divorced or separated.  
Parental employment status. The HILDA Survey collects information on paternal 
and maternal employment status via separate questions worded: “Thinking back to when 
you were 14 years old, did your father(mother) work in a job, business or farm?”. I combine 
this information to derive a categorical variable indicating the number of employed parents 
when the respondent was age 14 (0, 1 or 2).  
Father’s unemployment history. This is a dichotomous variable indicating whether 
or not the respondent’s father was unemployed for a total of 6 months or more while the 
respondent was growing up. Unfortunately, there is no analogous question on the 
unemployment history of the mother in the HILDA Survey.  
Parental education. The HILDA Survey also collects information on father’s and 
mother’s highest educational qualifications via three questions: (i) “please tell me how 
much schooling your father(mother) completed? None; Primary school only; Some 
secondary school, but no more than Year 10; Year 11 or equivalent; Year 12 or equivalent; 
Don’t know.” (ii) “Did your father(mother) complete an educational qualification after 
leaving school? Please include any trade certificates, apprenticeships, diplomas, degrees 
or other educational qualifications”, and (iii) “From where was his(her) highest level 
qualification obtained? University; Teachers college/College of Advanced Education; 
Institute of Technology; Technical college/TAFE/College of Technical and Further 
Education; Employer; Other (please specify); Don’t know”. I first create two dummy 
variables indicating whether the father and mother had a university degree, and then 
combine these into a categorical variable capturing the number of parents with university 
degrees (0, 1 or 2).  
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Parental occupation. Respondents were asked to write down the title and the main 
tasks/duties of their father’s and mother’s occupations when respondents were 14 years of 
age. This information was then coded to the 2006 Australian and New Zealand Standard 
Classification of Occupations (ANZSCO) in the HILDA Survey. I use the father’s and 
mother’s occupational codes to create two dummy variables indicating whether each 
parent worked in a managerial/professional occupation. I then combine these two dummy 
variables and create a categorical variable indicating the number of parents in 
managerial/professional occupations (0, 1 or 2).  
Parental occupational status. Measures of paternal and maternal occupational 
status based on the Australian Socioeconomic Index 2006 (McMillan, Beavis & Jones, 
2009) are available in the HILDA Survey. Scores in this classification range from 0 (lowest 
status) to 100 (highest status). I create a continuous variable that captures the mean 
occupational status of the respondent’s father and mother. If only one parent has an 
occupation, the score of this occupation is used to represent parental occupational status. 
 
4.5.5 Children’s major life events  
 
To assess the patterns of parental wealth transfers at children’s major life events by 
family background, I choose the following candidate events during which transfers likely 
differ. Existing studies on the effect of life events on parental transfers have used some of 
these events, including childbirth, marriage and university enrolment (Cooney & 
Uhlenberg, 1992; Leopold & Schneider, 2011), and have found that these life events are 
associated with increases in the probability of receiving parental transfers. Given the surge 
of property prices in Australia, however, it is increasingly difficult for young people to 
purchase a property without financial assistance from parents. Parental transfers therefore 
provide financial means that enable property purchases, more so for young adults from 
affluent families. Additionally, parental monetary transfers may also be associated with 
children’s adverse financial circumstances such as lack of financial prosperity, worsening 
financial conditions, material deprivation and income poverty, simply because parental 
transfers are the quickest and most efficient way of relieving the financial pressure of adult 
children. 
Childbirth. This is a dummy variable taking the value one if there is an increase in 
the total number of children the respondent ever had between years t and t-1, and the 
value zero otherwise.  
91 
 
Getting married. This is a dummy variable coded to one if the respondent’s marital 
status changes to ‘married’ from some other status (never married, cohabiting, divorced, 
separated, widowed) between years t and t-1, and coded zero otherwise. 
Buying a property. HILDA Survey respondents were asked whether they own the 
property they live in, rent it, or live there rent free. I create a dummy variable taking the 
value one if the respondent becomes a home owner between years t and t-1, and the 
value zero otherwise. 
Being a full-time student. This is a dummy variable taking the value one if the 
respondent is engaged in full-time studies at the time of interview, and the value zero 
otherwise. 
Lack of financial prosperity. HILDA Survey data on financial prosperity come from a 
survey question asking respondents: “Given your current needs and financial 
responsibilities, would you say that you and your family are: (i) prosperous; (ii) very 
comfortable; (iii) reasonably comfortable; (iv) just getting along; (v) poor; or (vi) very poor”. 
Using this information, I create a dummy variable taking the value one if the respondent 
considers his/her financial situation to be ‘poor’ or ‘very poor’, and the value zero 
otherwise. 
Financial worsening. This is a dummy variable taking the value one if the 
respondent reports experiencing a major worsening in his/her financial situation over the 
past 12 months, and the value zero otherwise. This information comes from a HILDA 
Survey question asking “Did any of these happen to you in the past 12 months—Major 
worsening in financial situation (e.g., went bankrupt)?”. 
Material deprivation. This is a dummy variable coded to one if respondents reported 
experiencing any of the following circumstances in the past year because of a shortage of 
money: (i) could not pay electricity, gas or telephone bills on time, (ii) could not pay the 
mortgage or rent on time, (iii) pawned or sold something, (iv) went without meals, (v) was 
unable to heat home, (vi) asked for financial help from friends or family, or (vii) asked for 
help from welfare/community organisations. 
Income poverty. Respondents are considered to be income poor if their equivalised 
gross annual household income is below 60% of the sample median (McLachlan, Gilfillan 
& Gordon, 2013). 
I also construct and use in my models lags of the dummy variables for the life 
events of childbirth, getting married and buying a property. These indicate whether the 
event was observed to occur between time t-2 and time t-1, and are used to capture 
parental wealth transfers made in anticipation of a foreseeable event. 
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4.5.6 Control variables 
 
In assessing the effect of family background and life events on the probability and 
amount of parental wealth transfers, I control for a set of ‘child’ characteristics (i.e. 
characteristics of the respondents) that may act as cofounders. These include 
respondents’ gender, age, marital status (partnered; divorced, separate or widowed; never 
partnered), employment status (employed; unemployed; not in the labour force), country of 
birth (Australia; main English-speaking country; other) 23, disability24, OECD equivalised 
household income, expressed in AU$10,000s and adjusted for inflation to 2015 prices 
using annual Consumer Price Index rates25, number of dependent children26, number of 
siblings, number of co-residing parents (0, 1 or 2), and survey wave (1-15).  
 
4.6 Methods 
 
4.6.1 Random-effect Heckman selection model 
 
To test my hypotheses, I use Heckman selection models estimated using panel 
data. This model is needed to jointly estimate the probability and the amount of transfers 
children receive over the observation window. In doing so, I make an important 
methodological contribution to the study of intergenerational wealth transfers. The majority 
of literature uses standard cross-sectional logit models to estimate the probability of 
receiving parental wealth transfers and linear regression models (e.g. OLS or tobit models) 
to estimate the transfer amount. Doing so results in two methodological issues.  
                                                          
23 The main English-speaking countries are the United Kingdom, Ireland, New Zealand, Canada, 
the United States and South Africa (ABS, 2011). 
24 Disability information comes from a question asking respondents: “Do you have any long-term 
health condition, impairment or disability that restricts you in your everyday activities, and has 
lasted or is likely to last, for 6 months or more?”. 
25 The equivalence scale here uses the square-root scale, which divides household income by the 
square root of household size (OECD, 2013). 
26 Dependent children are defined as persons under 15 years of age, or persons aged 15-24 who 
are “engaged in full-time study, not employed full-time, living with one or both parents, not living 
with a partner, and who does not have a resident child of their own” (Wilkins, 2015: 14). 
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The first issue relates to the use of cross-sectional data, as it assumes that the 
relationship between child characteristics and parental wealth transfers is 
contemporaneous. Nevertheless, it is of critical value to look at the pattern of parental 
wealth transfers receiving over time. This is because parental transfers can be time-
sensitive: children who receive large amount of parental transfers in one year due to 
significant life events (such as getting married or buying a property) may not receive the 
same amount in another year; parents may give an equal chance of providing wealth 
transfers to all children, resulting in some sibling members receiving parental transfers in 
one year while other sibling members receiving parental transfers in another year. Given 
this, using cross-sectional data of parental transfers only captures transfer receiving at one 
time point, and masks the underlying dynamics of parental transfers.  
The second issue relates to separating the analyses on the probability and amount 
of parental wealth transfers, as it assumes that the two processes are independent. Such 
assumption, however, is too stringent for two reasons. First, it is likely that children who 
receive more money come from better-off families, and so are also more likely to receive 
parental transfers. Therefore, unobserved heterogeneity is correlated with both the 
probability and the amount of transfers. Failure to capture this correlation in the two 
processes is likely to lead to biased estimates in both models (Berry, 2006; Heckman, 
1979). The direction of bias, however, is not clear, because the bias in the transfer amount 
equation can go either upward or downward27. For example, if excluding observations with 
missing transfer amount results in children from well-off families being overly 
representative, the effect of family background would be overestimated. Conversely, if 
children from adverse family background are overly represented after excluding 
observations with missing transfer amount, the effect of family background would be 
underestimated. Hence, determining which of these scenarios hold remains a question to 
be addressed empirically. Second, only children who are “selected” to receive parental 
transfers reported the amount of transfers received. In other words, the amount of parental 
transfers is contingent upon having received transfers. The conditionality of transfer 
amount indicates that modelling the amount of parental transfers without taking into 
account the probability of receiving transfers may result in biased estimates in the amount 
equation. 
                                                          
27 The bias would most likely occur in the transfer amount equation, as the selection equation 
always uses the full sample, regardless of whether the transfer amount equation is jointly 
estimated or not. 
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To account for this correlation and address these sources of selection bias, the 
models for the probability and the amount of parental transfers need to be estimated 
jointly. Heckman selection models are a widely used tool to jointly model the selection and 
outcome processes (Heckman, 1979). 
A handful of studies on parental wealth transfers used this model to jointly estimate 
(i) the probability and amount of transfers (Berry, 2006), or (ii) the probability of co-
residence and the probability of making financial transfers (conditional on children not co-
residing with parents) (Albertini & Kohli, 2013).28 These studies, however, use cross-
sectional data. When panel data are used (see Berry, 2008 and Rosenzweig and Wolpin, 
1993), processes of transfer amount/probability are treated as independent, which as 
explained before is problematic. 
I improve upon these studies by applying Heckman selection models to panel data. 
This is done by adding random effects to the models, thereby capturing the nested 
structure of the data (multiple observations nested within individuals). The random-effect 
Heckman selection model has two important advantages over the standard panel 
regression models and the (cross-sectional) Heckman selection model. First, it allows me 
to examine changes in parental wealth transfers received over time, avoids transitory 
fluctuations associated with parental transfers received due to children’s major life events, 
and improves efficiency in the estimation. Second, it models the probability and amount of 
parental transfers jointly even after accounting for the panel structure of the data, thus 
addressing the correlated residuals and avoiding selection bias.29 
                                                          
28 Other studies use alternative methods to account for the correlated residuals that may underlie 
the system of equations of interest. Nordblom and Ohlsson (2011) use the trivariate probit model to 
predict the probabilities of receiving university education, inter vivos transfers and inheritances. 
Attias-Donfut, Ogg and Wolf (2005) apply the Geweke–Hajivassiliou–Keane simulation method to 
estimating the probabilities of giving and receiving financial and time transfers, specifying the 
residuals of these models to follow a multivariate normal distribution. Spilerman and Wolff (2012) 
jointly estimate the impact of gift/bequest transfers on the proportion of down payment (ordered 
probit) and the housing value (OLS) using a maximum likelihood algorithm with numerical 
integration of the residuals from the statistical package aML.   
29 While there have been a number of econometric solutions to estimating selection models in the 
context of panel data (Hsiao, 2003; Kyriazidou, 1997; Wooldridge, 1995), their applications 
remained difficult, chiefly because standard statistical packages did not allow for these. From its 
13th version, these models can be fit in Stata’s software via its generalised structural equation 
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4.6.2 Statistical methods 
 
Let me denote ln (𝐺𝑖𝑡) as the logarithmic transformation of the transfer amount 𝐺𝑖𝑡 
individual 𝑖 received at wave 𝑡, 𝐷𝑖𝑡 as the binary outcome of having received parental 
transfers for individual 𝑖 at wave 𝑡, and 𝑦𝑖𝑡
∗  as the latent continuous variable that 
determines the outcome 𝐷𝑖𝑡. I have: 
 
                        ln(𝐺𝑖𝑡) |𝐷𝑖𝑡=1 = 𝑿𝒊𝒕𝜷 + 𝑢𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡, and missing otherwise                            (4.1) 
 
                                        𝑦𝑖𝑡
∗ = 𝒁𝒊𝒕𝜸 + 𝑣𝑖 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡 > 0                                                           (4.2) 
 
Equations (4.1) and (4.2) need to be estimated jointly, as the error term of the 
probability of receiving parental transfers and the error term of the transfer amount are 
likely correlated. In the context of panel data, I fit the Heckman selection model using 
generalised structural equation modelling (GSEM) by adding random effects at level two 
(i.e. the individual level) (StataCorp, 2013). The coefficients of interest, i.e. 𝜷 and 𝜸 can 
then be transformed from the corresponding GSEM 𝜷∗ and 𝜸∗ in the output by 𝜷 = 𝜷∗ and 
𝜸 = 𝜸∗/√𝜎2∗ + ?̃?2∗ + 1, where 𝜎2
∗
 is the GSEM output for the error variance in the transfer 
probability model and ?̃?2
∗
is the GSEM output for the variance of the random effects. The 
coefficients 𝜷 can be interpreted as the percentage changes in parental transfers 
associated with a one-unit increase in 𝑿𝒊𝒕, and the coefficients 𝜸 can be interpreted as the 
change in the log of odds of receiving over not receiving parental transfers associated with 
a one-unit increase in 𝒁𝒊𝒕. In the results, I will present the transformed coefficients in the 
amount equation (i.e. 𝜷), and the odds ratios of the transformed coefficients in the 
probability equation (i.e. 𝜸). 
To correctly identify the system of equations, it is advised that 𝑿𝒊𝒕 be a subset of 𝒁𝒊𝒕 
(for detailed discussions, see Wooldridge, 2009; Wooldridge, 2010). The analyses show 
that, for models involving the overall effect of parental background (section 4.7.2) and 
parental transfers at children’s major life events (section 4.7.4), the quadratic term of age 
is significant only in the probability equation. Therefore, I use this in the selection equation 
to meet the requirement of exclusion restriction. Similarly, for models examining the life-
                                                                                                                                                                                                
modelling routine (Statacorp, 2013). This simplifies the task of estimating Heckman selection 
models using panel data. 
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course patterns of parental transfers (section 4.7.3), the cubic term of age serves as the 
variable “excluded” from the amount equation. 
 
4.6.3 Analytical approach 
 
I begin with descriptive analyses of the probability and amount of parental wealth 
transfers. I then fit a series of random-effect Heckman selection models, introducing 
different indicators of family background. To examine the life-course patterns of parental 
transfers by parental SES, I model the probability and amount of parental transfers as a 
function of higher-order age polynomials. I test the robustness of the differences in the 
predicted probability and amount of parental transfers across SES families by including 
different sets of controls. To further my discussions on the different patterns of parental 
transfers by parental SES over children’s life course, I explore how parental transfers differ 
at children’s major life events by parental SES. In all models that separate respondents by 
parental SES, I use parental occupation (managerial/professional vs other occupations) as 
the proxy of SES: low SES families are families in which neither parents are in 
managerial/professional occupations; families in which one parent is in 
managerial/professional occupation are middle SES families; and children are from high 
SES families if both parents are in managerial/professional occupations. To ease 
comparisons, I combine middle and high SES families and contrast these families with low 
SES families in subsequent analyses of the life-course patterns of parental transfers. 
 
4.7 Results 
 
4.7.1 Descriptive statistics 
 
Figure 4-1 reports the unconditional probabilities, mean and median amount of 
parental wealth transfers received over the observation window. I find that while both the 
probability and the amount of parental transfers fluctuate from 2001 to 2015, there is an 
overall increase in the probability of receiving parental transfers over time. 5.3% of 
respondents aged 18-40 in 2001 received transfers from parents, and by 2015 this figure 
increased to 10.4%. The mean amount of parental transfers varies to a greater extent 
compared to the probability of parental transfers, and the overall mean transfers remain 
stable over time. The lowest amount appears in 2004 ($4,926), whereas the highest 
amount shows in 2003 ($9,222). The over-time average of the probability and amount of 
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parental transfers is 8.3% and $7,215, respectively. The median amount of parental 
transfers, however, stays around $2,000 over the 15 years. Summary statistics of the 
analytical variables can be found in Table A4-1 in the Appendices. 
 
Figure 4-1 Probability and amount of parental wealth transfers, by year 
Notes: HILDA Survey, 2001-2015. Mean and median transfer amounts do not include zero 
transfers. All figures are adjusted for inflation to 2015 prices using CPI. 
 
Disaggregating the full sample by family background reveals that there are clear 
disparities in the probability and amount of parental wealth transfers by parental SES 
(Figure 4-2). Children born to low SES families are not only less likely to receive parental 
transfers (6%), but also receive much less money (mean amount of $4,789 and median 
amount of $1,224), than children born to middle SES families (9%, mean amount of $8,172 
as well as median amount of $1,680) and high SES families (15%, mean amount of $9,039 
as well as median amount of $2,304). On average, children from high SES families are 
42% more likely to receive money, and receive 88% more money when they do, than their 
peers from low SES families. The gaps in the probability and amount of parental transfers 
between low and middle/high SES families are statistically significant. Descriptive statistics 
on the demographic characteristics of the adult children by parental SES can be found in 
Table A4-2 in the Appendices. 
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Figure 4-2 Probability and amount of parental wealth transfers, by parental SES 
Notes: HILDA Survey, 2001-2015. 95% confidence intervals are reported. Mean and median 
transfer amounts do not include zero transfers. All figures are adjusted for inflation to 2015 prices 
using CPI. 
 
4.7.2 Family background and parental wealth transfers 
 
To examine the overall effect of family background on the probability and amount of 
receiving parental transfers, I fit a series of random-effect Heckman selection models, 
controlling for various child characteristics as outlined before.30 I enter parental labour 
force characteristics in separate models to avoid collinearity (Table 4-1). Full model output 
can be found in Table A4-4 in the Appendices.  
I find that all else being equal, children from intact families (i.e. parents never 
divorced or separated) are significantly more likely to receive parental transfers (odds ratio 
[OR] =1.16, p<0.001), and receive 24% more money (β=0.24, p<0.01), than children from 
families in which parents experienced union dissolution. Parental employment status 
positively predicts the probability of parental transfers (ORone=1.34, ORboth=1.48, p<0.001), 
and children receive 47%-50% more money if at least one parent is employed (βone=0.47, 
βboth=0.50,  p<0.01). Transfer receiving is more likely (OR=1.22, p<0.001), and transfer 
                                                          
30 I present in Table A4-3 in the Appendices the results of the baseline model with control variables 
only. 
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amount is 36% higher (β=0.36, p<0.001), if fathers were never unemployed for 6 months 
or longer. Not surprisingly, parental education and occupation significantly raise the 
likelihood and magnitude of parental transfers. The odds of receiving parental transfers are 
significantly higher if at least one parent has a university degree (ORone=1.30, ORboth=1.63, 
p<0.001), or is in a managerial/professional occupation (ORone=1.25, ORboth=1.58, 
p<0.001). Children receive 21%-43% more money if they are born to parents with one or 
both university degrees (βone=0.21, βboth=0.43,  p<0.001), and 22%-53% more if they are 
born to parents with one or both in managerial/professional occupations (βone=0.22, 
βboth=0.53,  p<0.001). Similarly, parental occupational status score significantly increases 
the odds of parental transfers (OR=1.01, p<0.001). A 10-unit increase in parental 
occupational status score is associated with a 10% increase in the magnitude of parental 
transfers received (β=0.01, p<0.001). 
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Table 4-1 Random-effect Heckman selection models of the effect of family background on parental wealth transfers 
Variables  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
S A S A S A S A S A S A 
Parents ever divorced/separated           
  Yes (reference)             
  No 0.15*** 0.24** 0.14*** 0.23** 0.13*** 0.21* 0.14*** 0.22* 0.15*** 0.23** 0.12*** 0.21* 
# parents employed              
  0 (reference)             
  1    0.29*** 0.47**         
  2    0.39*** 0.50**         
Father ever unemployed over 6 months           
  Yes (reference)             
  No     0.20*** 0.36***       
# parents with university degree            
  0 (reference)             
  1        0.26*** 0.21***     
  2        0.49*** 0.43***     
# parents in managerial/professional occupation           
  0 (reference)             
  1          0.22*** 0.22***   
  2          0.46*** 0.53***   
Parental mean occupational status         0.01*** 0.01*** 
Controls  Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
N (observations) 87,196 87,196 87,196 87,196 87,196 87,196 87,196 87,196 87,196 87,196 83,677 83,677 
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N (individuals) 16,628 16,628 16,628 16,628 16,628 16,628 16,628 16,628 16,628 16,628 15,967 15,967 
AIC / BIC 62,715 / 63,118 62,634 / 63,094 62,602 / 63,043 62,380 / 62,839 62,334 / 62,794 60,125 / 60,545 
Notes: HILDA Survey, 2001-2015. S: selection equation. A: amount equation. Control variables in all models include respondent’s gender, age, marital status, 
employment status, country of birth, disability, OECD-equivalised household income, number of dependent children, number of siblings, number of co-residing 
parents, and survey wave. Parental employment status and occupation are measured when the respondent was 14 years of age. The coefficients on the dummy 
variables capturing missing information are omitted for readability. Significance levels: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. 
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4.7.3 Life-course patterns of parental wealth transfers by parental SES 
 
While I have established that parental SES (using various measures of the labour 
force characteristics of the parents) is strongly and positively associated with the 
probability and amount of parental wealth transfers, it remains unclear how parental 
transfers change over individuals’ life course and how the life-course patterns of parental 
transfers differ by parental SES. To examine these, I model the probability and amount of 
parental transfers as a function of children’s age. To ease comparisons, I combine the 
middle and high SES samples and contrast this sample to the sample of low SES. I first 
determine the best functional form of age effect for the sample of low SES (cubic in the 
selection equation and quadratic in the amount equation) and for the sample of 
middle/high SES (quadratic in both the selection and amount equations). I then fit the 
random-effect Heckman selection models by adding the interaction terms of parental SES 
with age polynomials, and calculate the predicted probability and amount of parental 
transfers by SES as well as their differences across the two SES groups.  
Model results are reported in Figure 4-3. The top-left graph compares across 
middle/high and low SES families the predicted probabilities of parental transfers over 
children’s age of 18-40. It gives the predicted probabilities for each SES group. The top-
right graph is the difference across middle/high and low SES families in the predicted 
probabilities of parental transfers over the same (children’s) age range. It provides a more 
straightforward approach to identify whether differences in the predicted probabilities 
across SES groups are significantly different from 0. Likewise, the bottom-left graph 
compares across middle/high and low SES families the predicted amount of parental 
transfers over children’s age of 18-40. The bottom-right graph is the difference across 
middle/high and low SES families in the predicted amount of parental transfers over the 
same (children’s) age range. 
I find significant differences in the life-cycle patterns of parental transfers by 
parental SES. The predicted probabilities of parental transfers decrease as children age, 
with children from middle/high SES families 7 times more likely to receive parental 
transfers before 20 than after 35 and children from low SES families 6 times more likely. 
This is consistent with findings in Cooney and Uhlenberg (1992). 31 However, the gradient 
                                                          
31 The findings of a decline in the probability of receiving parental transfers as children age could 
be due to selection bias if parents who give more to children are older on average than parents 
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of the decreases is sharper before age 28, and becomes smooth thereafter. The sharp 
decline in the predicted probabilities may reflect the fact that children enter the labour 
market and become wage earners themselves, thus parental transfers become less 
frequent and probable. The predicted probabilities are consistently higher for the 
middle/high SES group than for the low SES group over children’s life course. Although 
the two trends of probability converge after age 30, the gap remains statistically significant. 
Similarly, children from middle/high SES families receive more money over their life course 
than their counterparts from low SES families. The shapes of the trends in transfer 
amount, however, differ from the shapes of the trends in the probability of parental 
transfers. The gap in transfer amount is small before age 20, and widens thereafter until it 
peaks at age 29. After this age point, the difference in transfer amount declines and 
becomes statistically insignificant after age 38. 
 
Figure 4-3 Life-course patterns of parental wealth transfers, by parental SES 
Notes: HILDA Survey, 2001-2015. 95% confidence intervals are reported. Age polynomials and 
their interactions with parental SES are included in the models. The graphs in the first row are 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
who do not, and older parents are more likely to have deceased than younger parents. 
Additionally, children’s age effect could reflect a parental age effect. Older children have older 
parents who have more limited capacity to give as they transition from paid work to retirement 
incomes.  
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marginal effects of the probability of receiving parental transfers, and the graphs in the second row 
are marginal effects of the amount of parental transfers received. The best functional forms of the 
age effect are fitted for both the low and the middle/high SES groups: for the low SES group, the 
best functional forms of the age effect are cubic in the selection equation and quadratic in the 
amount equation. For the middle/high SES group, the best functional forms of the age effect are 
quadratic in both the selection and amount equations. 
 
I conduct a number of additional analyses to examine whether the patterns in the 
probability and amount of parental transfers between low and middle/high SES families 
persist after accounting for various child characteristics. I do so by adding different 
permutations of covariates in the models and test whether the gaps in the predicted 
probability and amount of parental transfers narrow or widen as a result. I first estimate a 
random-effect Heckman selection model with age polynomials only, then add a set of 
variables that represent pre-determined child characteristics, including gender, country of 
birth, number of siblings and survey wave. In the third model, I add a new set of covariates 
related to children’s earnings potential, i.e. education, employment status, OECD-
equivalised household income and disability. In the fourth model, I replace the variables 
related to children’s earnings potential with another set of covariates pertaining to 
respondents’ family structure, including marital status and number of dependent children. I 
then again replace these variables with number of co-residing parents to assess if the 
presence of co-residing parents would lead to changes in the differences in transfer 
patterns across the SES groups. Finally, I add back all the aforementioned covariates. 
I find that different model specifications do not substantially change the gaps in the 
probability and amount of parental transfers by parental SES over children’s life course 
(Figure 4-4). This is demonstrated by the overlapping confidence intervals of the gaps 
using different specifications in both Figures. The gaps in the probability of receiving 
parental transfers by SES remain significantly different from 0 for all models (left panel in 
Figure 4-4). While the shape of the differences in transfer amount by SES changes slightly 
as all covariates enter the model (right panel in Figure 4-4), all model specifications yield 
more or less the same outcomes: the difference in transfer amount by SES increases as 
children age, peaks in children’s late 20s, and declines afterwards. This difference 
becomes statistically insignificant after age 38. Overall, these results suggest that the life-
course patterns of parental wealth transfers across different SES families exist and cannot 
be explained away by child characteristics. 
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Figure 4-4 Differences in the probability and amount of parental wealth transfers, by 
parental SES 
Notes: HILDA Survey, 2001-2015. 95% confidence intervals are reported. Six models with different 
sets of covariates are fitted and marginal effects are presented. The covariates in the first model 
(age only) include age polynomials only. The covariates in the second model (pre-determined child 
characteristics) include age polynomials, gender, country of birth, number of siblings and survey 
wave. The covariates in the third model (earnings potential) include age polynomials, gender, 
country of birth, number of siblings, survey wave, education, employment status, OECD-
equivalised household income and disability. The covariates in the fourth model (family conditions) 
include age polynomials, gender, country of birth, number of siblings, survey wave, marital status 
and number of dependent children. The covariates in the fifth model (co-residing parents) include 
age polynomials, gender, country of birth, number of siblings, survey wave, and number of co-
residing parents. The final model includes all of these covariates. 
 
4.7.4 Parental wealth transfers at children’s major life events by parental SES 
 
In this section, I look specifically at the patterns of parental wealth transfers at major 
life events of children born to different SES families. This is important because while 
parental transfers exhibit different life-course patterns by parental SES overall, the 
patterns of parental transfers may diverge even further when it comes to children’s life 
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circumstances. The analyses are based on the following life events: childbirth, getting 
married, buying a property, being a full-time student, lack of financial prosperity, financial 
worsening, material deprivation, and income poverty.  
Existing studies have found that childbirth, marriage and university enrolment are 
associated with increased probability of receiving parental transfers (Cooney & Uhlenberg, 
1992; Leopold & Schneider, 2011). Since property purchase is another important life 
decision that involves large volume of money and young adults do not have enough 
savings, parental financial support in the form of financial transfers is often involved, 
particularly for the downpayment (Angelini, Laferrère & Weber, 2013). Such support may 
be more pronounced in high than low SES families because of the differences in the 
capacity of giving. Additionally, parental transfers may also be associated with children’s 
adverse financial circumstances, because monetary transfers serve as direct ease for 
children’s financial stress. 
I find that the patterns of parental wealth transfers are similar when respondents 
experience childbirth, marriage, being a full-time student, material deprivation, lack of 
financial prosperity and income poverty (Table 4-2, full model output can be found in 
Tables A4-5 to A4-12 in the Appendices). The event of having children has no significant 
effect on the likelihood and magnitude of parental transfers for both low and middle/high 
SES families. This finding is consistent with Leopold and Schneider (2011). One possible 
explanation is that parents are more likely to be involved in care and purchasing maternity 
items than direct monetary transfers. Parental transfers are more prevalent for both SES 
groups, however, when children get married. The odds of receiving parental transfers are 
higher in the year of marriage for the low (OR=1.21, p<0.05) and middle/high (OR=1.23, 
p<0.001) SES families, and higher in the year before marriage for the middle/high SES 
group only (OR=1.13, p<0.05). Children born to low SES parents receive 57% more 
money in the year before marriage (β=0.57, p<0.05), and 81% more in the year of 
marriage (β=0.81, p<0.001). Likewise, children born to middle/high SES parents receive 
35% more money in the year before marriage (β=0.35, p<0.01), and 90% more in the year 
of marriage (β=0.90, p<0.001). Being a full-time student is associated with higher odds of 
receiving parental transfers for children in both SES groups (OR=1.45, p<0.001), and with 
41% more parental transfers in low SES families as well as 33% more parental transfers in 
middle/high SES families. Material deprivation significantly raises the odds of receiving 
parental transfers for both SES groups (ORlow=1.22, ORmiddle/high=1.27, p<0.001), although 
the effect is not significant for transfer amount. Similar to childbirth, lack of financial 
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prosperity and income poverty have no effect on the probability and amount of parental 
transfers. 
The patterns of parental transfers diverge notably when it comes to buying a 
property and financial worsening, with parental transfers more likely and involving larger 
volume of money in middle/high SES families. While purchasing properties has no effect 
on the probability and amount of parental transfers in low SES families, the effect is 
significant in the year of purchase for middle/high SES families. The odds of transfer 
receiving is significantly higher (OR=1.14, p<0.01), and the transfer amount increases by 
80% (β=0.80, p<0.001) in the year of buying a property. I interpret these as suggesting 
that middle/high SES parents simply have the capacity to help with large purchases. When 
children born to middle/high SES families experience worsening finance, they are more 
likely to receive parental transfers (OR=1.22, p<0.001), whereas the effect is not 
significant in low SES families. 
 
Table 4-2 Random-effect Heckman selection models of the effect of children’s major 
life events on parental wealth transfers by parental SES 
Variables  Low SES Middle/High SES 
S A S A 
Panel 1     
Childbirth -0.08 -0.03 -0.01 0.09 
Childbirth: year before -0.08 -0.35 -0.02 -0.02 
Panel 2     
Getting married 0.19* 0.81*** 0.21*** 0.90*** 
Getting married: year before -0.01 0.57* 0.12* 0.35** 
Panel 3     
Buying a property 0.10 0.29 0.13** 0.80*** 
Buying a property: year before 0.03 0.35 0.01 -0.03 
Panel 4     
Being a full-time student 0.37*** 0.41*** 0.37*** 0.33*** 
Panel 5     
Lack of financial prosperity a 0.04 0.06 0.10 -0.08 
Panel 6     
Financial worsening a 0.08 0.25 0.20*** 0.05 
Panel 7     
Material deprivation a 0.20*** 0.06 0.24*** 0.07 
108 
 
 
Panel 8     
Income poverty 0.00 0.07 0.04 -0.05 
Controls Y Y Y Y 
N (observations) 28,387 28,387 35,811 35,811 
N (individuals) 5,534 5,534 6,833 6,833 
Notes: HILDA Survey, 2001-2015. S: selection equation. A: amount equation. Each panel represents a 
separate set of two models by parental SES. Control variables in all models include respondent’s gender, 
age, marital status, employment status, country of birth, disability, OECD-equivalised household income, 
number of dependent children, number of siblings, number of co-residing parents, and survey wave. a The 
coefficients on the dummy variables capturing missing information are omitted for readability. Significance 
levels: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. 
 
4.8 Discussion and conclusion 
 
4.8.1 Summary of aims, contributions and key findings 
 
The objectives of this chapter are (i) provide first-time empirical evidence on the 
effect of family background on the probability and amount of parental wealth transfers in 
Australia, (ii) pioneer the application of random-effect Heckman selection model to the 
analysis of parental wealth transfers, and (iii) examine how patterns of parental wealth 
transfers over children’s life course differ by parental SES for the first time in wealth 
transfer literature in Australia. In doing so, I contribute to the literature of intergenerational 
transmission of advantage (i) methodologically, by applying Heckman selection model to 
the panel data, thereby taking into account the inter-dependence of the probability and 
amount of parental transfers, avoiding selection bias, and capturing the underlying 
dynamics of parental transfers, and (ii) substantively, by using a life-course approach to 
better understand the different patterns of parental wealth transfers among children born to 
different family background, thereby shedding some lights on one important mechanism 
through which social and economic advantages transmit across generations.  
I find an overall increase in the probability of receiving parental wealth transfers 
over time, while the amount of transfers received remain stable. On average, children from 
high SES families are 42% more likely to receive money, and receive 89% more money 
when they do, than their peers from low SES families. Random-effect Heckman selection 
models indicate that children are more likely to receive parental transfers, and receive 
larger amount of parental transfers, if their parents never divorced or separate, and if their 
109 
 
 
fathers were never unemployed for 6 months or longer. Parental employment status, 
education and occupation also positively predict the likelihood and magnitude of parental 
transfers. Therefore, I find robust evidence that parental socioeconomic resources and 
union history are positively associated with the probability and amount of parental wealth 
transfers.  
Parental wealth transfers exhibit different life-cycle patterns by parental SES. The 
predicted probabilities and amount of parental transfers are consistently higher for the 
middle/high SES group than for the low SES group over children’s life course. The gap in 
the likelihood of receiving parental transfers narrows as children age, while the gap in the 
amount of parental transfers exhibits an inverse “U” shape with respect to children’s age: 
the difference in transfer amount increases and peaks in children’s early 30s, and declines 
afterwards. These life-course patterns are robust to various model specifications.  
The patterns of parental wealth transfers by parental SES are similar at the events 
of childbirth, marriage, being a full-time student, material deprivation, lack of financial 
prosperity and income poverty. Marriage is significantly associated with higher likelihood 
and magnitude of parental transfers for both SES groups, whilst material deprivation 
significantly increases the odds of receiving parental transfers. On the contrary, 
purchasing a property positively predicts the probability and amount of parental transfers 
for the middle/high SES group only, and financial worsening is related to higher odds of 
parental transfers for children born to middle/high SES families only. These findings 
suggest that patterns of parental wealth transfers show similarities and differences 
depending on specific life events of the children. 
 
4.8.2 Implications for research and practice 
 
The findings of the divergent life-course patterns of parental transfers point towards 
an important mechanism of intergenerational transmission of advantage. The reproduction 
of socioeconomic statuses across generations persists not only because high SES parents 
invest more on children over their life course, but also because they invest more regularly 
over the early adult years, and invest particularly at children’s major life events. This has 
important implications for research and practice. Parental wealth transfers provide a 
significant head start that enables children of high SES parents to advance more quickly 
than their peers from low SES families. Further research could consider whether and how 
such differences in parental wealth transfers may be associated with sustained gaps in 
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children’s cognitive and non-cognitive skills, social and economic statuses, health and 
subjective wellbeing. The sizes of these associations may have important policy 
implications, because if there exist substantial associations between gaps in parental 
wealth transfers and in children’s skills, statuses and wellbeing, policy interventions using 
targeted, compensatory public transfers would provide real impact on mitigating such gaps 
and creating equal chance for children from adverse family background. 
 
4.8.3 Limitations and future research 
 
Despite my theoretical and methodological contributions to the intergenerational 
wealth transfer literature, some limitations of this study must be acknowledged. First, I lack 
critical information on parental income and wealth, which are arguably better measures of 
parental background. As a result, using parental union history and labour force 
characteristics to predict parental wealth transfers, this chapter remains largely exploratory 
and lacks systematic development and testing of substantive hypotheses. This could have 
been addressed if parental income and wealth were observed in the data. For example, 
the correlation between parental wealth transfers and parental income/wealth offers an 
important tool of assessing the role family background plays in child investment. These 
data will also enable me to calculate the fraction of parental transfers over parental income 
and wealth, thereby providing new insights into the generosity of parents. Future research 
aiming to peruse these data will be possible by matching parent-child dyads across the 
entire age distribution (to avoid the potential life-cycle bias associated with young dyads) 
as the HILDA Survey continues to mature. 
Second, some of my data on family background are retrospective reports of 
parental statuses (i.e. employment and occupation) when respondents were 14 years of 
age, and this may have ramifications on the precision of my analyses. It is understood that 
retrospective reports of parental characteristics are more noisy measures of status than 
those directly observed, as they are susceptible to measurement errors (Huang, Perales & 
Western, 2016a; Huang, Perales & Western, 2016b). Additionally, these data only capture 
parental characteristics at one time point, whereas parental wealth transfers are dynamic. 
Hence, my results need to be interpreted with care. Future research could use other data 
sources that directly observe parental characteristics in the years in which parental 
transfers are made. 
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Third, the probability and amount of parental wealth transfers are found to vary with 
children’s age, but children’s age effect may as well reflect parental age effect. Older 
children have older parents who may have limited capacity to give as they transition from 
paid work to retirement income. Another possibility that older children are less likely to 
receive parental wealth transfers is that their parents are older than parents of young 
children, and hence more likely to have deceased. The HILDA Survey only collects 
information on parents’ decease status in waves 8 and 12, resulting in unknown decease 
status of parents in other waves. Consequently, this is not controlled for in the analyses. 
Future research using the HILDA Survey data could capture the decease of one parent by 
matching parents with children in the panel as more data of the HILDA Survey become 
available. 
Finally, a promising avenue for future research on parental wealth transfers is to 
study the impact of parental wealth transfers on economic wellbeing, quality of life, 
standard of living and socioeconomic achievement of adult children. Data from the HILDA 
Survey will enable the examination of the ways in which such transfers at different time 
points of children’s early life can affect the wellbeing and success in children’s later life. 
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Chapter 5 Intra-generational and intergenerational impact on economic behaviours 
in contemporary Australia 
 
5.1 Chapter introduction 
 
 This chapter examines adult children’s economic behaviours, operationalised using 
within-couple bank account choices, in contemporary Australia. It provides evidence of the 
over-time changes in and predictors of within-couple bank account ownership, focusing on 
intra- and inter-generational economic, life-course, and socio-cultural factors. Section 5.2 
lays out the background for studying bank account choices. Section 5.3 discusses the 
importance of studying couples’ bank account choices as a reflection of egalitarianism in 
financial arrangements within families. Section 5.4 develops a set of research hypotheses 
on the key predictors of within-couple bank account choices. Sections 5.5 and 5.6 explain 
the social and institutional context in Australia for the study of couples’ bank account 
choices, and how this chapter contributes to the existing within-household finance 
literature. Sections 5.7 and 5.8 detail the data and methods used. Section 5.9 presents the 
findings and my interpretations of these findings. Section 5.10 concludes. 
 
5.2 Background 
 
In the past few decades, Western countries have witnessed important changes 
towards more progressive gender ideologies (England, 2010), the emergence of 
increasingly participative economic roles for women (OECD, 2013; United Nations 
Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 2010), and substantial diversification in the 
duration, types and outcomes of intimate relationships (Cherlin, 2009; Lesthaege, 2014). 
All of these factors have had an impact on the financial circumstances of partnered 
individuals and the patterns through which these individuals manage their economic 
assets (Cunningham-Burley & Jamieson, 2003). It is therefore unsurprising that academic 
and policy interest in how couples manage their financial resources grew exponentially 
following these unprecedented socio-demographic transformations, with Pahl’s (1983) 
influential conceptual framework as a departure point. 
Women’s financial independence is an important aspect of gender equality within 
heterosexual couples, because it liberates women from fear of obligations to men 
(England, 2010). With the surge of cohabitation and the increasing incidence of 
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relationship breakdown, financially dependent women are susceptible to income poverty, 
material deprivation, poor physical and mental health, and marital instability (Burgoyne, 
1990; Munsch, 2015; Pahl, 1980; Pahl, 1995; Vogler, 1989; Wilson, 1987). While women’s 
labour force participation, occupational standing and earnings in Western countries have 
increased substantially since the mid 20th century, it is unclear whether these 
improvements have translated into egalitarian arrangements concerning the management 
of and control over household financial resources (Morris, 1987; United Nations 
Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 2009). 
The continuing normativity of historical stereotypes of women as ‘secondary 
earners’, at the macro level (United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 
2009; Zelizer, 1994), and the prevalence of traditional gender-role attitudes among women 
and their partners, at the micro level, have been put forwards as explanations for 
prevailing gender inequality in financial management (Bartley, Blanton & Gilliard, 2005; 
Kaufman, 2000). Despite ideological movements towards gender egalitarianism since the 
1960s (Brewster & Padavic, 2000; Brooks & Bolzendahl, 2004), traditional family models 
involving a male ‘breadwinner’ and a female ‘homemaker’ remain popular, particularly at 
some stages of the life course (Brown & Robert, 2014; Hendrickx, Bernasco & de Graaf, 
2001; Vogler & Pahl, 1993). This is evidenced, among others, by remaining inequalities 
between men and women in housework and childcare responsibilities (Bianchi et al., 2012; 
Sayer, Bianchi & Robinson, 2004), and a greater tendency for women to work part-time to 
‘juggle’ work and family and to forfeit paid employment after childbirth (Budig, 2003; 
Lyonette, 2015). 
As men remain the main contributors to household income, they often feel entitled 
to control over the household financial resources (Fleming, 1997). This leaves women with 
weak bargaining power and financial vulnerability, and may have important long-term 
consequences on their financial security and wellbeing (Burgoyne, 2004). Hence, studying 
financial arrangements within heterosexual couples provides deep insights into intra-
household gender equality, and its implications on women’s financial and general 
wellbeing. In this chapter, I consider an aspect of gender egalitarianism in couples’ 
financial arrangements that has been largely overlooked: bank account choices, defined 
as the choices made within intimate relationships concerning the number, type (joint vs. 
separate) and holder of couple members’ bank accounts. Bank account choices are an 
important reflection of gender egalitarianism in financial arrangements within couples, with 
distinctions drawn between ‘collectivised’ arrangements (when couples pool financial 
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resources in joint bank accounts) and ‘privatised’ arrangements (when couple members 
hold financial resources in separate bank accounts) (Treas, 1993). However, despite some 
pioneer contributions (Cheal, 1993; Kan & Laurie, 2014; Kenney, 2006; Lee & Pocock, 
2007; Lyngstad, Noack & Tufte, 2011; Treas, 1993), we still know relatively little about 
what personal, familial and societal factors are associated with the adoption of different 
bank account arrangements within couples. 
In this chapter I use panel data from the Household, Income and Labour Dynamics 
in Australia (HILDA) Survey and panel regression models to examine the predictors of 
bank account choices among heterosexual couples in Australia. In doing so, I add to the 
existing literature by (i) systematically assessing how intra- and inter-generational 
economic, life-course, and socio-cultural factors jointly determine couples’ bank account 
choices, using relevant information from both couple members; (ii) modelling couples’ 
bank account choices as they evolve over time; and (iii) providing first-time evidence for 
the Australian context that complements the limited international evidence available. Key 
findings indicate that a relatively large share of couples in Australia favour ‘mixed’ bank 
account choices (i.e. holding both joint and separate accounts), but ‘egalitarian’ choices 
(i.e. dual separate accounts) are prevalent and on the rise. Couples’ bank account choices 
are influenced in theoretically-meaningful ways by economic resources, transaction costs, 
relationship history, gender-role attitudes, and family background.  
 
5.3 Egalitarianism in financial arrangements through the lens of bank account 
choices 
 
Assessing the ways in which couples arrange their bank accounts opens a window 
to improving our understanding of gender egalitarianism in financial arrangements within 
the household. Joint bank accounts have been argued to have symbolic meanings 
involving mutuality, collectivity and trust, as they signal commitment to the conjugal family 
(Treas, 1993). From this perspective, joint bank accounts are a symptom of egalitarianism 
concerning how couples manage, control and access money. In contrast, separate bank 
accounts have symbolic meanings of financial autonomy, and the money deposited in 
separate bank accounts is often viewed by partners as ‘their own money’ (Vogler, Lyonette 
& Wiggins, 2008).  
The choice between joint and separate bank accounts has important substantive 
implications. For example, separate bank accounts allow men and women to have 
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independent and relatively unsupervised access to money, whereas expenditure of money 
deposited in joint bank accounts may be subject to closer scrutiny by the other partner and 
more overt within-couple negotiations. Given this, individuals who rely exclusively on joint 
accounts, but whose partners have also separate accounts, may find themselves 
particularly disadvantaged. This imbalance can become the root of power differentials 
within the couple, and a potential source of tension and conflict (see Kan & Laurie, 2014).  
While bank account choices are an important aspect of financial organisation within 
the household, research into the patterns and precursors of within-couple bank account 
arrangements is very limited. This lack of attention likely has its roots in the absence of 
suitable data sources that collect such complex information. Consequently, the majority of 
the literature on within-couple financial arrangements focuses on subjectively defined 
money management (Ludwig-Mayerhofer et al., 2011). For instance, surveys often ask 
respondents which couple member takes the responsibility for managing household 
money, or who has the final say over large expenditure decisions (Vogler, Brockmann & 
Wiggins, 2006). While these measures provide valuable insights, they are not without 
issues or an exhaustive representation of couples’ financial arrangements. One problem is 
that these subjective measures may not reflect actual behaviours, and hence may be 
susceptible to measurement error. For example, respondents may over-report their 
partner’s role in deciding how money is organised or spent, or report more egalitarian 
arrangements than actually take place due to social pressures, resulting in social 
desirability bias (Zaller & Feldman, 1992). Responses between couple members are also 
likely to be inconsistent due to differences in their subjective perceptions of or definitions 
around money management. Information on bank account ownership, on the other hand, 
is an objective measure of financial arrangements, and may be more accurate in capturing 
actual financial practices within couples and a better proxy for economic behaviour. 
Altogether, I argue that there is value in paying attention to within-couple bank account 
choices as an alternative and additional aspect of gender-egalitarianism (or lack of it) in 
day-to-day financial practices. 
 
5.4 Predictors of bank account arrangements: Theoretical expectations and 
international evidence 
 
An extensive literature examines intra-household financial organisation and money 
management generally, yet only a handful of studies has examined couples’ bank account 
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choices more specifically. This includes Treas (1993) and Kenney (2006) for the US, 
Cheal (1993) for Canada, Kan and Laurie (2014) for the UK, Lyngstad, Noack and Tufte 
(2011) for Norway and Lee and Pocock (2007) for South Korea.  Despite some 
inconsistencies in the measurement of bank account choices and the timing of the studies 
used, findings from this small pool of international studies suggest that couples’ bank 
account choices differ substantially across countries: two thirds of American couples rely 
exclusively on joint bank accounts (Treas, 1993), whereas around 60-80% of UK couples 
hold separate bank accounts (Kan & Laurie, 2014). About 44% of Norwegian couples pool 
their economic resources in joint bank accounts (Lyngstad, Noack & Tufte, 2011), while 
these are virtually inexistent among South Korean couples –due to legislative emphasis on 
financial individuality (Lee & Pocock, 2007). Across studies, bank account choices are 
associated with couple members’ absolute and relative income, education, ethnicity, 
employment status, relationship characteristics, and family size (Cheal, 1993; Kan & 
Laurie, 2014; Kenney, 2006; Lyngstad, Noack & Tufte, 2011; Treas, 1993). Taking 
together these previous findings, and theory and evidence from the broader literature on 
within-couple financial organisation and practices, I derive testable hypotheses about how 
different factors will be related to couples’ bank account choices in our contemporary 
Australian panel data.  
 
5.4.1 Absolute and relative income 
 
Income is a key predictor of within-couple financial arrangements (Heimdal & 
Houseknecht, 2003; Vogler & Pahl, 1993; Yodanis & Lauer, 2007). The effect of income on 
financial arrangements depends on two factors. The first factor is the position of couples’ 
total income in the income distribution. Independent financial arrangements are more 
prevalent among high-income couples (Edwards, 1982; Vogler, Brockmann & Wiggins, 
2006), whereas resource sharing occurs more often in low- and moderate-income couples 
(Bennett & Sung, 2013). This is because resource pooling accomplishes economies of 
scale in household production, whereas high-income couples are able to forgo the cost 
advantages by adopting multiple bank accounts (i.e. separate accounts) in pursuit of 
financial autonomy. 
The second factor is the relative contributions of the male and female partners to 
couples’ total income (i.e. their relative resources). Relative resources and bargaining 
power theories pose that an individual’s power in household decision making is 
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proportional to the amount of resources that she/he contributes to the household vis-à-vis 
her/his partner (Blood & Wolfe, 1960; Nyman, 2003; Rogers & Schlossman, 1990). 
Particularly, couples are more likely to pool resources as the male and female income 
contributions approach equality, and more likely to bank separately when women 
contribute more than men to household income (Kenney, 2006; Yodanis & Lauer, 2007). 
This resonates with research findings indicating that financial independence is higher in 
dual-earner couples (Fleming, 1997; Pahl, 1989; Vogler, Brockmann & Wiggins, 2006). 
Based on this literature, for bank account choices I hypothesise that: 
 
Hypothesis 1a: Couples’ total income will be positively associated with the 
probability of holding separate bank accounts.  
Hypothesis 1b: Unequal income contributions to couple household income will lead 
to separate banking strategies, with women’s contributions being more predictive of 
separate bank account choices than men’s contributions. 
 
5.4.2 Children as a transaction cost 
 
The resources necessary to raise children (e.g. time and effort) are scarce, and so 
families with children operate subject to constraints (Becker, 1981). In this context, families 
must strategically allocate their finite resources to maximise outputs. One way to 
accomplish this is smoothing their daily operations by minimising everyday-life hassles, 
constant auditing of the spending of the other couple member and persistent negotiations 
on what money needs to be spent on, and why (Treas, 1993). In the context of family 
finance research, the presence of children has been argued to lead to increasing 
‘transaction costs’, i.e. costs associated with bargaining and monitoring household 
resource spending among couple members (Pollak, 1985). For example, children increase 
the number of payments and daily financial operations within households. To minimise 
these transaction costs, couples with children will be particularly likely to seek efficient 
banking strategies that enable them to maximise personal and household utilities. 
Specifically, having joint bank accounts should reduce time-consuming discussions and 
negotiations about whose account to use to make payments. Another important 
consideration regarding the implications of joint accounts in the presence of transaction 
costs of children is that paying for children’s costs is often undertaken by women. In 
situations where most women have fewer economic resources than their partners do, joint 
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accounts minimise transaction costs and also provide women with access to resources 
they would otherwise lack. I therefore hypothesise that: 
 
Hypothesis 2: The number of dependent children will be positively associated with 
the likelihood of having a joint bank account. 
 
5.4.3 Relationship history and duration 
 
Relationship history can predict financial organisation because, compared to other 
couples, remarried/re-partnered couples (i) are more likely to consider money 
management as a major issue in their relationship (Lown, McFadden & Crossman, 1989), 
(ii) may have gained a certain degree of financial autonomy (Fishman, 1983), and (iii) may 
have more complicated financial situations, e.g. they may retain complex financial links 
with their ex-partners and/or biological children (Burgoyne & Morison, 1997; Coleman & 
Ganong, 1989). Collectively, these suggest that remarried/re-partnered couples may have 
a tendency towards banking separately. Conversely, couples in longer relationships may 
be more likely to bank jointly, because the longevity in their relationship is indicative of 
mutual trust.  
Empirically, evidence suggests that relationship duration is positively associated 
with the likelihood of income pooling (Lyngstad, Noack & Tufte, 2011). On the other hand, 
the incidence of separate financial management in remarried couples is much higher than 
in the general population. This constitutes suggestive evidence that resource pooling in 
new families is hampered by unresolved financial problems from previous relationships, 
the desire to protect one’s financial assets in case the new relationship breaks down, or as 
an ‘exit’ option from such relationship (Burgoyne & Morison, 1997). Studies also indicate 
that having a previous history of union dissolution predicts bank account choices: couples 
in which at least one partner was divorced or widowed are less likely to use joint bank 
accounts (Heimdal & Houseknecht, 2003; Treas, 1993). 
Based on the existing theory and evidence, I hypothesise that: 
 
Hypothesis 3a: Remarried/re-partnered couples will be more likely to use separate 
bank accounts than couples in their first marriages/de facto relationships. 
Hypothesis 3b: Relationship duration will be positively associated with the 
probability of resource pooling. 
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5.4.4 Gender-role attitudes 
 
The traditional male breadwinner model is still enacted by many couples, given 
economic realities such as the gender pay gap and unaffordable childcare (Burgoyne et 
al., 2006). Since gender attitudes are often predictive of subsequent behaviour (Davis & 
Greenstein, 2009), these can be considered an important driver of within-couple financial 
arrangements (Roman & Vogler, 1999). The perception that women should prioritise 
homemaking and childrearing justifies men’s assertion of masculinity and domination in 
household money control and financial decision making, which should in turn preclude 
financial separateness –particularly for women. Consistent with this, traditional gender 
ideology is often associated with joint access to money (Treas & Widmer, 2000) and 
authoritarian control over money by the male partner (Kenney, 2006). In contrast, the 
egalitarian ideology of co-providing emphasises equal financial wellbeing through 
independent money control and management (Cheal, 1993; Vogler, 1998; Vogler, 
Brockmann & Wiggins, 2006). 
I therefore hypothesise that: 
Hypothesis 4: Couples in which partners hold traditional gender-role attitudes will be 
less likely to have separate bank accounts than couples in which partners hold 
egalitarian gender-role attitudes.   
 
5.4.5 Intergenerational effects 
 
The family is a socialising unit through which children learn about their social world. 
One component of this socialisation process is the transmission of information, attitudes, 
values, etc. about money and finances from parents to children. Through explicit 
education, information sharing, and day-to-day interactions, parents pass onto their 
children financial attitudes, knowledge and capabilities (Alhabeeb, 1996; Gudmunson & 
Danes, 2011; John, 1999; Moschis, 1985; Wald, 1974). This financial mentality is then 
brought into intimate relationships, and enacted –among others– via bank account 
choices. Family financial socialisation theory suggests that individuals’ financial 
perceptions and practices are reflective of parental social class and parental education 
(Cateora, 1963; Gudmunson & Danes, 2011; John, 1999; Wald, 1974). Specifically, high 
parental education and occupational status are associated with positive offspring 
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economic behaviours, including prudent saving, rational spending and strategic financial 
planning (Furnham, 1999; Gudmunson & Danes, 2011). Additionally, highly educated 
parents are more likely to set up egalitarian family arrangements concerning finances and 
money management (Conger, Conger & Martin, 2010). Hence, it is possible that their adult 
children also do so through the impact of socialisation and role modelling. I thus predict 
that: 
 
Hypothesis 5a: Couples in which partners come from high socioeconomic family 
backgrounds will be more likely to organise money separately than couples in which 
partners come from low socioeconomic family backgrounds.  
 
Another strand of intergenerational research on the transmission of financial 
attitudes and practices has focused on the role of gender egalitarian attitudes and 
practices in the parental generation. For example, growing up in a family in which the 
mother held egalitarian gender-role attitudes has a large positive effect on daughters’ 
gender ideology and labour market outcomes, such as the probability of full-time 
employment and work hours (Johnston, Schurer & Shields, 2014). Other research has 
found similar results for maternal engagement in the labour force, earnings and 
occupational standing (Morrill & Morrill, 2013; van Putten, Dykstra & Schipper, 2008). 
These families can be described as ‘non-traditional’, in the sense that mothers’ bargaining 
power is more comparable to fathers’. Children raised in such non-traditional families 
(particularly daughters) are likely to emulate these arrangements as adults, which should 
in turn translate into egalitarian financial arrangements by banking separately as they form 
their own family. While research on this is very limited, descriptive analyses reveal 
substantial intergenerational continuity in money management among couples in the UK, 
whereby adult children’s financial management resembles that of the parental generation 
(Volger & Pahl, 1993). Based on this, I expect that: 
 
Hypothesis 5b: Couples in which partners come from non-traditional family 
backgrounds will be more likely to organise money separately than couples in which 
partners come from traditional family backgrounds.  
 
5.5 The Australian case: Institutional context and previous evidence 
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While the international literature on within-couple bank account choices is growing, 
very few studies have focused on Australia. However, Australia stands out as an important 
case study because of its centralised pay setting for most of the 20th century. This is a 
unique policy phenomenon by international standards, which had a remarkable impact on 
women’s financial dependence on their partners/husbands. This state-instituted pay 
setting system consisted of a regulated “family wage” for male jobs, and half the male 
earning rates for women in the same jobs. These practices deterred women’s labour force 
participation and institutionalised a male breadwinner model in which men were 
considered to be the ‘financial leaders’ within their households (Nolan, 2003; Whitehouse, 
2004). Historically, this has been identified as a major factor obstructing women’s financial 
independence and enhancing men’s sense of entitlement to a higher standard of living 
(Land, 1980; Rathbone, 1947). It has been argued that a legacy of these institutional 
arrangements is the historical, high prevalence of female part-time work rates in Australia. 
Women in Australia are more likely to engage in part-time work, particularly after becoming 
mothers, than women in other OECD countries, which entrenches their financial 
dependence on their male partners (Baxter, 2013; Bittman et al., 2003). To the extent that 
these factors have remained embedded in the Australian social ethos, bank account 
arrangements within couples in Australia may exhibit different patterns and dynamics than 
those in other developed countries. For example, there may exist a greater tendency 
towards joint banking due to this historical legacy, and such tendency may be more highly 
associated with couple’s relative income contribution and gender ideology than observed 
in other countries. Examining couples’ bank account choices in Australia may also 
contribute to the within-couple finance literature more broadly, because the blend of an 
egalitarian ‘fair go’ culture, the institutionalised male breadwinner ideology, and the 
historical expectations of female homemakers in Australia may influence the way couple 
members arrange their bank accounts, thereby creating a unique model of mixed banking 
strategies combining joint and separate bank accounts in Australian households. 
There is only one previous quantitative study on the predictors of bank account 
choices among couples in Australia (Singh & Morley, 2010).32 This explored factors 
                                                          
32 There is however more Australian evidence focusing on financial organisation more generally. 
For instance, in descriptive analyses of three datasets (Australian Family Formation Project 1981, 
n=2,544 and 1991, n=1,536, Australian Family Formation Case Studies 1983, n=58, and Australian 
Family Project 1986, n= 2,041), Glezer (1994) found a comparatively high degree of resource 
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influencing individual-level bank account choices using a multinomial logit model estimated 
on the 2006 wave of the Household, Income and Labour Dynamics in Australia (HILDA) 
Survey. Key findings from this study indicate that employment status (but not household 
income) is an important predictor of bank account choices. While a pioneer in the 
Australian context, this can be extended in several fronts. The study relies on data which 
are now relatively old, uses the data cross-sectionally, does not exploit the household 
structure of the HILDA Survey, and does not account for many important theoretical 
factors (e.g. gender-role attitudes, transaction costs, parental background, and relationship 
history). I further its findings in these and other ways, as described below. 
 
5.6 The current study 
 
I expand upon earlier studies of within-couple bank account choices in several 
ways. First, I provide a more systematic examination of couple’s bank account choices 
than can be found in the available literature. I compare and contrast the predictive power 
on bank account choices of a wider range of factors than those considered by previous 
studies, including economic factors (absolute and relative income, and number of 
dependent children as transaction costs), life-course factors (relationship history and 
duration), and socio-cultural factors (gender-role attitudes). Second, I am the first to use 
longitudinal survey data and panel regression models. This enables me to estimate the 
predictors of couple’s bank account choices more robustly by taking into consideration 
within- and between-couple differences in bank account ownership and its underlying over-
time dynamics. Third, I also innovative by examining bank account choices at the couple 
level using information from both couple members. This is important, as reliance on survey 
responses from just one couple member leads to measurement error (due to misreporting 
of joint bank accounts) and omitted-variable bias (due to the absence of partner 
characteristics in the model). Some studies use respondents’ reports of partners’ 
characteristics, but these are less precise than partners’ self-reports (Heimdal & 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
pooling among dual-earner couples, and no association between such financial arrangements and 
partners’ employment status. These findings were replicated by Foreman and Wilson (1995) using 
two samples of low-income families reliant on social security payments (Social Impact Study 1992-
1993, n=1,402 and Pre-Home Child Care Allowance Survey 1994, n=1,453. These surveys were 
collected from the female partner only). 
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Houseknecht, 2003; Lyngstad, Noack & Tufte, 2011; Yodanis & Lauer, 2007). Fourth, I 
consider intergenerational effects on within-couple bank account choices. While parental 
background is a theoretically important factor potentially explaining partnered individuals’ 
bank account choices, it has so far been overlooked in the existing literature. Finally, I 
provide the first robust account of couples’ bank account choices in Australia. This is 
important because Australia is an interesting case study due to its institutional legacy, and 
so this study contributes to enriching cross-national comparisons. 
 
5.7 Data 
 
5.7.1 Dataset 
 
The goal is to model the longitudinal determinants of couples’ bank account 
choices. To accomplish this, I use four waves of data (2002, 2006, 2010 and 2014) from 
the Household, Income and Labour Dynamics in Australia (HILDA) Survey. This survey is 
particularly useful for my research purposes in this chapter for several reasons. First, its 
wealth module collects longitudinal information on participants’ bank account ownership in 
four occasions: wave 2 (2002), wave 6 (2006), wave 10 (2010) and wave 14 (2014). Few 
international panel surveys collect such complex information over an extended period of 
time and on an ongoing basis. Second, data on joint bank accounts contain personal 
identifiers of household members, which enables me to determine whether a joint bank 
account is in fact held by both couple members. Third, couple-level data enable more 
precise estimates of the effects of relative income and relationship history than individual-
level data.  
 
5.7.2 Information on bank account ownership 
 
In the HILDA Survey’s wealth module, respondents are asked whether they have 
any bank accounts in their name only (i.e. separate accounts), and whether they hold any 
joint bank accounts with other people (i.e. joint accounts). For respondents who indicated 
that they hold joint bank accounts, the number of joint accounts and the identity of other 
household members who co-held each of the accounts were asked. These names were 
coded into person identifiers to facilitate matching. I use this information to identify different 
bank account choices at the couple level. My initial categorisation of bank account choices 
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draws upon Treas’ (1993) typology, including the following seven mutually exclusive 
categories:33 
(i) Both partners have a joint bank account only. 
(ii) Both partners have separate bank accounts only. 
(iii) The male partner has a separate bank account, while the female partner has 
no bank accounts. 
(iv) The female partner has a separate bank account, while the male partner has 
no bank accounts. 
(v) Both partners have a joint bank account, and the male partner has a separate 
bank account. 
(vi) Both partners have a joint bank account, and the female partner has a 
separate bank account. 
(vii) Both partners have a joint bank account, and both the male and female 
partners have separate bank accounts. 
I use this categorisation in a first set of analyses to examine the distribution of 
couples’ bank account choices and how it has changed over time. In subsequent analyses, 
I simplify this categorisation to produce results that are theoretically meaningful and 
statistically feasible. First, I construct a dichotomous variable indicating whether or not 
couples have at least one joint account. Second, I construct a four-category variable 
splitting couples as follows:  
(i) Both partners have a joint bank account only (i.e. no separate bank accounts, 
the reference category); 
(ii) The male partner has a separate bank account, while the female partner does 
not; 
(iii) The female partner has a separate bank account, while the male partner does 
not; and  
(iv) Both the male and female partners have a separate bank account. 
 
5.7.3 Sample selection 
                                                          
33 For 3.79% of couples (n= 1,062) there are mismatches in their reports of joint bank accounts. 
Most of these emerge when one partner reports having a joint bank account, but the other partner 
does not. In these cases, I consider couples as having a joint bank account as long as one partner 
indicates so.  
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Since bank account information is only available in HILDA Survey waves 2, 6, 10 
and 14, my initial sample excludes unpartnered individuals, and comprises 34,854 
observations from 15,579 partnered individuals who participated in any of these four 
survey waves with valid bank account information. I drop observations from individuals 
who do not cohabit with their partners (n=101 person-year observations), and from 
respondents whose partners did not participate in the survey (n=1,827 person-year 
observations). For respondents who did not have a consistent partner over the observation 
period, I exclude observations from their second and higher-order partnerships (n=635 
person-year observations). I also exclude from my analytical sample same-sex couples, as 
the theoretical reasons leading to different bank account choices are likely to be different 
for these couples (n=314 person-year observations), couples in which the male and 
female partners reported inconsistent marital statuses (n=20 person-year observations), 
and couples in which neither of the partners reported having a bank account (n=80 
person-year observations). Based on data from these matched couples, I derive the 
couple-level analytical variables by using information from both couple members, resulting 
in two identical records for each couple (n=31,144). I retain only one of these two identical 
records. My final analytical sample consists of 15,572 observations from 7,094 couples. 
 
5.7.4 Other analytical variables 
 
Income. For total income, I take the inverse hyperbolic sine (IHS) transformation34 
of the sum of both partners’ financial-year gross total incomes, after having adjusted these 
for inflation to 2014 prices using annual Consumer Price Index rates. For relative income, I 
follow Kenney’s (2006) approach and create a categorical variable with three categories: 
(i) women contribute 60% or more of the income; (ii) both men and women contribute 40-
60% of the income (equal contribution); and (iii) men contribute 60% or more of the 
income. 
                                                          
34 The formula for the IHS transformation is: log (𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 + √𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒2 + 1). For very small changes, 
the square root component goes to 0 and in the limit the transformation is log(𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒) giving the 
standard interpretation. This transformation can effectively deal with non-positive income while at 
the same time transforming a positively skewed income into a normally distributed income.  
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Number of children. I use an available variable within the HILDA Survey capturing 
the number of dependent children in the household. Dependent children are defined as 
persons under 15 years of age, or persons aged 15-24 who are “engaged in full-time 
study, not employed full-time, living with one or both parents, not living with a partner, and 
who does not have a resident child of their own” (Wilkins, 2015: 14).  
Relationship history and duration. The HILDA Survey contains information on the 
number of marriages and de facto relationships (of 3 months or more) participants have 
had. I use this in combination with respondents’ current marital status to separate 
individuals who are in their first marriage/de facto relationship from individuals who are in 
their second or higher order marriage/de facto relationship. At the couple level, I combine 
this information from both partners into a variable containing four categories: (i) both 
partners are in their first marriage/de facto relationship; (ii) men are in their first 
marriage/de facto relationship and women in their second or higher order marriage/de 
facto relationship; (iii) women are in their first marriage/de facto relationship and men in 
their second or higher order marriage/de facto relationship; and (iv) both partners are in 
their second or higher order marriage/de facto relationship. Relationship durations for both 
marriages and de facto relationships are recorded in years.  
Gender-role attitudes. In its self-completed questionnaires, the HILDA Survey asks 
about respondents’ gender-role attitudes. These questions were included in waves 1, 5, 8 
and 11. I carry forward their responses to waves in which bank details were collected: 
attitudes in wave 1 are brought forward to wave 2, attitudes in wave 5 are brought forward 
to wave 6, attitudes in wave 8 are brought forward to wave 10, and attitudes in wave 11 
are brought forward to wave 14. I use the degree of respondents’ agreement with the 
following four items to measure respondents’ attitudes towards gender roles: (i) “Many 
working mothers seem to care more about being successful at work than meeting the 
needs of their children”; (ii) “Whatever career a woman may have, her most important role 
in life is still that of being a mother”; (iii) “Mothers who don’t really need the money 
shouldn’t work”; and (iv) “It is better for everyone involved if the man earns the money and 
the woman takes care of the home and children” (Cronbach’s α=0.66). Higher scores 
represent more traditional attitudes, with variables being reverse coded where necessary. 
Scores in each of these items are then summed and rescaled to create an index ranging 
from 0 (most egalitarian attitudes) to 100 (most traditional attitudes). I then created a 
variable measuring the average attitude score of each couple by taking the mean of both 
partners’ scores.  
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Family background. Parental occupation and education are used to capture the 
socioeconomic status (SES) of the family in which respondents grew up. Parental 
occupational status is measured by the Australian Socioeconomic Index 2006 (McMillan, 
Beavis & Jones, 2009), while parental education is recoded into three categories: (i) 
school year 12 and below, (ii) professional qualification, and (iii) bachelor degree or higher. 
I create a continuous variable measuring the average status of the family by taking the 
mean occupational status scores of parents. In addition, I derive a dichotomous variable 
identifying whether the respondent comes from a ‘non-traditional family’, i.e. a family in 
which the mother’s educational level is higher than or equal to the father’s educational 
level. I then create a couple-level categorical variable comparing the partners’ family 
background: (i) both partners come from non-traditional families; (ii) only men come from 
non-traditional families; (iii) only women come from non-traditional families; and (iv) neither 
partner comes from a non-traditional family. 
Control variables. My multivariate models control for a set variables which are 
known predictors of within-couple financial organisation. Couples in de facto relationships 
are more likely to use separate bank accounts than married couples (Heimdal & 
Houseknecht, 2003; Kan & Laurie, 2014; Lyngstad, Noack & Tufte, 2011). Hence, I control 
for marital status in all models except for the model testing the effect of relationship 
history, due to multicollinearity. I also control for couples’ mean age, and age differences 
between partners within a couple. The latter is captured by a trichotomous variable: (i) 
men are at least 5 years older than women; (ii) the age difference is within five years; and 
(iii) women are at least 5 years older than men. This is important, as age gaps can be 
reflective of financial mentality: the larger the age gap, the more divergent individual 
financial perceptions may be, and thus the more likely it is that couples organise money 
separately. Controls for education are added because highly educated couples are likely to 
be more financially liberal than those with low education levels, and therefore more likely 
to choose separate bank accounts. Couple-level education is measured through a variable 
capturing the following scenarios: (i) both partners have University degrees; (ii) only the 
male partner has a University degree; (iii) only the female partner has a University degree; 
and (iv) neither partner has a University degree. Dual-earner couples are more likely to 
have separate bank accounts than other couples (Fleming, 1997; Pahl, 1989; Vogler, 
Brockmann & Wiggins, 2006), and so I distinguish between couples in which (i) both 
partners are employed; (ii) only the male partner is employed; (iii) only the female partner 
is employed; and (iv) neither partner is employed. Because there may be cultural 
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differences in financial practices, I also control for ethnicity in my models. I use a variable 
that separates couples into those in which (i) both partners were born in Australia; (ii) only 
the male partner was born in Australia; (iii) only the female partner was born in Australia; 
and (iv) neither partner was born in Australia. To test the direct effects of key variables and 
account for the effect of income on financial organisation, I control for total income in all 
models.  
 
5.8 Methods 
 
5.8.1 Statistical models 
 
I extend Treas’s (1993) analyses of bank account choices using panel data and 
panel regression models. Unlike cross-sectional techniques, these models take into 
consideration both within-couple and between-couple differences in bank account 
ownership over time, improving efficiency and reducing bias in their predictions of the 
longitudinal associations between the factors of interest and couples’ bank account 
choices (Hsiao, 2007). 
First, I estimate a set of random-effect binary logit models that predict whether or 
not couples hold a joint bank account. These models are extensions of cross-sectional 
binary logit models for panel data. Let 𝑦𝑖𝑡 denote the choice of bank account for couple 𝑖 at 
time 𝑡, 𝜋𝑖𝑡 denote the probability of having a joint bank account, 𝑿𝒊𝒕 denote a 𝑁𝑋 × 1 vector 
of time-varying variables, 𝒁𝒊 denote a 𝑁𝑍 × 1 vector of time-invariant variables, and 𝑁∙ the 
number of variables in each vector. The probability function of holding a joint bank account 
for couple 𝑖 at time 𝑡 can be written as: 
 
                    𝜋𝑖𝑡 = Pr(𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 1|𝑿𝒊𝒕, 𝒁𝒊) = 𝐹(𝛼 + 𝜷′𝑿𝒊𝒕 + 𝜽
′𝒁𝒊 + 𝑢𝑖 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡) (5.1) 
 
where  
 
                                                    𝐹(𝑧) =
ez
1+ez
  (5.2) 
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The log of the odds (i.e. the ratio of the probability of having a joint bank account to 
the probability of not having a joint bank account, denoted as 𝜂𝑖𝑡) is a linear function of 𝑿𝒊𝒕 
and 𝒁𝒊: 
 
                           log(𝜂𝑖𝑡) = log (
𝜋𝑖𝑡
1−𝜋𝑖𝑡
) = 𝛼 + 𝜷′𝑿𝒊𝒕 + 𝜽
′𝒁𝒊 + 𝑢𝑖 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡     (5.3) 
 
This gives the random-effect binary logit model for panel data. The coefficients of 
continuous independent variables can be interpreted as changes in the logarithmic odds 
ratio (denoted as 𝑂𝑅): 
 
                                            log(𝑂𝑅) = log (
𝜂𝑖𝑡|𝑥+∆𝑥
𝜂𝑖𝑡|𝑥
) = 𝛽   (5.4) 
 
Equation (5.4) can be rewritten as: 
 
                                                  𝑂𝑅 =
𝜂𝑖𝑡|𝑥+∆𝑥
𝜂𝑖𝑡|𝑥
= 𝑒𝛽  (5.5) 
 
which is the relative probability, or the change in the odds, of having a joint account 
associated with a one-unit change in the continuous independent variable. For categorical 
independent variables, a more nuanced equation of the 𝑂𝑅 is: 
 
                                                    𝑂𝑅 =
𝜂𝑖𝑡|𝑧𝑐
𝜂𝑖𝑡|𝑧𝑏
= 𝑒𝜃                                                   (5.6) 
 
where 𝑧𝑐 is the comparison category, and 𝑧𝑏 is the baseline category. 
Second, I estimate a set of random-effect multinomial logit models that distinguish 
between four different types of bank account choices: (i) partners have a joint bank 
account only (the reference category), (ii) only the male partner has a separate bank 
account, (iii) only the female partner has a separate bank account, and (iv) both partners 
have a separate bank account.35  
                                                          
35 In practice, these are fitted as generalised structural equation models using Stata 13 (StataCorp, 
2013). 
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Let ?̃?𝑖𝑡 denote the observed type of bank account choice for couple 𝑖 at time 𝑡, and 
ℤ denote the integer set containing the aforementioned four types, ?̃?𝑖𝑡 ∈ ℤ = {1, … , 4}. Let 
?̃?𝑖𝑡
(𝑗)
 represent the 𝑗th type of bank account choice in ℤ, 𝑗 = 1, … , 4. The probability of 
couple 𝑖 at time 𝑡 choosing certain type of bank account (denoted as ?̃?𝑖𝑡
(𝑗)
) is: 
 
                           ?̃?𝑖𝑡
(𝑗)
= Pr (?̃?𝑖𝑡 = ?̃?𝑖𝑡
(𝑗)|𝑿𝒊𝒕, 𝒁𝒊) =
𝑒
𝜷𝒋
′𝑿𝒊𝒕+𝜽𝒋
′𝒁𝒊+𝑢𝑖+𝑒𝑖𝑡
∑ 𝑒𝜷𝒌
′ 𝑿𝒊𝒕+𝜽𝒌
′ 𝒁𝒊+𝑢𝑖+𝑒𝑖𝑡4
𝑘=1
                      (5.7) 
 
where 𝑿𝒊𝒕 and 𝒁𝒊 are the same vectors of independent variables as in equation 
(5.1); 𝜷𝒋 is the 𝑗th coefficient vector associated with ?̃?𝑖𝑡
(𝑗)
 for 𝑿𝒊𝒕, and 𝜽𝒋 is the 𝑗th coefficient 
vector associated with ?̃?𝑖𝑡
(𝑗)
 for 𝒁𝒊. If one computes each ?̃?𝑖𝑡
(𝑗)
 using equation (5.7), however, 
the model is unidentified (StataCorp, 2013). To identify the model, it is customary to treat 
one type of bank account, ?̃?𝑖𝑡
(𝑏)
 as the baseline (or reference) type. Equation (5.7) can then 
be rewritten as: 
 
             ?̃?𝑖𝑡
(𝑏)
= Pr(?̃?𝑖𝑡 = ?̃?𝑖𝑡
(𝑏)|𝑿𝒊𝒕, 𝒁𝒊) =
1
1+∑ 𝑒𝜷𝒌
′ 𝑿𝒊𝒕+𝜽𝒌
′ 𝒁𝒊+𝑢𝑖+𝑒𝑖𝑡4
𝑘=1
, 𝑘 ≠ 𝑏; 
              ?̃?𝑖𝑡
(𝑗)
= Pr (?̃?𝑖𝑡 = ?̃?𝑖𝑡
(𝑗)|𝑿𝒊𝒕, 𝒁𝒊) =
𝑒
𝜷𝒋
′𝑿𝒊𝒕+𝜽𝒋
′𝒁𝒊+𝑢𝑖+𝑒𝑖𝑡
1+∑ 𝑒𝜷𝒌
′ 𝑿𝒊𝒕+𝜽𝒌
′ 𝒁𝒊+𝑢𝑖+𝑒𝑖𝑡4
𝑘=1
, 𝑗 ≠ 𝑏 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑘 ≠ 𝑏     (5.8) 
 
Hence, the log odds of the probability of the 𝑗th bank account type over the 
probability of the baseline type is a linear function of 𝑿𝒊𝒕 and 𝒁𝒊: 
 
                               log (
?̃?𝑖𝑡
(𝑗)
?̃?𝑖𝑡
(𝑏)) = 𝜷𝒋
′𝑿𝒊𝒕 + 𝜽𝒋
′𝒁𝒊 + 𝑢𝑖 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡, 𝑗 ≠ 𝑏  (5.9) 
 
This gives the random-effect multinomial logit model for panel data. 
 
5.8.2 Analytical approach 
 
I begin with descriptive analyses of the distribution of couples’ bank account 
choices for the pooled sample and its changes over time, followed by bivariate analyses 
comparing the prevalence of different bank account arrangements across categories of the 
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independent variables. I then estimate more robust multivariate panel regression models 
that account for observable and unobservable confounders. I first fit a baseline multivariate 
model that includes only the control variables: marital status, age, employment status, 
education, ethnicity, and couple total income. This serves as a benchmark for five 
subsequent models in which I add sets of independent variables of interest. In models that 
test the effect of relationship history and duration, I exclude marital status, which is 
collinear with the more detailed measured added in this model. I perform all bivariate and 
multivariate analyses on both the short (binary) and long (multinomial) measures of bank 
account choices described before. 
 
5.9 Results  
 
5.9.1 Descriptive analyses 
 
Table 5-1 summarises the sample prevalence of different bank account 
arrangements. Couples in Australia generally prefer a mixed strategy, with 47% of couples 
holding both joint and separate accounts, compared to 31% having only a joint account, 
and 22% holding only separate accounts. Altogether, about 78% of couples in Australia 
have a joint account. Among those couples with joint bank accounts in which at least one 
partner also has a separate account, women (17% of all couples) are more than twice as 
likely as men (8% of all couples) to have separate accounts. It is however more common 
for both partners within these couples to hold a separate account (23% of all couples). Just 
in over 1% of couples in Australia, a partner reports having no bank accounts. 
Figure 5-1 shows changes in the distribution of couples’ bank account choices over 
the 2002-2014 observation window. There have been declines in the proportions of 
couples with (i) a joint account only, and (ii) a joint account and a separate account for one 
of the partners. In contrast, there have been increases in the proportions of couples in 
which (i) both partners hold separate accounts only, and (ii) both partners hold a joint 
account and a separate account. These trends suggest that, as time unfolds, there is 
increasing financial autonomy among individuals within heterosexual couples in Australia, 
as well as greater gender equality in separate bank account ownerships. 
Sample means in the explanatory variables by bank account choices are shown in 
Table 5-2. These show that couples with higher incomes are more likely to have separate 
accounts and less likely to have joint accounts. Partners’ relative resources are also 
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related to banking strategies: partners who contribute more income to the household are 
more likely to have a separate account, whereas couples in which both partners contribute 
equally tend to have a joint bank account only. Relative to couples with a joint bank 
account only, couples with dual separate bank accounts are characterised by fewer 
dependent children, shorter relationship duration, more complex relationship histories, 
more egalitarian gender attitudes, and a higher likelihood of coming from non-traditional 
families. Couples in de facto relationships are more than twice as likely as married couples 
to have dual separate accounts. In contrast, married couples are five times as likely as 
couples in de facto relationships to have only a joint account. Compared to couples with 
separate bank accounts, couples with a joint bank account only have older partners with 
smaller age gaps, lower education levels, and lower employment participation, and are 
more likely to be migrants. 
Table 5-1 Bank account choices of heterosexual couples in Australia 
Bank account choices % 
Partners have only a joint account 30.9 
Partners have only separate accounts 21.9 
  Man has separate account, woman has no accounts            0.6 
  Woman has separate account, man has no accounts           0.7 
  Both have separate accounts            20.6 
Partners have both joint and separate accounts 47.2 
  Joint account + man has a separate account           7.6 
  Joint account + woman has a separate account           16.6 
  Joint account + both partners have a separate account           23.0 
N (observations) 15,572 
N (individuals) 7,094 
Notes: HILDA Survey data (2002, 2006, 2010 and 2014). Percentages do not add up to 100 due to 
rounding. 
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Figure 5-1 Over-time change in bank account choices of heterosexual couples in 
Australia 
Notes: HILDA Survey data (2002, 2006, 2010 and 2014). 
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Table 5-2 Sample descriptive statistics (means and standard deviations) 
 
Number of  
observations 
All 
couples 
Bank account choices 
 
Only man has 
a separate 
account 
Only woman has 
a separate 
account 
Both have 
separate 
accounts 
Joint 
account 
only 
Total income (IHS) a 15,572 
11.4 
(0.7) 
 11.5 
     (0.8) 
  11.4 
  (0.7) 
 11.4 
 (0.7) 
 11.3 
 (0.8) 
Relative income b 15,572      
  Women contribute 60%+  12.7   7.4   19.0  47.9   25.8 
  Similar income contributions  36.7   7.2   15.1  43.5  34.2 
  Men contribute 60%+  50.7   9.0   18.6  42.6  29.8 
Number of dependent children a 15,572 
0.9 
(1.2) 
  1.1 
 (1.2) 
    1.0 
   (1.2) 
   0.8 
  (1.1) 
 1.0 
 (1.2) 
Relationship duration a 15,450 
19.8 
(16.4) 
 19.5 
        (15.1) 
   23.2 
  (15.3) 
  14.5 
 (15.5) 
      25.3 
     (16.4) 
Relationship history b 15,570      
  Both 1st relationship  64.4   9.1    19.5   33.1  38.3 
  Men 1st  relationship and women 2nd+   5.5   7.1     20.6   45.1  27.2 
  Women 1st  relationship and men 2nd+   6.2  10.0    16.9   44.5  28.6 
  Both 2nd+ relationship  23.9   5.3     10.8   71.3  12.6 
Gender-role attitudes, mean a 14,245 59.6  60.2    60.2   57.8  61.4 
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 (11.6)         (11.3)   (11.2)  (11.7)  (11.3) 
Mean parental SES a 15,559 
42.3 
(15.8) 
43.8 
(16.3) 
41.0 
(15.1) 
43.6 
(16.3) 
40.9 
(15.1) 
Non-traditional family background  15,572      
    Both from non-traditional family  35.1 7.8 17.3 43.6 31.4 
    Only man from non-traditional family  15.0 8.5 16.9 44.7 29.8 
    Only woman from non-traditional 
family 
 
16.7 9.2 18.3 42.8 29.7 
    Neither from non-traditional family  8.7 8.2 16.4 42.1 33.3 
Controls        
Marital status b 15,572      
  Married  81.4 8.9 19.7 35.2 36.3 
  De facto relationship  18.6 5.0 7.0 80.6 7.4 
Mean age a 15,572 
47.5 
(15.6) 
46.5 
(14.2) 
50.1 
(14.1) 
44.0 
(15.9) 
51.3 
(15.3) 
Age difference b 15,572      
  Man 5+ years older   19.0 8.6 15.1 48.1 28.3 
  Age difference within 5 years  77.9 8.2 18.0 42.0 31.9 
  Woman 5+ years older  3.0 5.5 15.6 57.1 21.8 
Employment status b 15,572      
  Both employed  54.8 8.1 17.6 45.8 28.6 
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  Only man employed  19.0 10.9 17.5 42.3 29.3 
  Only woman employed  4.9 7.3 17.4 51.3 24.0 
  Neither employed  21.3 6.1 16.6 37.5 39.9 
Education b 15,572      
  Both have degree  14.5 10.6 15.9 47.1 26.4 
  Only man has degree  10.1 8.9 17.3 43.3 30.5 
  Only woman has degree  12.1 9.4 15.2 45.5 30.0 
  Neither has degree  63.3 7.2 18.1 42.5 32.2 
Ethnicity b 15,572      
  Both born in Australia  65.8 7.6 18.0 44.6 29.9 
  Men born in Australia only  8.9 10.2 16.0 48.2 25.7 
  Women born in Australia only  10.4 8.2 16.6 44.7 30.5 
  Neither born in Australia  14.8 9.5 15.8 35.8 38.8 
Notes: HILDA Survey (2002, 2006, 2010 and 2014). Standard deviations in parentheses. Percentages do not add up to 100 due to rounding. The 
missing category of non-traditional family background is omitted for readability.  a statistically significant at the 0.1% level in a one-way analysis of 
variance. b statistically significant at the 0.1% level in a Pearson chi-square test.  
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5.9.2 Multivariate analyses: Baseline models 
 
I begin by fitting baseline panel regression models which test the effect of the 
control variables on couples’ bank account choices (Table 5-3). The baseline random-
effect logit model in column 1 compares couples with joint accounts with couples without 
joint accounts. The odds of having joint bank accounts is significantly higher among 
couples who are married (OR=54.44, p<0.001)36, Australian-born (ORmen=1.99, 
ORwomen=1.90, ORboth=1.67, p<0.01), and older (OR=1.06, p<0.001), and among couples 
with smaller age gaps (ORmen_older=0.41, βwomen_older=0.29, p<0.001) and higher absolute 
income (OR=1.31, p<0.001). Significantly higher odds of having joint accounts are also 
observed among dual-earner couples (OR=3.05, p<0.001) and couples in which only the 
male partner is employed (OR=2.40, p<0.001) vis-à-vis jobless couples. Compared to 
couples in which neither partner has a university degree, couples in which both partners 
(OR=1.82, p<0.001) or only the male partner (OR=1.41, p<0.1) do so have significantly 
higher odds of holding joint accounts. 
The baseline random-effect multinomial logit model further splits couples’ bank 
account choices into four categories, which collectively consider an exhaustive set of 
permutations concerning couples’ separate and joint account ownership (columns 2-4, 
Table 5-3). This more complex model reveals several interesting patterns which were not 
apparent in the more parsimonious random-effect logit model. The odds of having 
separate bank accounts over no separate accounts (i.e. joint accounts only) for married 
couples relative to cohabiting couples indicates that married couples are significantly less 
likely to have separate bank accounts either for one partner (ORmen=0.10, ORwomen=0.13, 
p<0.001) or both partners (ORboth=-3.66, p<0.001), and so display a greater tendency to 
rely exclusively on a joint account. The odds of having separate accounts over no separate 
accounts either for one partner (ORmen=0.97, p<0.001; ORwomen=0.99, p<0.01) or for both 
                                                          
36 The high odds ratio (raw coefficient equal to 4) is not due to collinearity, error in the coding, or 
computational issue associated with inflated standard error. It is likely due to a concentration of 
data among married couples who hold joint accounts (70% of the sample), which leads to a large 
maximum likelihood estimate. Ideally, a penalised likelihood estimation method should be used to 
deal with this, such as the exact logit model or the Firth logit model (Firth, 1993; Heinze & 
Schemper, 2002). Such model, however, is not implemented in the context of panel data. I 
therefore use the “doing nothing” strategy suggested in Allison (2008), as the maximum likelihood 
for other independent variables are still valid. 
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partners (ORboth=0.97, p<0.001) also decrease as couples age. If the partner is over 5 
years older than the other, he/she is more likely to have separate accounts alone than 
having no separate accounts (ORmen=1.55, p<0.01, ORwomen=2.00, p<0.05). These 
gendered age gaps also positively predict the odds of both partners having separate 
accounts relative to having no separate accounts (ORmen older=1.65, ORwomen older=2.80, 
p<0.001). Employed couples have significantly higher odds of holding separate accounts 
relative to no separate accounts than jobless couples: the male partner is more likely to 
have separate accounts than having no separate accounts when either partner is 
employed (ORmen employed=1.69, p<0.01; ORwomen employed=1.70, p<0.05), whereas the female 
partner is more likely to have separate accounts than having no separate accounts when 
at least one partner is employed (ORmen employed=1.59, p<0.01; ORwomen employed=2.19, 
p<0.001; ORboth employed=1.67, p<0.001). The higher level of education both couple 
members have, the more likely they hold separate accounts than no separate accounts for 
the male partner (ORmen degree=1.43, p<0.05; ORwomen degree=1.34, p<0.1; ORboth degree=1.88, 
p<0.001), or both partners (ORmen degree=1.45, p<0.05; ORboth degree=1.72, p<0.001). 
Separate bank accounts are also more likely relative to no separate accounts to be 
organized among Australian-born couples: the male partner is more likely to have separate 
accounts alone than having no separate accounts (OR=1.83, p<0.01) if he was born in 
Australia, while the female partner (ORmen Australia=1.86, p<0.01; ORwomen Australia=1.46, 
p<0.1; ORboth Australia=1.55, p<0.01) or both partners (ORmen Australia=1.95, p<0.01; ORwomen 
Australia=1.42, p<0.1; ORboth Australia=1.39, p<0.05) are more likely to have separate accounts 
than having no separate accounts if at least one couple member was born in Australia.  
Across the two baseline models, I find that couples’ employment status, education 
and ethnicity predict their ownership of joint and separate bank accounts in similar 
directions: employed, educated and Australian-born couples have a comparatively higher 
odds of holding both joint accounts (in the random-effect logit model) and some form of 
separate accounts (in the random-effect multinomial logit model). The random-effect 
multinomial logit results reveal reasonably consistent patterns in how the explanatory 
variables relate to the male and female partner having a separate account in addition to a 
joint account, hinting a certain degree of gender egalitarianism in bank account choices in 
the contemporary Australian context. 
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Table 5-3 Bank account choices among heterosexual couples in Australia, baseline models 
Variables  
Joint account 
vs. 
no joint account 
Account choice (ref. partners have only a joint account) 
Only man has 
a separate 
account  
Only woman has 
a separate 
account 
Both have 
separate 
accounts 
Marital status (ref. de facto)     
  Legally married 54.44*** 0.10*** 0.13*** 0.026*** 
Mean couple age 1.06*** 0.97*** 0.99** 0.97*** 
Age difference (ref. <5 years)     
  Man 5+ years older 0.41*** 1.55** 1.23 1.65*** 
  Woman 5+ years older 0.29*** 1.50 2.00* 2.80*** 
Employment status (ref. neither employed)     
  Only man employed  2.40*** 1.69** 1.59** 0.95 
  Only woman employed  1.11 1.70* 2.19*** 1.77** 
  Both employed 3.05*** 1.20 1.67*** 0.96 
Education (ref. neither have degree)     
  Only man has degree 1.41+ 1.43* 1.16 1.45* 
  Only woman has degree 1.26 1.34+ 0.94 1.14 
  Both has degree 1.82*** 1.88*** 1.27 1.72*** 
Ethnicity (ref. neither born in Australia)     
  Only man born in Australia 1.99** 1.83** 1.86** 1.95** 
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  Only woman born in Australia 1.90** 1.15 1.46+ 1.42+ 
  Both born in Australia 1.67** 1.07 1.55** 1.39* 
Total couple income (IHS) 1.31*** 1.19** 1.08 1.08 
N (observations) 15,572 15,572 15,572 15,572 
N (individuals) 7,094 7,094 7,094 7,094 
AIC / BIC 11,684 / 11,814 33,222 / 33,597 
Notes: HILDA Survey (2002, 2006, 2010 and 2014). Odds ratios reported. Column 1 displays the results of the random-effect binary logit model (with 
robust standard errors), and columns 2-4 display the results of the random-effect multinomial logit model (with robust standard errors). + p<0.1, * 
p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
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5.9.3 Multivariate analyses: Hypothesis testing 
 
In Table 5-4 I present the results of a final series of panel regression models aimed 
at testing the 5 sets of research hypotheses. These add selected variables to the baseline 
models discussed before. Full model output can be found in Tables A5-1 to A5-5 in the 
Appendices. The first set of models tests the effect of absolute and relative income on 
couples’ bank account choices. In the random-effect logit model absolute income 
increases the odds of couples choosing a joint account (OR=1.30, p<0.001). However, 
results from the random-effect multinomial logit model reveal that it actually raises the 
relative probability that couples have some combination involving separate accounts. 
These seemingly contradictory results resonate with findings from Treas (1993): while 
partially pooling their resources, high-income couples also maintain a certain extent of 
financial autonomy to ensure freedom in personal spending. This is not evident in the 
simpler binary logit model, as joint accounts are often accompanied by separate accounts. 
Consistent with my relative resources hypothesis, I find that couples in which the female 
partner contributes more income to the household have a significantly lower odds than 
couples in which both partners make similar income contributions to have a joint account 
(OR=0.67, p<0.05). The random-effect multinomial logit model results further reveal that 
greater income contributions to the household by the female partner increase the chances 
that couples have any bank account arrangement involving separate accounts, suggesting 
that women’s income contribution is more predictive of separate banking than men’s.  
The second set of models tests the effect of the number of dependent children in 
the household on couples’ bank account choices. In the random-effect logit model, the 
number of children is associated with increased odds of having a joint account (OR=1.33, 
p<0.001). In the random-effect multinomial logit model, the number of children is 
negatively associated with the odds of having separate accounts over having no separate 
accounts for either partner (ORmen=0.86, p<0.001; ORwomen=0.92, p<0.05) or both partners 
(ORboth=0.77, p<0.001). These findings are consistent with my second hypothesis, and 
suggests that couples pool resources to achieve optimal utility in the presence of 
increased transaction costs. 
Results from the third set of models indicate that, as predicted in my hypotheses, 
relationship history and duration are strong predictors of bank account choices. In the 
random-effect logit model, remarried/re-partnered couples have much lower odds of 
having joint accounts than couples in their first marriages/de facto relationships 
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(ORmen=0.23, ORwomen=0.33, ORboth=0.05, p<0.001). In the random-effect multinomial logit 
model, I further learn that remarriage/re-partnership is positively associated with having 
separate accounts relative to having no separate accounts for either or both partners. In a 
similar vein, relationship duration is positively associated with the odds of having a joint 
account in the random-effect logit model (OR=1.07, p<0.001), and negatively associated 
with the odds of all arrangements involving separate accounts in the random-effect 
multinomial logit model (ORmen=0.97, ORwomen=0.97, ORboth=0.95, p<0.001). 
The fourth set of models considers the predictive power of gender ideology on bank 
account choices. Traditional gender attitudes are not associated with the odds of couples 
having joint accounts in the random-effect logit model. However, results in the more 
complex random-effect multinomial logit model indicate that traditional gender attitudes 
predict reduced odds of the female partner (OR=0.99, p<0.1) or both partners (OR=0.99, 
p<0.001) having separate accounts, relative to having a joint account only. This is 
consistent with my fourth hypothesis. 
The final set of models yields evidence of substantial intergenerational impacts on 
couples’ bank account choices. As predicted in my last hypothesis, in the random-effect 
logit model, couples in which both partners come from non-traditional family backgrounds 
have much lower odds of having joint accounts (OR=0.57, p<0.05). The random-effect 
multinomial logit model yields additional insights: parental socioeconomic status is 
positively associated with the odds of both partners having separate bank accounts over 
having no separate accounts (OR=1.01, p<0.1), with women’s family background being 
more predictive of separate account choices than men’s. That is, separate bank accounts 
are more prevalent among couples in which only one partner comes from a non-traditional 
family when such partner is the woman (ORmen=1.52, p<0.1; ORwomen=1.51, p<0.05; 
ORboth=1.42, p<0.1). 
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Table 5-4 Bank account choices among heterosexual couples in Australia, hypothesis testing 
Hypotheses  
Joint account 
vs. no joint 
account 
Account choice (ref. partners have only a joint account) 
Only man has 
a separate 
account  
Only woman has 
a separate 
account 
Both have 
separate 
accounts 
Hypothesis 1     
Total income (IHS) 1.30*** 1.19** 1.08 1.09+ 
Relative resources (ref. similar contribution)     
  Women contribute 60%+ 0.67** 1.32+ 1.64*** 1.51*** 
  Men contribute 60%+ 1.01 1.14 1.27** 1.06 
Control variables a Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N (observations) 15,572 15,572 15,572 15,572 
N (individuals) 7,094 7,094 7,094 7,094 
AIC / BIC 11,679 / 11,824 33,208 / 33,628 
Hypothesis 2     
Number of dependent children 1.33*** 0.86*** 0.92* 0.77*** 
Control variables b Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N (observations) 15,572 15,572 15,572 15,572 
N (individuals) 7,094 7,094 7,094 7,094 
AIC / BIC 11,651 / 11,789 33,140 / 33,537 
Hypothesis 3     
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Relationship history (ref. both 1st relationship)     
  Men 1st relationship and women 2nd+ 0.23*** 1.55+ 2.07*** 2.12*** 
  Women 1st relationship and men 2nd+ 0.33*** 1.80* 1.69* 1.96*** 
  Both 2nd+ relationship 0.05*** 5.50*** 5.90*** 14.57*** 
Relationship duration 1.07*** 0.97*** 0.97*** 0.95*** 
Control variables c Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N (observations) 15,449 15,449 15,449 15,449 
N (individuals) 7,046 7,046 7,046 7,046 
AIC / BIC 11,582 / 11,734 33,089 / 33,533 
Hypothesis 4     
Gender-role attitudes 1.00 1.00 0.99+ 0.99*** 
Control variables b Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N (observations) 14,243 14,243 14,243 14,243 
N (individuals) 6,522 6,522 6,522 6,522 
AIC / BIC 10,469 / 10,605 30,709 / 31,095 
Hypothesis 5     
Mean parental SES  1.00 1.01 1.00 1.01+ 
Family background (ref. neither from non-traditional family)     
    Only man from non-traditional family 0.70 1.33 1.29 1.34 
    Only woman from non-traditional family 0.83 1.52+ 1.51* 1.42+ 
    Both from non-traditional family 0.57* 1.29 1.36 1.40+ 
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Control variables b Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N (observations) 15,559 15,559 15,559 15,559 
N (individuals) 7,084 7,084 7,084 7,084 
AIC / BIC 11,667 / 11,835 33,211 / 33,700 
Notes: HILDA Survey (2002, 2006, 2010 and 2014). Odds ratios reported. Column 1 displays the results of the random-effect binary logit models, and 
columns 2-4 display the results of the random-effect multinomial logit models. All models feature robust standard errors. The coefficient of the missing 
category in non-traditional family background is omitted for readability. a marital status, age, employment, education and ethnicity. b marital status, 
age, employment, education, ethnicity and total income (IHS). c age, employment, education, ethnicity and total income (IHS). Significance levels: + 
p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. 
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5.10 Discussion and conclusion 
 
5.10.1 Summary of aims, contributions and key findings 
 
In this chapter I have systematically examined the trends in and predictors of bank 
account choices among heterosexual couples in contemporary Australia. By paying 
attention to economic, life-course, and socio-cultural explanations, and taking into 
consideration intergenerational factors, I provided a more encompassing and granular 
picture of within-couple bank account choices than ever before. My empirical analyses 
were undertaken using a large, nationally representative household panel survey 
comprising the period 2002-2014, exploiting both its panel structure (by estimating state-
of-the-art panel regression models for the first time in this field) and its household structure 
(by leveraging couple-level data that better reflects partnership circumstances and 
improves estimation). 
I find that heterosexual couples in contemporary Australia tend to favour mixed 
banking strategies which combine joint and separate bank accounts. The most prevalent 
scenario is the exclusive use of a joint bank account, but alternative ‘separate but equal’ 
models are on the rise. These involve both the male and female partners holding separate 
accounts in addition or instead of a joint account. In addition to confirming that couple’s 
bank account choices in the contemporary Australian context are reflective of partners’ 
socio-demographic characteristics (e.g. age, marital status, age, employment status, 
education, and ethnicity), I find new evidence that such choices are also contingent on 
other economic, life-course, socio-cultural and intergenerational factors. Altogether, I found 
robust evidence supporting Hypotheses 1 to 3 (relative resources, transaction costs, 
relationship history), and some evidence in support of Hypotheses 4 and 5 (gender 
ideology, intergenerational effects). 
Economic factors were found to be important predictors of couples’ bank account 
choices. Both absolute and relative income affected these in theoretically expected ways: 
high absolute income was associated with increased odds of joint account ownership, 
whereas comparable income contributions to the household by couple members were 
associated with arrangements involving separate accounts. This pattern of results 
concerning spousal bargaining power is consistent with findings from other literatures 
examining couple-level outcomes (e.g. employment and housework). Interestingly, 
women’s contribution of total income was more predictive of separate bank accounts than 
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men’s contribution. I take this finding as evidence that women’s economic resources are 
important drivers of financial independence. My results were also consistent with the 
hypothesis that the number of children in the household would lead to increased odds of 
joint bank accounts and decreased odds probability of arrangements involving separate 
bank accounts. I take this finding as suggestive evidence of the notion of ‘transaction 
costs’. That is, couples opt for a joint banking strategy that minimises negotiations and 
disputes on the source of payments associated with their collective capitals. 
Life-course factors were also important precursors of couples’ banking 
arrangements. Particularly, shorter and more complicated relationship histories were 
associated with couples more often relying on separate accounts. This finding highlights 
the importance of considering bank account choices within a life-course perspective.  
In addition, socio-cultural aspects, measured through individual attitudes, were also 
predictive of bank account choices in theoretically meaningful ways. In this respect, I 
provide evidence that traditional gender-role attitudes are negatively related to the odds of 
couple members using separate banking. This constitutes novel evidence that attitudes 
are important drivers of individuals’ bank account choices net of material/tangible factors, 
and of couples ‘doing gender’ when making banking decisions. This finding adds to a body 
of knowledge documenting the effects of gender-role attitudes on individuals’ behaviours 
across life domains, e.g. labour, childcare and housework supply, union formation and 
dissolution, leisure time allocations, or marital conflict –see Davis & Greenstein (2009) for 
a review.  
Finally, I provided first-time evidence of intergenerational effects on bank account 
choices –prior research focused predominantly on concurrent individual and couple 
factors. High parental socio-economic status and ‘non-traditional’ family background 
(concerning gender equality) were both associated with an increased prevalence of 
separate banking arrangements. Altogether, the intergenerational effects found were more 
pronounced for women, suggesting that certain family backgrounds may promote the 
transgression of gendered scripts. 
 
5.10.2 Implications for theory, policy and practice 
 
My results speak of similarities and differences in the prevalence and predictors of 
different bank account arrangements between Australia and other countries. Unlike 
countries in which exclusive use of joint accounts (e.g. the US) or separate accounts (e.g. 
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the UK and South Korea) is the norm, Australia is distinctive for the prevalence of mixed 
banking strategies which combine joint and separate accounts. Similar to studies in the 
US, the UK and Norway, I find that egalitarian contributions to household income, 
dependent children and longer relationships are all positively associated with joint account 
ownership and negatively associated with separate accounts. However, my finding of a 
positive (negative) effect of traditional gender ideology on couples’ ownership of joint 
(separate) bank accounts in Australia is at odds with findings for other countries. In the 
US, Heimdal & Houseknecht (2003) found no such effect. This could reflect Australia’s 
unique historical legacy: institutional inertia due to previous legislation reinforcing the 
male-breadwinner model may still influence the behaviours and outcomes of couples in 
contemporary Australia. More broadly, my study has added Australia as a comparison 
benchmark to existing evidence for the US, the UK, Canada, Norway and South Korea. 
Pooling the results from my study and these other studies, I now have a relatively good 
understanding of the micro-level factors associated with different bank account 
arrangements within couples, e.g. age, education, number of children, and marital status. 
Yet, I have virtually no evidence on the role of macro-level factors in influencing couples’ 
bank account arrangements. One set of such macro-level factors may operate through 
country contexts, as hinted by documented country-level differences in the prevalence of 
joint bank accounts across studies –with the United States (very prevalent) and South 
Korea (virtually non-existent) as two extremes. Hence, a promising research avenue within 
this field of enquiry would be to systematically examine the country-level factors 
associated with bank account choices. From other literature looking at contextual 
moderators of gender inequality (e.g. pertaining to the division of domestic labour, see 
Geist & Cohen, 2011), I suspect that such factors may encompass welfare regimes, 
average levels of female economic activity, normative gender ideologies, or family tax 
policies (see also Prince-Cooke & Baxter, 2010). A move in this direction would however 
require the availability of a harmonised cross-national dataset containing the requisite 
information. 
Concerning gender theory, my findings confirm that aspects known to produce 
gendered behaviours and outcomes in other domains (e.g. domestic divisions of labour) 
also produce gendered behaviours and outcomes in relation to couples’ bank account 
choices. These include economic factors (absolute income, relative resources), cultural 
factors (gender ideology), and life-course factors (relationship history and duration). 
Hence, taken together, my results indicate that examining the precursors of bank account 
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choices constitutes a novel and insightful way to further probe into the gendering of every-
day family life. Thus, my findings have implications for gender equality in financial 
arrangements within Australian couples, and the financial emancipation of partnered 
women. High female income contributions to household resources and egalitarian 
ideologies of co-provision both translate into more ‘democratic’ bank account 
arrangements. If empowering women in intimate relationships through more equal banking 
strategies is a desirable goal, social policies and interventions which promote the 
emergence of gender egalitarian attitudes and improve the financial position of women are 
likely to have such an effect. Mothers’ education was also an important precursor of adult 
children’s bank account choices, being associated with banking arrangements that provide 
their adult daughters with increased financial autonomy. Hence, current trends in female 
educational attainment may indirectly result in societal changes in the prevalence of more 
gender-egalitarian bank account arrangements. More broadly, I find that factors such as 
parental socio-economic status are related to couple members’ separate banking 
behaviours. Given ongoing socio-demographic trends in these factors, my findings suggest 
that bank account choices will become progressively more egalitarian and individualised 
over the life course, across generations and over time. 
 
5.10.3 Limitations and further research 
 
Despite several contributions to the scant international literature on bank account 
choices, this chapter suffers from some limitations which must be acknowledged. First, my 
operationalisation of certain explanatory variables is hampered by data quality. 
Particularly, the gender-attitude measure is not concurrent and neglects the fact that such 
attitudes can change (Baxter et al., 2015), and parental background variables are 
retrospectively reported by adult children, which may lead to measurement error (Huang, 
Perales & Western, 2016). Additionally, I lacked information on parents’ bank account 
choices, financial arrangements, and gender ideology, all of which would have added 
depth to my intergenerational analyses. Second, I only consider the types of bank account 
arrangements, but do not delve into other potentially important factors. These may include 
the number of accounts, how much money people have in each account, the source of 
money deposited in joint accounts, and the spending behaviour of the different owners of 
joint accounts. It is likely that having joint accounts does not translate into egalitarian 
control over the money deposited in such accounts (Edwards, 1981; Glezer, 1994), as 
150 
 
 
perceptions of money ownership and patterns of expenditure may be associated with who 
brings money in (Nyman, 2003). Future research studies should consider these factors as 
a means to gain better insights into within-couple everyday financial arrangements. In 
particular, there is room for more qualitative research examining whether and how gender 
ideology and family background relate to individual- and couple-level decision making 
concerning bank account ownership. Third, while I now know a lot about the precursors of 
bank account choices, I still have a very limited understanding about the potential 
consequences of these choices. Pioneer research suggests that couples who make 
spending decisions separately are comparatively less satisfied with family life (Vogler, 
Lyonette & Wiggins, 2008), while whether or not couples have joint accounts makes no 
significant difference to partners’ psychological wellbeing (Kan & Laurie, 2014). Future 
studies should expand the analysis of bank account choices by considering their potential 
consequences on other (inter)personal outcomes, including relationship quality and 
satisfaction, happiness, life satisfaction, financial stress, and perceptions of money control. 
Such studies, however, will face important methodological challenges, particularly 
concerning their ability to identify the direction of causal arrows (Nyman, 2003).  
To conclude, this chapter has focused on an important and often overlooked aspect 
of within-couple financial arrangements: bank account choices. As I have argued and 
demonstrated throughout this chapter, bank account choices are complex and 
multifaceted, and provide an additional window into how everyday-life family decisions are 
enacted, and are sometimes rooted within gendered discourses. Findings in this chapter 
contributed to our understanding of intergenerational economic mobility by providing 
empirical evidence of the intergenerational impact of parental socioeconomic status on 
adult children’s financial behaviour. More research on financial autonomy among couple 
members is needed, as this has important implications on women’s financial emancipation. 
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Chapter 6 Discussion and conclusion  
 
6.1 Summary of aims, contributions and findings of the thesis 
 
This thesis aims to provide a better understanding of the degree, nature and 
mechanisms of intergenerational economic mobility in contemporary Australia. I began the 
thesis by providing an overview of historical evidence on intergenerational social mobility 
in colonial and post-colonial Australia, and then I outlined the potential consequences of 
intergenerational economic immobility, surveyed the active areas of research in 
intergenerational economic mobility, and summarised the main contributions and key 
findings. In Chapter 2, I developed a conceptual framework of intergenerational economic 
mobility, and detailed various pathways from social origins to destinations —linking family 
background to adult children’s economic outcomes. In Chapter 3, I examined the degree 
and dynamics of intergenerational earnings mobility in Australia, focusing on the effects of 
different levels of occupational disaggregation and different earnings measures on the 
magnitude of father-son earnings elasticities, and revisiting international associations 
between economic inequality and immobility. In Chapter 4, I investigated the effect of 
family background on the probability and amount of parental wealth transfers, and 
assessed the different patterns of parental wealth transfers by parental SES over 
children’s life courses and at children’s major life events. Finally, in Chapter 5 I explored 
how intra-generational and intergenerational factors impact on couple-level economic 
behaviours in Australia (using bank account choices as a case study). 
In providing empirical evidence of the degree and mechanisms of intergenerational 
economic mobility, I used data from the longest running Australian panel study—the 
Household, Income and Labour Dynamics in Australia Survey (2001-2015), and state-of-
the-art statistical techniques adequate to panel data and to the nature of the response 
variables. Specifically, I deployed (i) random-effect panel regression models for the 
estimation of intergenerational earnings elasticity, (ii) random-effect selection models for 
the study of intergenerational wealth transfers, which jointly estimate the probability of 
receiving parental transfers and the amount of such transfers; and (ii) binary and 
multinomial random-effect logit models of couple-level bank account choices.  
 
6.1.1 Revisiting my conceptual framework of intergenerational economic mobility 
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Intergenerational economic mobility reflects the economic aspect of social mobility 
across generations. This concept is therefore embedded in the broader area of social 
mobility. Social mobility can be categorised into within-generation (intra-generational) and 
between-generation (intergenerational) mobility. Intergenerational mobility constitutes 
occupational mobility, class mobility, educational mobility and economic mobility. Three 
important components were identified to measure intergenerational economic mobility: 
income mobility, wealth transfers, and the effect of family background on adult children’s 
financial attitudes and behaviours. Theoretically, economic mobility in respect to personal 
wealth is another critical measure of economic mobility, because lifetime wealth is one of 
the best proxies of economic resources (Boserup, Kopczuk & Kreiner, 2014). In practice, 
however, studies on intergenerational wealth mobility are largely constrained by the 
availability of wealth data that (i) capture all dimensions of wealth (including assets, debts, 
public and private transfers etc.), and (ii) capture lifetime wealth of at least two 
generations. In the absence of administrative data and long-running panel data, studies on 
intergenerational transmission of wealth focus on wealth transfers made from parents to 
children. This thesis, therefore, considers parental wealth transfers as an important 
mechanism of intergenerational wealth transmission to assess intergenerational economic 
mobility. 
In developing this conceptual framework, this thesis contributed to the research 
area of intergenerational economic mobility in the following ways. First, it provided a new 
conceptualisation of intergenerational economic mobility that was neither explicitly nor fully 
discussed in the literature. It mapped out the hierarchical relationship between social 
mobility, intergenerational mobility and intergenerational economic mobility, and outlined 
the measures and components of each type of mobility. Second, this conceptual 
framework combined research areas in economics and sociology, thereby providing a 
more comprehensive and granular picture of social mobility than ever before. Third, this 
conceptual framework linked the study of intergenerational economic mobility to the study 
of economic behaviour. Studying economic behaviour provides an important lens into 
economic mobility by examining the impact that family background has on grown-up 
children’s economic and financial practices, which has implications on their economic 
outcomes. Finally, this conceptual framework provided an important guidance for future 
mobility studies to expand and modify the conceptualisation of intergenerational economic 
mobility in different contexts.  
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6.1.2 Intergenerational earnings elasticity 
 
By convention, intergenerational income mobility is measured using father-son 
earnings elasticity. This measure captures the expected percentage change in child’s 
earnings associated with a one-percent increase in father’s earnings. Due to high rates of 
part-time work and discontinuous employment histories, women’s permanent earnings are 
less predictable than men’s. As a result, the common practice in the income-mobility 
literature is to estimate earnings elasticity using father-son dyads. Since fathers’ earnings 
are not observable in the HILDA Survey, I applied a two-stage panel regression model 
which first computes fathers’ earnings based on sons’ reports of fathers’ occupations, and 
then estimates the elasticity.  
This study constituted one of the few income mobility studies in Australia. It also 
added to the existing literature by introducing and applying a two-stage panel regression 
model to estimate earnings elasticities, establishing trends in earnings elasticity in 
Australia over time, examining how using different levels of occupational (dis)aggregation 
and earnings measures affects elasticity estimates, and providing the latest elasticity 
estimates in Australia using more recent data than previous studies.  
Results show that father-son earnings elasticity in Australia between 2001 and 2013 
ranges from 0.11 to 0.30, and has increased over the observation window. My preferred 
elasticity estimates lie between 0.24 and 0.28. Elasticity estimates vary depending on the 
level of occupational (dis)aggregation and earnings measure used: they are highest when 
two-digit level occupations and hourly earnings are used, and lowest when four-digit level 
occupations and annual earnings are used. A statistically significant correlation between 
earnings elasticity and Gini coefficients supports the empirical argument in the existing 
literature that economic mobility is inversely associated with economic inequality. I read 
these findings as indicating that (i) Australia has a moderate level of income mobility by 
international standards; (ii) over the past decade there was a slight decline in 
intergenerational income mobility, and this decline in income mobility is accompanied by 
an increase in income inequality; and (iii) elasticity estimates are very sensitive to the 
choice of data and methods. 
These findings have the following implications. First, analyses of earnings elasticity 
should pay careful attention to the extent to which their results are robust to alternative 
analytic choices. Second, cross-temporal and cross-national comparative analyses should 
recognise that differences in the analytic approach across comparison units may 
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contribute to observed similarities or differences. Third, changing patterns of earnings 
elasticity in a specific country need to be carefully evaluated with the dynamics of 
economic inequality. 
In summary, this chapter adds to my overarching framework for the study of 
intergenerational economic mobility by having examined the degree and dynamics of 
intergenerational income mobility (using intergenerational earnings elasticity) in 
contemporary Australia. Findings in this chapter constitute the income aspect of economic 
mobility outlined in Chapter 2.  
 
6.1.3 Intergenerational wealth transfers 
 
Intergenerational wealth transfers are financial transfers made within families and 
across generations. The direction of transfers can be either “downward” or “upward”: 
downward wealth transfers include (i) transfers made from parents to children; and (ii) 
generation-skipping transfers from grandparents to grandchildren (or transfers involving 
multiple generations). Upward wealth transfers go in the opposite direction: a typical type 
of these is transfers from children to parents. Wealth transfers take two forms: inter vivos 
transfers (i.e. monetary gifts) and bequests/inheritances. Since the HILDA Survey records 
gift transfers received from parents, and collects information on inheritances received 
without specifying its source, I focused on examining the effect of family background on 
the probability and amount of parental gift transfers (generalised as parental wealth 
transfers thereafter). I also adopted a life-course approach to the study of wealth transfers 
by examining how the probability and amount of such transfers differ by parental SES over 
children’s life course and at children’s major life events.  
In doing so, I provided first-time empirical evidence on the effect of family 
background on parental wealth transfers in Australia. I pioneered the application of 
random-effect Heckman selection model to the analysis of parental wealth transfers, 
thereby taking into account the inter-dependence of the probability and amount of parental 
transfers, avoiding selection bias, and capturing the underlying dynamics of parental 
transfers. Additionally, I examined how life-course patterns of parental transfers differ by 
parental SES for the first time in wealth transfer literature in Australia.  
Findings show an overall increase in the probability of receiving parental transfers 
over time, while transfer amount remains stable. Parental employment status, education 
and occupation positively predict the likelihood and magnitude of parental transfers, 
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whereas parental union history and father’s unemployment history are negatively 
associated with the probability and amount of parental transfers. The predicted 
probabilities and amount of parental transfers are consistently higher for the middle/high 
SES group than for the low SES group over children’s life course. Transfer patterns by 
parental SES are similar at the events of childbirth, marriage, being a full-time student, 
material deprivation, lack of financial prosperity and income poverty, while purchasing a 
property and financial worsening are related to increases in the likelihood and magnitude 
of parental transfers for children born to middle/high SES families only. 
These findings have important implications for research and practice. First, parental 
wealth transfers may provide an important means through which intergenerational 
transmission of advantage takes place. Children from affluent families over their life course 
and at major life events not only are more likely to receive parental transfers, but also 
receive larger amount of parental transfers, than their peers from poor families, suggesting 
that parental transfers facilitate the reproduction of socioeconomic statuses (Albertini & 
Radl, 2012). Therefore, parental wealth transfers need to be theorised as an important 
driver of intergenerational inequality and persistence. Second, parental wealth transfers 
are likely to become more important over time, given the critical role these transfers play in 
helping children deal with the surge of tertiary education costs and property price. The 
findings point out that parents’ abilities to give depend not only on their socioeconomic 
statuses (measured by their employment status, education and occupation), but also on 
whether their unions remain intact, because separation and divorce fracture parental 
assets. Third, further research could consider whether and how differences in parental 
wealth transfers may be associated with sustained gaps in children’s cognitive and non-
cognitive skills, social and economic statuses, health and subjective wellbeing. The sizes 
of these associations may have important policy implications, because if there exist 
substantial associations between gaps in parental wealth transfers and in children’s skills, 
statuses and wellbeing, policy interventions using targeted, compensatory public transfers 
would provide real impact on mitigating such gaps and creating equal chance for children 
from adverse family background. 
In summary, this chapter adds to my overarching framework for the study of 
intergenerational economic mobility by having explored the effect of family background on 
the probability and amount of parental wealth transfers, and how parental wealth transfers 
differ by family socioeconomic status over the life course and at major life events of adult 
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children. Findings in this chapter constitute the wealth transfer aspect of economic mobility 
outlined in Chapter 2. 
 
6.1.4 Intra-generational and intergenerational factors and economic behaviours  
 
Adult children’s financial organisation is an important aspect of their economic 
behaviours, and may be influenced by parental resources during upbringing. For example, 
parental earning capacity affects the way in which they manage, save and spend money, 
which in turn shapes children’s monetary views and practices. In this thesis, I studied the 
patterns, determinants and dynamics of within-couple bank account choices (a case study 
for financial behaviours), paying attention to a wide range of intra-generational and 
intergenerational factors. The use of couple-level bank account information improves upon 
studies using such information from just one couple member, as doing so reduces (i) 
measurement errors associated with misreport of joint bank accounts, and (ii) omitted-
variable bias due to the absence of partner characteristics in the model. This study was 
the first to use longitudinal survey data and panel regression models in within-couple 
finance literature, and provides the first robust account of couples’ bank account choices in 
Australia. It was also the first to empirically test the effect of family background on 
partnered individuals’ bank account choices, as the intergenerational factors have largely 
been overlooked in the literature. 
Results suggest that heterosexual couples in contemporary Australia favour mixed 
banking strategies which combine joint and separate bank accounts. In addition to 
confirming that couple’s bank account choices are reflective of partners’ socio-
demographic characteristics (e.g. age, marital status, age, employment status, education, 
and ethnicity), I find new evidence that such choices are also contingent on other 
economic, life-course, socio-cultural and intergenerational factors: income, number of 
children and traditional gender ideologies increase the odds of joint account choices and 
decrease the odds of separate banking, whereas comparable income contribution, shorter 
and more complicated relationship histories, high parental socioeconomic status and non-
traditional family background are associated with couples choosing separate bank 
accounts. 
The findings of intergenerational impact on adult children’s bank account choices 
have important implications for practice. Mothers’ education was found to be an important 
precursor of adult children’s bank account choices, being associated with banking 
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arrangements that provide their adult daughters with increased financial autonomy. Hence, 
current trends in female educational attainment may indirectly result in societal changes in 
the prevalence of more gender-egalitarian bank account arrangements. Parental 
socioeconomic status are related to couple members’ separate banking behaviours. Given 
ongoing socio-demographic trends in these factors, the findings suggest that bank account 
choices will become progressively more egalitarian and individualised over the life course, 
across generations and over time. 
In summary, this chapter adds to my overarching framework for the study of 
intergenerational economic mobility by studying the intergenerational impact on adult 
children’s economic behaviour (operationalised using bank account choices), while also 
taking into consideration intra-generational predictors. Findings in this chapter constitute 
the economic behaviour aspect of economic mobility outlined in Chapter 2. 
 
6.2 Limitations of the thesis 
 
This thesis is not without limitations. First, my empirical analyses lack information 
on actual parental income and wealth, which are arguably better measures of parental 
socioeconomic status than parental education, occupation or imputed earnings (Boserup, 
Kopczuk & Kreiner, 2014). The lack of observed parental income poses significant 
challenges to the estimation of intergenerational earnings elasticity, and points towards a 
suboptimal solution of imputing parental earnings. The imputed parental earnings are less 
precise than the actual earnings, and this may hamper the accuracy of the elasticity 
estimates. The lack of observed parental wealth obstructs the estimation of 
intergenerational wealth mobility, and due to its multidimensionality, imputation of parental 
wealth is theoretically and empirically difficult. Lacking parental income and wealth also 
impedes the calculation of the share of parental transfers over parental income and 
wealth, which can be used to assess wealth transfer motives and the degree of generosity 
of parents (Cox & Rank, 1992; Norton, Nicholas & Huang, 2013). The thesis also lacks 
information on parental bank account arrangements, which would otherwise provide 
additional insights into the intergenerational transmission of financial practices. 
Additionally, information on parental characteristics comes from respondents’ retrospective 
reports, which is susceptible to measurement errors and recall bias (Huang, Perales & 
Western, 2016a; Huang, Perales & Western, 2016b).  
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Second, in this thesis I was unable to estimate the causal effect of family 
background on children’s income, bank account choices and parental wealth transfers 
received. Fixed-effect models are an important analytical tool for causal inference in the 
context of panel data (Antonakis et al., 2010), because these models can control for the 
unobserved time-invariant cofounders that may be correlated with the explanatory 
variables, thereby reducing omitted variable bias (Hsiao, 2007). The trade-off is that fixed-
effect models do not estimate the effects of the explanatory variables whose values are 
time-constant. Since retrospective information on family background is time invariant, I 
could not use such information in fixed-effect models. Random-effect models use both the 
within-individual and between-individual variation in the panel data and improve the 
efficiency of the estimation, but assume no omitted variables and orthogonality (i.e. no 
correlation) between individual-level unobserved heterogeneity and the explanatory 
variables in the models. These assumptions, however, are restrictive and unrealistic. For 
example, respondents’ unobserved characteristics such as cognitive abilities, non-
cognitive abilities and family environment when they grew up are likely to affect their 
income, bank account choices and parental transfers received (thus the assumption of no 
omitted variables is violated), and are correlated with family background as well as their 
observed characteristics such as education (thus the assumption of orthogonality is 
violated). Therefore, estimates of the effect of family background in this thesis need to be 
interpreted as association rather than causation. Other statistical techniques for causal 
inference, such as instrumental variables, could be potential alternatives to fixed-effect 
models, although valid instruments for family background remain difficult to find.37 
Finally, most family background variables pertain to parental characteristics when 
the respondent was 14 years of age. These include parental employment status, education 
and occupation. Using these parental characteristics in the past to predict adult children’s 
contemporary economic outcomes may result in imprecise estimates of the “true” effect of 
                                                          
37 The idea of using instrumental variables is to isolate the part of the variation in the endogenous 
regressor (i.e. family background) that is correlated with the error term (i.e. individual-level 
unobserved heterogeneity), thereby obtaining an estimate of the “true” effect. To obtain this causal 
effect, however, the selected instruments need to be valid. To meet the requirement of validity, the 
selected instruments must be uncorrelated with the error term in the outcome equation (instrument 
exogeneity), be highly correlated with the endogenous regressor (instrument relevance), and not 
be predictors of the outcome variable themselves (exclusion restriction). 
159 
 
 
family background, because such prediction assumes that parental employment status 
and occupation do not change over time. This assumption is less likely to hold, given the 
ongoing socio-demographic transformation taking place in contemporary Australia. A 
solution to this is to match parents and adult children in the panel data so that we could 
use the observed parental characteristics in the same waves as the observed children’s 
economic outcomes to establish the models. Doing so in the HILDA Survey—a 
comparatively short panel with 15 waves of available data—may however results in a 
selective sample of mostly young adult children, which, as has been discussed before, is 
problematic. 
 
6.3 The future of research into intergenerational economic mobility 
 
This thesis points out several fruitful avenues for future research in the broad area 
of intergenerational economic mobility. First, future studies on intergenerational income 
mobility could move beyond my analyses by estimating earnings elasticities using other 
parent-child dyads, such as father-daughter or mother-son dyads, and examine whether 
different types of fathers/parents (e.g. step fathers, adoptive fathers, and biological fathers) 
influence their children’s outcomes to the same extent. Additionally, income measures 
other than earnings, such as total household income, could be used to estimate and 
compare the elasticities, as past research suggests that household income can account for 
spousal selection (i.e. assortative mating) and better capture inter-family dynamics than 
individual earnings (Torche, 2015). Furthermore, studies in Australia could also explore the 
patterns of income mobility by different ethnic/racial groups, by migrant status or by 
Indigenous status. Such studies will help provide a clear picture of how well different social 
groups in Australia perform in income across generations. 
Second, future research could explore intergenerational correlation of wealth by 
estimating wealth elasticities. To do so, the wealth of both parents and adult children 
needs to be observed. This can be done by linking parents to adult children in the HILDA 
Survey, taking care of the potential life-cycle bias associated with using young parent-child 
dyads. Cohort analysis can also be conducted to compare the trends of intergenerational 
wealth mobility over time. 
Third, future studies could delve into the mechanisms through which 
intergenerational transmission of income and wealth takes place. This can be done by 
decomposing income or wealth elasticity into components contributed by different 
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characteristics of parents and adult children, such as education, occupation, health and 
marital status (Blanden et al., 2014). In doing so, we could examine the relative strengths 
of the influences of various characteristics of parents and adult children on income and 
wealth mobility, and understand multiple channels and pathways into status transmission 
and intergenerational persistence. Understanding these mechanisms also involves 
examining how advantage emerges from early life and is perpetuated thereafter. 
Therefore, it is important to link studies of child development and educational inequality to 
studies of intergenerational transmissions of socioeconomic statuses. 
Fourth, future research could examine the effect of family background and major life 
events of adult children on the occurrence and timing of parental wealth transfers (Leopold 
& Schneider, 2011). While in this thesis I have established that parental wealth transfers 
follow different patterns over children’s life course by parental SES, how children’s life 
events trigger the occurrence and timing of parental transfers and how these differ by 
parental SES remain unclear. Additionally, parents typically transfer wealth multiple times, 
and this needs to be taken into consideration empirically. Multilevel event-history analysis 
can be used to accommodate these multiple occurrences of parental wealth transfers. 
Furthermore, new analyses on how receiving parental transfers transforms into advantage 
amongst adult children of middle/high SES parents would also help advance the research 
area of intergenerational wealth transfers. This could involve examining, for example, 
whether parental transfers in middle/high SES families improve adult children’s health, 
buffer against children’s economic strains, or enable children to choose better jobs. 
Fifth, future studies could link wealth transfers to wealth mobility to examine the role 
that parental transfers play in reducing or exacerbating intergenerational wealth mobility. 
Existing studies show mixed findings with regard to the impact of wealth transfers on 
wealth correlations: evidence from Sweden suggests that bequests and gifts account for at 
least 50% of the parent-child correlation (Adermon, Lindahl & Waldenström, 2016), 
whereas parental wealth transfers have negligible effects on intergenerational wealth 
elasticity in Norway (Fagereng, Mogstad & Rønning, 2015). More research is needed on 
the association between wealth transfers and wealth mobility, and cross-country 
comparative analysis will provide more insights into the similarities and differences of this 
association across different welfare regimes. 
Sixth, findings of the intergenerational impact on children’s financial organisation in 
this thesis point towards a promising research avenue consisting of examining the 
intergenerational transmission of economic behaviours, attitudes and practices. 
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Information on financial arrangements of the parents and adult children can be used to 
investigate the degree of intergenerational continuity of financial organisation. Future 
research could explore data sources that contain requisite information on banking 
practices of both generations, or conduct case studies that gather information on bank 
account choices of both the focus group and their parents.  
Seventh, separate analyses of the different patterns of intergenerational economic 
mobility by ethnicity, by geography, or by the distribution of income/wealth could be 
conducted. In doing so, we could examine the ethnic and geographic variations of 
intergenerational economic mobility and how the mobility patterns differ at different 
positions of the income/wealth distribution. Prior research suggests great geographic 
variation in intergenerational mobility (Chetty et al., 2014), more mobility in the white 
population than in the non-white population (Mazumder, 2014), and less mobility at the 
tails of the income/wealth distribution (Jianakoplos & Menchik, 1997). Similar analysis 
could be conducted in Australia to enrich international comparisons.   
Finally, international comparative work on intergenerational economic mobility is 
needed to complement my findings for Australian context. In this thesis I have established 
that the institutionalised family wage system, the historical egalitarian culture and the early 
abolition of wealth transfer tax have made Australia an internationally distinctive country in 
the patterns of intergenerational economic mobility observed: comparatively high income 
mobility due to the legacy of wage compression in the 1980s, larger volume of and more 
frequent parental wealth transfers in high SES families than in low SES families in a tax-
free environment, and mixed financial arrangements combining joint and separate bank 
accounts in Australian families due to the blend of male breadwinner ideology and the 
egalitarianism tradition. It would be highly desirable to conduct cross-country comparative 
analysis on intergenerational economic mobility that follow my proposed theoretical model 
and empirical specification. These would showcase how the patterns of economic mobility 
differ by historical, institutional and socio-cultural contexts. International comparisons 
would also contribute to the theory of welfare state regimes by assessing how well the 
patterns of intergenerational economic mobility among rich capitalist countries fit into the 
three worlds of welfare capitalism (Esping-Andersen, 1990).  
 
6.4 Concluding remarks 
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Is Australia still the land of the “fair go”? Does the egalitarian ethos still exist in 
contemporary Australia? These questions have always been under the spotlight in mass 
media and debated in academic and government work in Australia.38 Inspired by the long-
standing, heated discussions in the public sphere, this thesis has provided a much needed 
evidence base to inform these discussions. It accomplished this by developing a 
conceptual framework of intergenerational economic mobility and providing empirical 
evidence of the degree, nature and mechanisms of intergenerational transmission of 
(dis)advantage in Australia. In doing so, this thesis contributed to clarifying the hierarchical 
relationships between social mobility, intergenerational mobility and intergenerational 
economic mobility, provided up-to-date estimates of intergenerational income mobility, 
underlined the importance of recognising intergenerational wealth transfers as a 
mechanism of status reproduction, and linked the study of economic mobility to the study 
of economic behaviour. Methodologically, this thesis used the newest, longest-running 
high-quality panel data in Australia and state-of-the-art panel regression models, and 
pioneered the application of panel Heckman selection model to the study of 
intergenerational economic mobility. Key findings in this thesis suggest a moderate level 
yet decreasing trend of intergenerational income mobility, persistent life-course gaps in 
parental wealth transfers by family socioeconomic status, and independent and 
individualised economic behaviours associated with ‘non-traditional’ family background. 
These findings help provide new insights into the degree, mechanism and progress of 
intergenerational economic mobility in contemporary Australian society.  
Future research in the area of intergenerational economic mobility needs to move 
beyond simple analyses of measuring intergenerational inequalities and calculating 
intergenerational correlations of income, and to pay more attention to the mechanisms 
through which intergenerational (im)mobility takes place. Given the global trends of 
massive expansion of higher education and the internationalisation of labour market, the 
younger generations may have more economic opportunities than their parental 
                                                          
38 An example of the frequent media attention and debates on these questions is that, in 2013 and 
2016, two programs under the same title “Is Australia still the land of the fair go?” were 
broadcasted in the Australian Broadcasting Corporation Radio National. These featured debates 
and critiques about Australia’s standing as the land of the “fair go”. In addition, numerous 
newspaper articles and politicians’ speeches routinely comment on the degree of “fair go” in 
contemporary Australia. 
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generations on one hand, but may face more economic inequalities than older generations 
on the other hand (as the wealthy can afford moving internationally to take over better 
opportunities, leading to more stratification). Increased employment flexibility, job 
precariousness and global competitions of work lead to greater economic uncertainties, 
which in turn transform into longer stay in education, delayed family formation and later 
labour market entry. These macro-level trends associated with globalisation play out 
differently and unevenly in ways that are mediated by local institutions of education, 
welfare state, labour market and family. More studies on social and economic stratification 
are needed to examine how these global trends interplay with factors influencing the 
degree and mechanisms of intergenerational economic mobility. 
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Appendices 
Table A3-1 Intergenerational income mobility across OECD countries 
Country Dyad Indexa Methodb 
Australia Father-son [0.2, 0.3] 2SLS 
Canada Father-son [0.13, 0.26] OLS, IV 
 Father-daughter 0.22 IV 
Denmark Father-son [0.071, 0.082] OLS 
 Father-daughter 0.034 OLS 
Finland Father-son [0.086, 0.18] OLS 
 Father-daughter 0.08 OLS 
France Father-son [0.36, 0.50] IV, TS2SLS 
 Father-daughter [0.23, 032] IV 
Germany Father-son [0.095, 0.34] OLS 
Italy Father-son [0.44, 0.50] TS2SLS 
Japan Father-son [0.25, 0.46] TS2SLS, IV 
 Father-daughter [0.3, 0.38] IV 
South Korea Father-son [0.22, 0.36] IV, SIMEX 
 Father-daughter [0.34, 0.46] IV, SIMEX 
Norway Father-son [0.12, 0.29] OLS, quantile regression 
 Father-daughter [0.11, 0.22] OLS, quantile regression 
Spain Father-son [0.33, 0.60] OLS, IV 
Sweden Father-son [0.13, 0.30] OLS, IV 
 Father-daughter 0.19 OLS 
United Kingdom Father-son [0.22, 0.59] OLS, IV, TS2SLS 
 Father-daughter [0.33, 0.70] OLS, IV 
 Mother-son [0.06, 0.23] OLS, IV 
 Mother-daughter 0.24 OLS, IV 
United States Father-son [0.09, 0.61] OLS, IV, tobit, TS2SLS 
 Father-daughter [0.28, 0.61] OLS, IV, tobit, TS2SLS 
 Mother-son 0.29 IV 
 Mother-daughter 0.27 IV 
Notes: We summarize up-to-date measures of parent-children income linkages, and present broad income 
mobility coefficients which include, but are not confined to, earnings elasticities. These are given as a range 
within which the estimates from studies in each country fall.  
a The range [a, b] denotes the lowest and highest values for the income mobility index in the existing 
literature. 
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b OLS: ordinary least squares; IV: instrumental variable; 2SLS: two-stage least squares; TS2SLS: two-
sample two-stage least squares; SIMEX: simulation extrapolation. 
Source: Based on Corak (2006) and Gong, Leigh and Meng (2012), updated with new evidence from 
Bratberg, Nilsen and Vaage (2007), Dearden, Machin and Reed (1997), Hugalde (2004), Jäntti et al. (2006), 
Mazumder (2005), Nicoletti and Ermisch (2007), Piraino (2007), Ueda (2009) and Ueda (2013). 
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Table A3-2 Father-son hourly earnings elasticity in Australia, by level of 
occupational (dis)aggregation, hourly wage adjusted using WPI 
Results 
Occupational disaggregation 
One digit Two digits Three digits Four digits 
25-64 30-55 25-64 30-55 25-64 30-55 25-64 30-55 
 0.234 0.303 0.262 0.284 0.237 0.257 0.113 0.131 
 (0.034) (0.041) (0.022) (0.026) (0.019) (0.023) (0.013) (0.015) 
R2 (overall) 0.031 0.024 0.047 0.037 0.049 0.039 0.038 0.030 
N (observations) 30,175 21,101 30,175 21,101 30,175 21,101 30,175 21,101 
N (individuals) 4,960 3,603 4,960 3,603 4,960 3,603 4,960 3,603 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Elasticities estimated using hourly earnings in the main job. All 
elasticities are statistically significant at the 0.1% level.  
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Table A3-3 Father-son hourly earnings elasticity in Australia, by level of 
occupational (dis)aggregation (full model output) 
Results 
One digit Two digits Three digits Four digits 
25-64 30-55 25-64 30-55 25-64 30-55 25-64 30-55 
Elasticities 0.232*** 0.301*** 0.259*** 0.282*** 0.235*** 0.255*** 0.112*** 0.129*** 
Son’s age 0.007*** 0.004*** 0.007*** 0.005*** 0.007*** 0.005*** 0.007*** 0.004*** 
Son’s age squared -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** 
Father’s age when 
son was 14 
0.006** 0.006* 0.006** 0.006* 0.006** 0.006* 0.006** 0.006* 
Father’s age 
squared when son 
was 14 
-0.000* -0.000 -0.000* -0.000 -0.000* -0.000 -0.000** -0.000 
Survey wave 0.019*** 0.020*** 0.019*** 0.020*** 0.019*** 0.020*** 0.019*** 0.020*** 
R2 (overall) 0.044 0.038 0.060 0.051 0.061 0.053 0.050 0.044 
N (observations) 30,175 21,101 30,175 21,101 30,175 21,101 30,175 21,101 
N (individuals) 4,960 3,603 4,960 3,603 4,960 3,603 4,960 3,603 
Notes: HILDA Survey, 2001-2013. Elasticities estimated using hourly earnings in the main job. Significance 
levels: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. 
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Table A3-4 Father-son earnings elasticity using different earnings measures (full 
model output) 
Results  
Weekly earnings Annual earnings 
Two digits Three digits Two digits Three digits 
25-64 30-55 25-64 30-55 25-64 30-55 25-64 30-55 
Elasticities 0.175*** 0.234*** 0.166*** 0.221*** 0.205*** 0.235*** 0.177*** 0.207*** 
Son’s age 0.006*** 0.005*** 0.006*** 0.005*** 0.009*** 0.007*** 0.009*** 0.006*** 
Son’s age squared -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 
Father’s age when 
son was 14 
0.005* 0.008** 0.005* 0.008* 0.003 0.009* 0.003 0.009** 
Father’s age 
squared when son 
was 14 
-0.000* -0.001* -0.000* -0.001* -0.000 -0.001** -0.000 -0.001** 
Survey wave 0.020*** 0.019*** 0.020*** 0.019*** 0.020*** 0.019*** 0.020*** 0.020*** 
R2 (overall) 0.052 0.037 0.053 0.040 0.043 0.030 0.042 0.030 
N (observations) 30,211 21,125 30,211 21,125 32,675 22,857 32,675 22,857 
N (individuals) 4,962 3,604 4,962 3,604 5,017 3,674 5,017 3,674 
Notes: HILDA Survey, 2001-2013. Significance levels: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. 
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Table A4-1 Summary statistics for the analytical variables in Chapter 4 
Variables Mean/% S.D. Obs. 
Outcome variables    
Transfer amount 7,214.6 27,032.0 7,059 
Transfer probability 8.3  87,854 
Explanatory variables: Child characteristics    
Female    
  No (reference)    
  Yes 52.1  87,854 
Age  28.9 6.7 87,854 
University degree     
  No (reference)    
  Yes  24.9  87,827 
Marital status     
  Partnered (reference)    
  Divorced, separate or widowed 3.9  87,838 
  Never partnered 37.5  87,838 
Employment status     
  Employed (reference)    
  Unemployed 5.4  87,854 
  Not in the labour force 16.5  87,854 
Ethnicity     
   Born in Australia (reference)    
   Main English Speaking countries 6.1  87,827 
   Other countries 10.2  87,827 
Disability     
  No (reference)    
  Yes 14.8  87,834 
OECD equivalised household income in 10,000s 5.6 3.9 87,854 
Number of dependent children 0.8 1.2 87,854 
Number of siblings 2.4 1.7 87,249 
Number of co-residing parents     
  0 (reference)    
  1  6.0  87,854 
  2  14.1  87,854 
Survey wave 8.5 4.4 87,854 
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Explanatory variables: Family background    
Parental union history     
  Divorced/separated (reference)    
  Did not divorce or separate 64.7  87,854 
  Missing  24.8  87,854 
Number of parents employed     
  0 (reference)    
  1  32.8  87,854 
  2  54.1  87,854 
  Missing  8.3  87,854 
Father ever unemployed over 6 months    
  Yes (reference)    
  No 74.9  87,854 
  Missing  10.6  87,854 
Number of parents with university degrees     
  0 (reference)    
  1  15.8  87,854 
  2  8.4  87,854 
  Missing  15.0  87,854 
Number of parents in managerial/professional 
occupations    
  0 (reference)    
  1  25.4  87,854 
  2  15.4  87,854 
  Missing  26.8  87,854 
Parental mean occupational status  46.7 20.8 83,880 
Explanatory variables: Children’s life events    
Having children     
  No (reference)    
  Yes 7.2  87,854 
Having children: year before     
  No (reference)    
  Yes 7.3  87,854 
Getting married     
  No (reference)    
  Yes 2.9  87,854 
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Getting married: year before     
  No (reference)    
  Yes 3.0  87,854 
Buying a property     
  No (reference)    
  Yes 4.7  87,854 
Buying a property: year before     
  No (reference)    
  Yes 4.7  87,854 
Being a full-time student    
  No (reference)    
  Yes 12.2  87,854 
  Missing  0.0  87,854 
Lack of financial prosperity     
  No (reference)    
  Yes 3.1  87,854 
  Missing  14.6  87,854 
Financial worsening     
  No (reference)    
  Yes 2.4  87,854 
  Missing  20.7  87,854 
Material deprivation     
  No (reference)    
  Yes 26.1  87,854 
  Missing  20.4  87,854 
Income poverty     
  No (reference)    
  Yes  15.9  87,854 
Notes: HILDA Survey, 2001-2015. Parental employment status and occupation are measured when the 
respondent was 14 years of age. 
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Table A4-2 Descriptive statistics on the demographic characteristics of adult 
children by parental SES 
Variables 
Parental SES 
Low Middle High Missing 
Outcome variables    
Transfer amount 4,789 (15,449) 8,172 (35,067) 9,039 (29,823) 6,215 (19,228) 
Transfer probability 6.1 9.3 14.7 6.2 
Demographic characteristics    
Female     
  No (reference)     
  Yes 52.9 52.0 53.6 50.4 
Age  29.2 (6.8) 29.1 (6.8) 28.6 (6.6) 28.5 (6.6) 
University degree      
  No (reference)     
  Yes  16.5 29.5 42.3 20.5 
Marital status      
  Partnered (reference)    
  Divorced, separate or 
widowed 
4.3 3.8 2.6 4.4 
  Never partnered 33.2 36.8 37.9 43.2 
Employment status      
  Employed (reference)     
  Unemployed 5.7 4.1 3.5 7.5 
  Not in the labour force 16.3 13.7 12.8 21.5 
Ethnicity      
   Born in Australia (reference)    
   Main English Speaking 
countries 
6.9 7.2 6.4 3.9 
   Other countries 5.9 8.2 11.6 16.4 
Disability      
  No (reference)     
  Yes 15.6 13.2 11.7 17.3 
OECD equivalised household 
income in 10,000s 
5.2 (3.2) 6.1 (4.4) 6.7 (5.0) 5.0 (3.3) 
Number of dependent 
children 
0.9 (1.2) 0.8 (1.1) 0.7 (1.1) 0.8 (1.2) 
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Number of siblings 2.3 (1.6) 2.2 (1.4) 2.1 (1.4) 2.8 (2.0) 
Number of co-residing parents     
  0 (reference)     
  1  5.8 5.3 4.4 7.8 
  2  12.0 13.9 14.2 16.7 
Survey wave 8.5 (4.4) 8.6 (4.4) 8.8 (4.4) 8.2 (4.5) 
Life events     
Having children      
  No (reference)     
  Yes 7.4 7.0 7.3 7.2 
Having children: year before      
  No (reference)     
  Yes 7.5 7.1 7.4 7.2 
Getting married      
  No (reference)     
  Yes 2.8 2.9 3.3 2.8 
Getting married: year before      
  No (reference)     
  Yes 2.9 3.0 3.3 2.8 
Buying a property      
  No (reference)     
  Yes 4.6 4.9 5.3 4.3 
Buying a property: year before     
  No (reference)     
  Yes 4.6 5.0 5.4 4.3 
Being a full-time student     
  No (reference)     
  Yes 9.3 13.8 18.0 10.9 
  Missing  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Lack of financial prosperity      
  No (reference)     
  Yes 3.5 2.8 2.1 3.7 
  Missing  14.0 14.0 12.9 17.0 
Financial worsening      
  No (reference)     
  Yes 2.6 2.2 2.2 2.6 
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  Missing  20.2 20.0 18.1 23.6 
Material deprivation      
  No (reference)     
  Yes 28.5 24.0 21.9 27.4 
  Missing  19.9 19.8 18.9 22.5 
Income poverty      
  No (reference)     
  Yes  15.9 12.6 11.2 21.7 
N (observations) 28,422 22,294 13,559 23,579 
N (individuals) 5,542 4,319 2,522 4,340 
Notes: HILDA Survey, 2001-2015. Mean values for continuous variables and percentages for categorical 
variables are reported. Standard deviations are in parentheses. 
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Table A4-3 Random-effect Heckman selection models of the effect of child 
characteristics on parental wealth transfers, baseline models  
Variables S A 
Female    
  No (reference)   
  Yes  0.06** 0.08+ 
Age  -0.31*** -0.00 
Age square 0.01***  
University degree    
  No (reference)   
  Yes  0.13*** 0.17** 
Marital status    
  Partnered (reference)   
  Divorced, separate or widowed 0.08 0.29 
  Never partnered 0.17*** 0.07 
Employment status    
  Employed (reference)   
  Unemployed 0.23*** 0.12* 
  Not in the labour force 0.17*** 0.29*** 
Country of birth    
  Born in Australia (reference)   
  Main English Speaking 0.18*** 0.10 
  Other 0.22*** 0.88*** 
Disability    
  No (reference)   
  Yes 0.07*** -0.15** 
OECD equivalised household income in 10,000s 0.01*** 0.08*** 
Number of dependent children -0.06*** -0.02 
Number of siblings -0.09*** -0.11*** 
Number of co-residing parents    
  0 (reference)   
  1  -0.16*** -0.61*** 
  2  -0.08** -0.78*** 
Survey wave 0.02*** -0.02*** 
N (observations) 87,196 87,196 
N (individuals) 16,628 16,628 
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AIC / BIC 62,842 / 63,208 
Notes: HILDA Survey, 2001-2015. S: selection equation. A: amount equation. Significance levels: * p < 0.05, 
** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. 
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Table A4-4 Random-effect Heckman selection models of the effect of family background on parental wealth transfers (full 
model output) 
Variables  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
S A S A S A S A S A S A 
Parents ever divorced/separated           
  Yes (reference)             
  No 0.15*** 0.24** 0.14*** 0.23** 0.13*** 0.21* 0.14*** 0.22* 0.15*** 0.23** 0.12*** 0.21* 
# parents employed              
  0 (reference)             
  1    0.29*** 0.47**         
  2    0.39*** 0.50**         
Father ever unemployed over 6 months           
  Yes (reference)             
  No     0.20*** 0.36***       
# parents with university degree            
  0 (reference)             
  1        0.26*** 0.21***     
  2        0.49*** 0.43***     
# parents in managerial/professional occupation           
  0 (reference)             
  1          0.22*** 0.22***   
  2          0.46*** 0.53***   
Parental mean occupational status         0.01*** 0.01*** 
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Controls              
Female              
  No (reference)             
  Yes  0.06** 0.08 0.06** 0.08 0.06** 0.08 0.06** 0.08 0.06** 0.07 0.07** 0.09 
Age  -0.31*** -0.00 -0.31*** -0.00 -0.31*** -0.00 -0.30*** 0.00 -0.31*** 0.00 -0.31*** 0.00 
Age square 0.00***  0.00***  0.00***  0.00***  0.00***  0.00***  
University degree              
  No (reference)             
  Yes  0.11*** 0.14* 0.11*** 0.14* 0.11*** 0.14* 0.06** 0.10 0.07** 0.09 0.03 0.06 
Marital status              
  Partnered (reference)             
  Divorced, separate or 
widowed 
0.08 0.28 0.09 0.28 0.08 0.28 0.09 0.29 0.09 0.30 0.11 0.27 
  Never partnered 0.17*** 0.07 0.18*** 0.08 0.18*** 0.07 0.17*** 0.06 0.17*** 0.05 0.16*** 0.03 
Employment status              
  Employed (reference)             
  Unemployed 0.24*** 0.13* 0.26*** 0.14* 0.26*** 0.15* 0.26*** 0.14* 0.26*** 0.14* 0.27*** 0.18** 
  Not in the labour force 0.17*** 0.29*** 0.18*** 0.30*** 0.18*** 0.30*** 0.17*** 0.29*** 0.18*** 0.29*** 0.18*** 0.31*** 
Country of birth              
  Born in Australia (reference)            
  Main English Speaking 0.19*** 0.11 0.18*** 0.11 0.19*** 0.11 0.17*** 0.10 0.18*** 0.12 0.15*** 0.04 
  Other 0.20*** 0.84*** 0.21*** 0.86*** 0.20*** 0.85*** 0.13*** 0.79*** 0.20*** 0.84*** 0.18*** 0.83*** 
Disability              
205 
 
 
  No (reference)             
  Yes 0.08*** -0.13* 0.09*** -0.12* 0.09*** -0.12* 0.09*** -0.13* 0.09*** -0.13* 0.10*** -0.13* 
OECD equivalised 
household income in 
10,000s 
0.01*** 0.08*** 0.01*** 0.08*** 0.01*** 0.08*** 0.01*** 0.08*** 0.01*** 0.08*** 0.01*** 0.08*** 
Number of dependent 
children 
-0.06*** -0.02 -0.06*** -0.02 -0.06*** -0.01 -0.05*** -0.02 -0.06*** -0.02 -0.05*** -0.03 
Number of siblings -0.09*** -0.10*** -0.08*** -0.09*** -0.08*** -0.10*** -0.08*** -0.09*** -0.08*** -0.09*** -0.08*** -0.08*** 
Number of co-residing parents             
  0 (reference)             
  1  -0.11** -0.50*** -0.10** -0.50*** -0.10** -0.49*** -0.11** -0.50*** -0.10** -0.48*** -0.11** -0.48*** 
  2  -0.12*** -0.84*** -0.11*** -0.83*** -0.12*** -0.83*** -0.12*** -0.84*** -0.10*** -0.82*** -0.12*** -0.83*** 
Survey wave 0.02*** -0.02*** 0.02*** -0.02*** 0.02*** -0.02*** 0.02*** -0.02*** 0.02*** -0.02*** 0.02*** -0.02*** 
N (observations) 87,196 87,196 87,196 87,196 87,196 87,196 87,196 87,196 87,196 87,196 83,677 83,677 
N (individuals) 16,628 16,628 16,628 16,628 16,628 16,628 16,628 16,628 16,628 16,628 15,967 15,967 
AIC / BIC 62,715 / 63,118 62,634 / 63,094 62,602 / 63,043 62,380 / 62,839 62,334 / 62,794 60,125 / 60,545 
Notes: HILDA Survey, 2001-2015. S: selection equation. A: amount equation. Parental employment status and occupation are measured when the respondent was 
14 years of age. The coefficients on the dummy variables capturing missing information are omitted for readability. Significance levels: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 
0.001. 
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Table A4-5 Random-effect Heckman selection models of the effect of childbirth on 
parental wealth transfers by parental SES (full model output) 
Variables  Low SES Middle/High SES 
S A S A 
Childbirth -0.08 -0.03 -0.01 0.09 
Childbirth: year before -0.08 -0.35 -0.02 -0.02 
Controls     
Female      
  No (reference)     
  Yes  0.04 0.10 0.11*** 0.12 
Age  -0.30*** 0.03 -0.33*** -0.01 
Age square 0.00***  0.00***  
University degree      
  No (reference)     
  Yes  0.10* 0.13 0.07* 0.05 
Marital status      
  Partnered (reference)     
  Divorced, separate or widowed 0.09 -0.10 0.09 0.36 
  Never partnered 0.15*** -0.17 0.16*** 0.13 
Employment status      
  Employed (reference)     
  Unemployed 0.26*** 0.07 0.27*** 0.26** 
  Not in the labour force 0.17*** 0.41*** 0.18*** 0.31*** 
Country of birth      
  Born in Australia (reference)     
  Main English Speaking 0.30*** -0.25 0.09 0.23 
  Other 0.25*** 0.26 0.22*** 1.02*** 
Disability      
  No (reference)     
  Yes 0.06 -0.22 0.11*** -0.16* 
OECD equivalised household 
income in 10,000s 
0.01 0.09*** 0.01*** 0.08*** 
Number of dependent children -0.07** -0.07 -0.04 0.02 
Number of siblings -0.09*** -0.07 -0.09*** -0.10*** 
Number of co-residing parents      
  0 (reference)     
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  1  0.02 -0.48** -0.23*** -0.64*** 
  2  -0.08 -0.62*** -0.11** -0.87*** 
Survey wave 0.03*** -0.05*** 0.02*** -0.01 
N (observations) 28,387 28,387 35,811 35,811 
N (individuals) 5,534 5,534 6,833 6,833 
AIC / BIC 16,207 / 16,562 33,032 / 33,396 
Notes: HILDA Survey, 2001-2015. S: selection equation. A: amount equation. Significance levels: * p < 0.05, 
** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. 
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Table A4-6 Random-effect Heckman selection models of the effect of marriage on 
parental wealth transfers by parental SES (full model output) 
Variables  Low SES Middle/High SES 
S A S A 
Getting married 0.19* 0.81*** 0.21*** 0.90*** 
Getting married: year before -0.01 0.57* 0.12* 0.35** 
Controls     
Female      
  No (reference)     
  Yes  0.04 0.12 0.11*** 0.11 
Age  -0.30*** 0.04* -0.34*** -0.01 
Age square 0.00***  0.00***  
University degree      
  No (reference)     
  Yes  0.10* 0.10 0.07* 0.04 
Marital status      
  Partnered (reference)     
  Divorced, separate or widowed 0.12 -0.02 0.11 0.45 
  Never partnered 0.17*** -0.09 0.19*** 0.22** 
Employment status      
  Employed (reference)     
  Unemployed 0.26*** 0.05 0.28*** 0.26** 
  Not in the labour force 0.16*** 0.36** 0.18*** 0.32*** 
Country of birth      
  Born in Australia (reference)     
  Main English Speaking 0.30*** -0.27 0.10 0.26* 
  Other 0.26*** 0.25 0.23*** 1.03*** 
Disability      
  No (reference)     
  Yes 0.07 -0.23* 0.11*** -0.17* 
OECD equivalised household 
income in 10,000s 
0.01 0.09*** 0.01*** 0.07*** 
Number of dependent children -0.07** -0.05 -0.03 0.07 
Number of siblings -0.09*** -0.07 -0.09*** -0.10*** 
Number of co-residing parents      
  0 (reference)     
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  1  0.02 -0.48** -0.23*** -0.63*** 
  2  -0.08 -0.62*** -0.11** -0.87*** 
Survey wave 0.03*** -0.05*** 0.03*** -0.01 
N (observations) 28,387 28,387 35,811 35,811 
N (individuals) 5,534 5,534 6,833 6,833 
AIC / BIC 16,189 / 16,544 32,973 / 33,338 
Notes: HILDA Survey, 2001-2015. S: selection equation. A: amount equation. Significance levels: * p < 0.05, 
** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. 
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Table A4-7 Random-effect Heckman selection models of the effect of property 
purchase on parental wealth transfers by parental SES (full model output) 
Variables  Low SES Middle/High SES 
S A S A 
Buying a property 0.10 0.29 0.13** 0.80*** 
Buying a property: year before 0.03 0.35 0.01 -0.03 
Controls     
Female      
  No (reference)     
  Yes  0.04 0.10 0.11*** 0.11 
Age  -0.30*** 0.03 -0.34*** -0.01 
Age square 0.00***  0.00***  
University degree      
  No (reference)     
  Yes  0.10* 0.11 0.07* 0.03 
Marital status      
  Partnered (reference)     
  Divorced, separate or widowed 0.10 -0.06 0.09 0.37 
  Never partnered 0.16*** -0.14 0.17*** 0.16* 
Employment status      
  Employed (reference)     
  Unemployed 0.25*** 0.04 0.27*** 0.24** 
  Not in the labour force 0.16*** 0.38** 0.18*** 0.31*** 
Country of birth      
  Born in Australia (reference)     
  Main English Speaking 0.30*** -0.25 0.10 0.24 
  Other 0.26*** 0.27 0.23*** 1.03*** 
Disability      
  No (reference)     
  Yes 0.07 -0.22 0.11*** -0.15* 
OECD equivalised household 
income in 10,000s 
0.01 0.09*** 0.01*** 0.07*** 
Number of dependent children -0.07** -0.06 -0.04 0.05 
Number of siblings -0.09*** -0.07 -0.09*** -0.10*** 
Number of co-residing parents      
  0 (reference)     
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  1  0.02 -0.49** -0.24*** -0.70*** 
  2  -0.08 -0.61*** -0.12** -0.90*** 
Survey wave 0.03*** -0.05*** 0.02*** -0.01 
N (observations) 28,387 28,387 35,811 35,811 
N (individuals) 5,534 5,534 6,833 6,833 
AIC / BIC 16,204 / 16,559 32,966 / 33,331 
Notes: HILDA Survey, 2001-2015. S: selection equation. A: amount equation. Significance levels: * p < 0.05, 
** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. 
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Table A4-8 Random-effect Heckman selection models of the effect of being a full-
time student on parental wealth transfers by parental SES (full model output) 
Variables  Low SES Middle/High SES 
S A S A 
Being a full-time student 0.37*** 0.41*** 0.37*** 0.33*** 
Controls     
Female      
  No (reference)     
  Yes  0.03 0.10 0.10** 0.10 
Age  -0.26*** 0.03* -0.30*** -0.00 
Age square 0.00***  0.00***  
University degree      
  No (reference)     
  Yes  0.15** 0.17 0.14*** 0.13 
Marital status      
  Partnered (reference)     
  Divorced, separate or widowed 0.11 -0.05 0.07 0.33 
  Never partnered 0.14*** -0.15 0.14*** 0.10 
Employment status      
  Employed (reference)     
  Unemployed 0.26*** 0.13 0.27*** 0.26** 
  Not in the labour force 0.10** 0.32** 0.11*** 0.26*** 
Country of birth      
  Born in Australia (reference)     
  Main English Speaking 0.30*** -0.20 0.10 0.24 
  Other 0.20** 0.23 0.18*** 0.98*** 
Disability      
  No (reference)     
  Yes 0.08* -0.18 0.13*** -0.14 
OECD equivalised household 
income in 10,000s 
0.01* 0.09*** 0.01*** 0.08*** 
Number of dependent children -0.06** -0.06 -0.03 0.03 
Number of siblings -0.08*** -0.08* -0.08*** -0.09*** 
Number of co-residing parents      
  0 (reference)     
  1  0.03 -0.45** -0.24*** -0.65*** 
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  2  -0.11* -0.65*** -0.13*** -0.90*** 
Survey wave 0.02*** -0.05*** 0.02*** -0.01 
N (observations) 28,387 28,387 35,811 35,811 
N (individuals) 5,534 5,534 6,833 6,833 
AIC / BIC 16,087 / 16,426 32,801 / 33,149 
Notes: HILDA Survey, 2001-2015. S: selection equation. A: amount equation. Significance levels: * p < 0.05, 
** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. 
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Table A4-9 Random-effect Heckman selection models of the effect of lack of 
financial prosperity on parental wealth transfers by parental SES (full model output) 
Variables  Low SES Middle/High SES 
S A S A 
Lack of financial prosperity a 0.04 0.06 0.10 -0.08 
Controls     
Female      
  No (reference)     
  Yes  0.04 0.10 0.10*** 0.12 
Age  -0.30*** 0.03 -0.33*** -0.01 
Age square 0.00***  0.00***  
University degree      
  No (reference)     
  Yes  0.10* 0.13 0.07* 0.05 
Marital status      
  Partnered (reference)     
  Divorced, separate or widowed 0.11 -0.05 0.10 0.35 
  Never partnered 0.16*** -0.14 0.17*** 0.13 
Employment status      
  Employed (reference)     
  Unemployed 0.25*** 0.06 0.27*** 0.26** 
  Not in the labour force 0.16*** 0.39*** 0.17*** 0.31*** 
Country of birth      
  Born in Australia (reference)     
  Main English Speaking 0.30*** -0.25 0.10 0.23 
  Other 0.26*** 0.27 0.23*** 1.02*** 
Disability      
  No (reference)     
  Yes 0.07 -0.22 0.11*** -0.16* 
OECD equivalised household 
income in 10,000s 
0.01* 0.09*** 0.01*** 0.08*** 
Number of dependent children -0.07** -0.07 -0.04* 0.03 
Number of siblings -0.09*** -0.07 -0.09*** -0.10*** 
Number of co-residing parents      
  0 (reference)     
  1  0.02 -0.49** -0.24*** -0.64*** 
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  2  -0.09 -0.63*** -0.12** -0.87*** 
Survey wave 0.03*** -0.05*** 0.02*** -0.01 
N (observations) 28,387 28,387 35,811 35,811 
N (individuals) 5,534 5,534 6,833 6,833 
AIC / BIC 16,202 / 16,557 33,002 / 33,367 
Notes: HILDA Survey, 2001-2015. S: selection equation. A: amount equation. a The coefficients on the 
dummy variables capturing missing information are omitted for readability. Significance levels: * p < 0.05, ** p 
< 0.01, *** p < 0.001. 
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Table A4-10 Random-effect Heckman selection models of the effect of financial 
worsening on parental wealth transfers by parental SES (full model output) 
Variables  Low SES Middle/High SES 
S A S A 
Financial worsening a 0.08 0.25 0.20*** 0.05 
Controls     
Female      
  No (reference)     
  Yes  0.04 0.10 0.11*** 0.12 
Age  -0.30*** 0.03 -0.33*** -0.01 
Age square 0.00***  0.00***  
University degree      
  No (reference)     
  Yes  0.10* 0.14 0.07* 0.06 
Marital status      
  Partnered (reference)     
  Divorced, separate or widowed 0.11 -0.05 0.09 0.34 
  Never partnered 0.16*** -0.13 0.17*** 0.12 
Employment status      
  Employed (reference)     
  Unemployed 0.25*** 0.06 0.26*** 0.26** 
  Not in the labour force 0.15*** 0.38*** 0.17*** 0.31*** 
Country of birth      
  Born in Australia (reference)     
  Main English Speaking 0.30*** -0.24 0.10 0.22 
  Other 0.26*** 0.28 0.23*** 1.01*** 
Disability      
  No (reference)     
  Yes 0.06 -0.23* 0.11*** -0.17* 
OECD equivalised household 
income in 10,000s 
0.01 0.09*** 0.01*** 0.08*** 
Number of dependent children -0.07** -0.06 -0.04 0.03 
Number of siblings -0.09*** -0.07 -0.09*** -0.10*** 
Number of co-residing parents      
  0 (reference)     
  1  0.02 -0.49** -0.24*** -0.64*** 
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  2  -0.09 -0.63*** -0.12** -0.86*** 
Survey wave 0.02*** -0.05*** 0.02*** -0.01 
N (observations) 28,387 28,387 35,811 35,811 
N (individuals) 5,534 5,534 6,833 6,833 
AIC / BIC 16,199 / 16,554 32,997 / 33,362 
Notes: HILDA Survey, 2001-2015. S: selection equation. A: amount equation. a The coefficients on the 
dummy variables capturing missing information are omitted for readability. Significance levels: * p < 0.05, ** p 
< 0.01, *** p < 0.001. 
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Table A4-11 Random-effect Heckman selection models of the effect of material 
deprivation on parental wealth transfers by parental SES (full model output) 
Variables  Low SES Middle/High SES 
S A S A 
Material deprivation a 0.20*** 0.06 0.24*** 0.07 
Controls     
Female      
  No (reference)     
  Yes  0.04 0.10 0.10*** 0.12 
Age  -0.31*** 0.03 -0.34*** -0.01 
Age square 0.00***  0.00***  
University degree      
  No (reference)     
  Yes  0.12* 0.13 0.09** 0.06 
Marital status      
  Partnered (reference)     
  Divorced, separate or widowed 0.08 -0.07 0.06 0.33 
  Never partnered 0.17*** -0.15 0.16*** 0.12 
Employment status      
  Employed (reference)     
  Unemployed 0.24*** 0.06 0.25*** 0.25** 
  Not in the labour force 0.15*** 0.39*** 0.17*** 0.31*** 
Country of birth      
  Born in Australia (reference)     
  Main English Speaking 0.30*** -0.25 0.09 0.23 
  Other 0.27*** 0.27 0.24*** 1.02*** 
Disability      
  No (reference)     
  Yes 0.05 -0.23* 0.09** -0.17* 
OECD equivalised household 
income in 10,000s 
0.01* 0.09*** 0.01*** 0.08*** 
Number of dependent children -0.07** -0.07 -0.04* 0.03 
Number of siblings -0.09*** -0.07* -0.09*** -0.10*** 
Number of co-residing parents      
  0 (reference)     
  1  0.04 -0.47** -0.21*** -0.63*** 
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  2  -0.05 -0.61*** -0.08* -0.86*** 
Survey wave 0.03*** -0.05*** 0.02*** -0.01 
N (observations) 28,387 28,387 35,811 35,811 
N (individuals) 5,534 5,534 6,833 6,833 
AIC / BIC 16,174 / 16,529 32,911 / 33,276 
Notes: HILDA Survey, 2001-2015. S: selection equation. A: amount equation. a The coefficients on the 
dummy variables capturing missing information are omitted for readability. Significance levels: * p < 0.05, ** p 
< 0.01, *** p < 0.001. 
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Table A4-12 Random-effect Heckman selection models of the effect of income 
poverty on parental wealth transfers by parental SES (full model output) 
Variables  Low SES Middle/High SES 
S A S A 
Income poverty 0.00 0.07 0.04 -0.05 
Controls     
Female      
  No (reference)     
  Yes  0.04 0.10 0.11*** 0.12 
Age  -0.30*** 0.03 -0.33*** -0.01 
Age square 0.00***  0.00***  
University degree      
  No (reference)     
  Yes  0.10* 0.13 0.07* 0.05 
Marital status      
  Partnered (reference)     
  Divorced, separate or widowed 0.10 -0.08 0.08 0.37 
  Never partnered 0.15*** -0.16 0.16*** 0.14 
Employment status      
  Employed (reference)     
  Unemployed 0.26*** 0.06 0.27*** 0.26** 
  Not in the labour force 0.16*** 0.38** 0.17*** 0.32*** 
Country of birth      
  Born in Australia (reference)     
  Main English Speaking 0.30*** -0.25 0.09 0.23 
  Other 0.26*** 0.26 0.22*** 1.02*** 
Disability      
  No (reference)     
  Yes 0.07 -0.22* 0.11*** -0.16* 
OECD equivalised household 
income in 10,000s 
0.01 0.09*** 0.01*** 0.08*** 
Number of dependent children -0.07** -0.07 -0.04* 0.03 
Number of siblings -0.09*** -0.07* -0.09*** -0.10*** 
Number of co-residing parents      
  0 (reference)     
  1  0.02 -0.46** -0.22*** -0.66*** 
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  2  -0.08 -0.60*** -0.10** -0.89*** 
Survey wave 0.03*** -0.05*** 0.02*** -0.01 
N (observations) 28,387 28,387 35,811 35,811 
N (individuals) 5,534 5,534 6,833 6,833 
AIC / BIC 16,210 / 16,548 33,026 / 33,374 
Notes: HILDA Survey, 2001-2015. S: selection equation. A: amount equation. Significance levels: * p < 0.05, 
** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. 
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Table A5-1 Bank account choices among heterosexual couples in Australia, 
Hypothesis 1 (full model output) 
Hypothesis 1  
Joint account 
vs. no joint 
account 
Account choice (ref. partners have only a joint 
account) 
Only man has 
a separate 
account  
Only woman has 
a separate 
account 
Both have 
separate 
accounts 
Total income (IHS) 1.30*** 1.19** 1.08 1.09+ 
Relative resources (ref. similar contribution)   
  Women contribute 60%+ 0.67** 1.32+ 1.64*** 1.51*** 
  Men contribute 60%+ 1.01 1.14 1.27** 1.06 
Controls     
Marital status (ref. de facto)     
  Legally married 53.92*** 0.10*** 0.13*** 0.026*** 
Mean couple age 1.06*** 0.97*** 0.99** 0.97*** 
Age difference (ref. <5 years)     
  Man 5+ years older 0.41*** 1.54** 1.22 1.64*** 
  Woman 5+ years older 0.29*** 1.49 1.99* 2.78*** 
Employment status (ref. neither employed)    
  Only man employed  3.08*** 1.17 1.59** 0.94 
  Only woman employed  2.36*** 1.62** 1.47* 0.94 
  Both employed 1.28 1.59+ 1.90** 1.54* 
Education (ref. neither have degree)    
  Only man has degree 1.84*** 1.87*** 1.26 1.70*** 
  Only woman has degree 1.41+ 1.40+ 1.12 1.43* 
  Both has degree 1.32 1.33+ 0.93 1.10 
Ethnicity (ref. neither born in Australia)    
  Only man born in Australia 1.67** 1.06 1.53** 1.38* 
  Only woman born in Australia 1.99** 1.79* 1.81** 1.93** 
  Both born in Australia 1.93** 1.14 1.44+ 1.41+ 
N (observations) 15,572 15,572 15,572 15,572 
N (individuals) 7,094 7,094 7,094 7,094 
AIC / BIC 11,679 / 11,824 33,208 / 33,628 
Notes: HILDA Survey (2002, 2006, 2010 and 2014). Odds ratios reported. Column 1 displays the results of 
the random-effect binary logit models, and columns 2-4 display the results of the random-effect multinomial 
logit models. All models feature robust standard errors. Significance levels: + p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** 
p<0.001. 
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Table A5-2 Bank account choices among heterosexual couples in Australia, 
Hypothesis 2 (full model output) 
Hypothesis 2 
Joint account 
vs. no joint 
account 
Account choice (ref. partners have only a joint 
account) 
Only man has 
a separate 
account  
Only woman has 
a separate 
account 
Both have 
separate 
accounts 
Number of dependent children 1.33*** 0.86*** 0.92* 0.77*** 
Controls     
Marital status (ref. de facto)     
  Legally married 46.00*** 0.11*** 0.14*** 0.03*** 
Mean couple age 1.06*** 0.97*** 0.99** 0.96*** 
Age difference (ref. <5 years)     
  Man 5+ years older 0.38*** 1.59** 1.25+ 1.73*** 
  Woman 5+ years older 0.29*** 1.49 2.01* 2.75*** 
Employment status (ref. neither employed)   
  Only man employed  3.05*** 1.20 1.68*** 0.98 
  Only woman employed  2.18*** 1.74** 1.62** 1.02 
  Both employed 1.10 1.69* 2.22*** 1.76** 
Education (ref. neither have degree)   
  Only man has degree 1.90*** 1.91*** 1.29+ 1.72*** 
  Only woman has degree 1.46+ 1.44* 1.17 1.44* 
  Both has degree 1.31 1.33+ 0.93 1.12 
Ethnicity (ref. neither born in Australia)    
  Only man born in Australia 1.68** 1.08 1.57** 1.40* 
  Only woman born in Australia 2.02** 1.83** 1.87** 1.94** 
  Both born in Australia 1.95** 1.15 1.46+ 1.42+ 
Total couple income (IHS) 1.27** 1.20** 1.08 1.11* 
N (observations) 15,572 15,572 15,572 15,572 
N (individuals) 7,094 7,094 7,094 7,094 
AIC / BIC 11,651 / 11,789  33,140 / 33,537  
Notes: HILDA Survey (2002, 2006, 2010 and 2014). Odds ratios reported. Column 1 displays the results of 
the random-effect binary logit models, and columns 2-4 display the results of the random-effect multinomial 
logit models. All models feature robust standard errors. Significance levels: + p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** 
p<0.001.
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Table A5-3 Bank account choices among heterosexual couples in Australia, 
Hypothesis 3 (full model output) 
Hypothesis 3 
Joint account 
vs. no joint 
account 
Account choice (ref. partners have only a joint 
account) 
Only man has 
a separate 
account  
Only woman has 
a separate 
account 
Both have 
separate 
accounts 
Relationship history (ref. both 1st relationship)   
  Men 1st relationship and women 2nd+ 0.23*** 1.55+ 2.07*** 2.12*** 
  Women 1st relationship and men 2nd+ 0.33*** 1.80* 1.69* 1.96*** 
  Both 2nd+ relationship 0.05*** 5.50*** 5.90*** 14.57*** 
Relationship duration 1.07*** 0.97*** 0.97*** 0.95*** 
Controls     
Mean couple age 1.03*** 0.99 1.01 1.00 
Age difference (ref. <5 years)    
  Man 5+ years older 0.73+ 1.12 0.91 1.01 
  Woman 5+ years older 0.61 0.94 1.16 1.36 
Employment status (ref. neither employed)   
  Only man employed  4.09*** 1.12 1.59** 0.77+ 
  Only woman employed  3.39*** 1.57** 1.50** 0.73* 
  Both employed 1.40 1.68+ 2.16*** 1.56* 
Education (ref. neither have degree)   
  Only man has degree 1.95*** 1.81*** 1.25 1.58** 
  Only woman has degree 1.66* 1.31 1.11 1.30 
  Both has degree 1.40+ 1.24 0.87 0.99 
Ethnicity (ref. neither born in Australia)   
  Only man born in Australia 1.69** 1.07 1.55** 1.43* 
  Only woman born in Australia 2.85*** 1.52+ 1.53* 1.44+ 
  Both born in Australia 2.36*** 1.06 1.32 1.27 
Total couple income (IHS) 1.39*** 1.19** 1.07 1.05 
N (observations) 15,449 15,449 15,449 15,449 
N (individuals) 7,046 7,046 7,046 7,046 
AIC / BIC 11,582 / 11,734 33,089 / 33,533 
Notes: HILDA Survey (2002, 2006, 2010 and 2014). Odds ratios reported. Column 1 displays the results of 
the random-effect binary logit models, and columns 2-4 display the results of the random-effect multinomial 
logit models. All models feature robust standard errors. Significance levels: + p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** 
p<0.001. 
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Table A5-4 Bank account choices among heterosexual couples in Australia, 
Hypothesis 4 (full model output) 
Hypothesis 4 
Joint account 
vs. no joint 
account 
Account choice (ref. partners have only a joint 
account) 
Only man has 
a separate 
account  
Only woman has 
a separate 
account 
Both have 
separate 
accounts 
Gender-role attitudes 1.00 1.00 0.99+ 0.99*** 
Controls     
Marital status (ref. de facto)     
  Legally married 53.84*** 0.10*** 0.13*** 0.03*** 
Mean couple age 1.05*** 0.98*** 0.99 0.97*** 
Age difference (ref. <5 years)     
  Man 5+ years older 0.44*** 1.53** 1.19 1.57*** 
  Woman 5+ years older 0.25*** 1.47 1.96* 2.78** 
Employment status (ref. neither employed)   
  Only man employed  2.36*** 1.68** 1.67** 0.97 
  Only woman employed  1.07 1.51 2.10** 1.72* 
  Both employed 3.02*** 1.26 1.66*** 0.95 
Education (ref. neither have degree)   
  Only man has degree 1.19 1.49* 1.21 1.50* 
  Only woman has degree 1.14 1.40+ 0.86 1.08 
  Both has degree 1.56* 1.90*** 1.17 1.54** 
Ethnicity (ref. neither born in Australia)    
  Only man born in Australia 1.78* 2.02** 1.93** 2.02** 
  Only woman born in Australia 1.86* 1.30 1.49+ 1.43+ 
  Both born in Australia 1.54* 1.17 1.60** 1.45* 
Total couple income (IHS) 1.27** 1.27*** 1.09 1.08 
N (observations) 14,243 14,243 14,243 14,243 
N (individuals) 6,522 6,522 6,522 6,522 
AIC / BIC 10,469 / 10,605 30,709 / 31,095 
Notes: HILDA Survey (2002, 2006, 2010 and 2014). Odds ratios reported. Column 1 displays the results of 
the random-effect binary logit models, and columns 2-4 display the results of the random-effect multinomial 
logit models. All models feature robust standard errors. Significance levels: + p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** 
p<0.001. 
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Table A5-5 Bank account choices among heterosexual couples in Australia, 
Hypothesis 5 (full model output) 
Hypothesis 5 
Joint account 
vs. no joint 
account 
Account choice (ref. partners have only a joint 
account) 
Only man has 
a separate 
account  
Only woman has 
a separate 
account 
Both have 
separate 
accounts 
Mean parental SES  1.00 1.01 1.00 1.01+ 
Family background (ref. neither from non-traditional family)   
    Only man from non-traditional 
family 
0.70 1.33 1.29 1.34 
    Only woman from non-
traditional family 
0.83 1.52+ 1.51* 1.42+ 
    Both from non-traditional family 0.57* 1.29 1.36 1.40+ 
Controls     
Marital status (ref. de facto)     
  Legally married 53.94*** 0.10*** 0.13*** 0.03*** 
Mean couple age 1.06*** 0.97*** 0.99** 0.97*** 
Age difference (ref. <5 years)     
  Man 5+ years older 0.42*** 1.55** 1.23 1.65*** 
  Woman 5+ years older 0.29*** 1.50 1.99* 2.80*** 
Employment status (ref. neither employed)    
  Only man employed  2.94*** 1.20 1.67*** 0.97 
  Only woman employed  2.33*** 1.69** 1.60** 0.95 
  Both employed 1.09 1.70* 2.20*** 1.77** 
Education (ref. neither have degree)    
  Only man has degree 1.55* 1.74** 1.25 1.56** 
  Only woman has degree 1.26 1.37+ 1.16 1.38+ 
  Both has degree 1.13 1.29 0.94 1.08 
Ethnicity (ref. neither born in Australia)    
  Only man born in Australia 1.66** 1.09 1.57** 1.42* 
  Only woman born in Australia 1.92** 1.85** 1.88** 1.99** 
  Both born in Australia 1.87** 1.16 1.47* 1.44+ 
Total couple income (IHS) 1.29*** 1.18** 1.08 1.08 
N (observations) 15,559 15,559 15,559 15,559 
N (individuals) 7,084 7,084 7,084 7,084 
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AIC / BIC 11,667 / 11,835 33,211 / 33,700 
Notes: HILDA Survey (2002, 2006, 2010 and 2014). Odds ratios reported. Column 1 displays the results of 
the random-effect binary logit models, and columns 2-4 display the results of the random-effect multinomial 
logit models. All models feature robust standard errors. The coefficient of the missing category in non-
traditional family background is omitted for readability. Significance levels: + p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** 
p<0.001. 
 
